In re City of Boston

• Decision Date: 22 June 1915
• Citation: 221 Mass. 468,109 N.E. 389
• Parties: In re CITY OF BOSTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

221 Mass. 468

109 N.E. 389

In re CITY OF BOSTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk

June 22, 1915

Case Reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Petition by the City of Boston for the appointment of commissioners to apportion the expenses incurred in the construction and maintenance of certain bridges connecting parts of Boston and Chelsea, opposed by the City of Chelsea and the Town of Revere, etc. Case reserved on motion of the City of Boston for the confirmation of an original and supplemental report. Motion granted, and report modified and confirmed.

COUNSEL

J. P Lyons, of Boston, for petitioner.

Andrew A. Casassa, City Sol., of Revere, for respondent town of Revere.

L. R Kiernan, of Chelsea, for respondent city of Chelsea.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This is a petition for the appointment of commissioners for the apportionment of the expenses incurred by the construction and maintenance of certain bridges connecting parts of Boston and Chelsea under St. 1911, c. 581, as amended by St. 1913 c. 341. Commissioners were appointed, who have filed an original and a supplemental report. The case was reserved by a single justice on motion made by the city of Boston for the confirmation of this report, except in a single particular referred to hereafter.

These statutes authorize the city of Boston to construct and repair Chelsea Bridge between Charlestown and Chelsea, Meridian Street Bridge between East Boston and Chelsea, and Chelsea Street Bridge between East Boston and Chelsea. The last-named bridge is not here involved. These statutes then authorize the appointment of a commission by the Supreme Judicial Court with power to 'apportion among the cities and towns which receive special benefits from the bridges * * * a just and equitable share of the cost of construction, reconstruction repairs and maintenance of said bridges.' The commission have reported that Chelsea Bridge consists of three parts: (1) Chelsea Bridge, south, extending from the Navy Yard to the Mystic flats or Mystic Wharf, spanning the south channel of the Mystic river; (2) the central part, which is a steel viaduct, extending over what formerly were flats partly above and partly below low-water level,

lying between the two channels of the Mystic river, which have been filled and are now used as a freight terminal; and (3) Chelsea Bridge, north, extending from the flats to Chelsea and spanning the north channel of the Mystic river. There is a draw in both the north and south parts. The commission determined that Revere, Chelsea and Boston receive special benefit from Chelsea Bridge and assessed certain percentages both of construction and maintenance on each of these municipalities. The commission determined that Boston and Chelsea alone receive special benefit from the Meridian Street Bridge and made apportionment of certain percentages of its cost and maintenance upon these two cities.

1. The constitutionality of these acts is attacked on several grounds. Certain general principles as to this branch of the law are well settled.

The cities and towns of the commonwealth are public corporations established by the Legislature for the convenient administration of government. In the furtherance of this end the extent and character of the burdens which may be imposed on them within the bounds of reason rest in the sound judgment of the General Court and are determined by its conception of the requirements of the public good. It is within the power of the Legislature to enact that a particular bridge shall be constructed or taken and established as a public highway and that its initial cost as well as the expense of its maintenance and operation shall be paid by counties, cities and towns named in the statute or selected, as being specially benefited, by commissioners appointed by the court. This is not a delegation of legislative powers to the judicial department of government and hence is not obnoxious to the provision of the Constitution which prohibits such delegation. Article 30 of Bill of Rights. The apportionment of the burden of providing for bridges over navigable waters with the necessary draws well may be thought to require a more elaborate and careful investigation than could be given by the Legislature itself or by one of its committees. The apportionment of expenses arising from public improvements like these among the several municipalities receiving special benefits therefrom in such manner as to be just and equitable to all interests involves the ascertainment of facts which according to common usage best can be reached by the hearing of evidence and of arguments. Difficult questions Turnpike & Chelsea Bridge Corp. v. County of Essex, 100 Mass. 282; Agawan v. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528, 530; Scituate v. Weymouth, 108 Mass. 128; Kingman, Pet'r, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N.E. 778, 12 L.R.A. 417.

2. It is urged that these statutes confer legislative power to the extent of leaving to the commission appointed by the court a free field in the selection of the municipalities specially benefited and not confining them to a particular county or district. This is not a decisive factor. The principle established is a just and reasonable apportionment among those specially benefited. This involves an inquiry judicial in its nature. Naturally the number receiving a peculiar advantage above the general improvement is small. The whole subject in this respect may be left to the commissioners where the basis of apportionment established by the statute is one which requires the exercise of the judicial faculty and does not involve by its conclusion alone the repeal of statutory provisions. There is nothing inconsistent with this result in Boston v. Chelsea, 212 Mass. 127, 130, 98 N.E. 620, 621. Indeed, it there was said:

'The ascertainment of the cities and towns deriving special and peculiar benefits from a designated public improvement has been left by the Legislature to the determination of commissioners appointed by this court * * * in numerous instances.'

Although the cities and towns upon which an assessment for costs and expenses closely resembling those at bar may be levied frequently have been restricted to those in certain named counties or districts, there are many statutes where no such limitation has been made whose constitutionality has not been doubted. See for example, St. 1868, c. 322, § 2; St. 1869, c. 266, §§ 1 and 2; St. 1870, c. 265, § 2; St. 1875, c. 200, § 3.

3. It is within the constitutional power of the Legislature to impose upon one town a part of the expense of erecting or maintaining a bridge within the limits of another town. Commonwealth v. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129. The same rule applies to counties. Carter v. Cambridge & Brookline Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236.

4. The circumstances that the entire management of the operation is vested in Boston and that Chelsea and Revere are required to contribute to such expense, although somewhat novel, is not unconstitutional. The practical advantages, for example, of placing unlimited responsibility for the operation of the north draw of the Chelsea Bridge in one municipality instead of dividing it between two is obvious. In its constitutional aspects it does not differ from requiring contribution from other citiel and towns toward the cost of a bridge built and maintained by a corporation or a municipality. Brayton v. Fall River, 124 Mass. 95; Northampton Bridge Case, 116 Mass. 442. See St. 1870, c. 265, § 2; St. 1869, c. 266, § 5. This does not relate to matters which are in the past, but it looks wholly to the future. In principle the proposition is no different from that of vesting in an independent board the control of a public project to the expense of which numerous cities and towns must contribute. See In re Metropolitan Park Commission, 209 Mass. 381, 385, 95 N.E. 866. The appropriate municipal officers of Boston in effect are constituted a public board to repair, maintain and operate the bridge. There is nothing in Hampshire Co. v. Franklin Co., 16 Mass. 76, and in Re Flatbush, 60 N.Y. 398, relied upon by the town of Revere, inconsistent with this conclusion. No attempt here is made to appropriate any money from one municipality for the benefit of another or to pay the debts of another as in those cases.

5. The contention that the statute makes no provision for the apportionment of the expense of operating the draws of the bridges cannot be supported. The bridges span navigable waters. Doubtless no permit could have been obtained from the United States for their construction had no adequate provision been made for the draws. The word 'maintenance' in sections 1 and 3 of St. 1911, c. 581, when applied to the subject-matter to which it relates, is of signification broad enough to include the operation of the draws.

6. It is argued that no part of the cost incident to...