In re Conservatorship of Brown, No. W2004-02825-COA-R3-CV (TN 8/5/2005)
| Decision Date | 05 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. W2004-02825-COA-R3-CV.,W2004-02825-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | IN RE: CONSERVATORSHIP OF LAJUANA YVETTE BROWN. DELISA PROVOST v. ALTON BROWN AND RON NANCE, CONSERVATORS. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Melanie E. Taylor, Memphis, TN, for Appellant
Randell K. Brooks, Memphis, TN, for Appellees
OPINION
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by the conservators requesting the imposition of a constructive trust on assets received by the appellant after the decedent's death. After issuing a temporary restraining order, testimony was taken and the trial court determined that the decedent intended for all funds received by the appellant upon decedent's death to be held in trust for decedent's daughter, the ward. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on these assets, ordered that the assets be paid over to the conservator of the ward's estate, and determined that the appellant was an unsuitable trustee for the funds. The trial court further ordered that the appellant would bear the costs of the proceedings but the conservators were responsible for their attorney's fees. This appeal followed. We affirm.
LaJuana Yvette Brown (d.o.b. 2/23/1969) ("Child") has a mental disability and primarily lived with her mother, Charlie Mae Brown ("Mother" or "Decedent") until Mother died on April 2, 1998. Alton Brown ("Father"), Child's father, and Mother divorced on May 25, 1982. After Mother died, Delisa Provost ("Provost" or "Appellant"), Mother's sister, filed a petition to appoint her the conservator for Child. Father answered and counter-petitioned arguing that he should be appointed the conservator for Child. A guardian ad litem was appointed and submitted a report to the trial court; additionally, an affidavit of Child's physician was submitted to the trial court stating that Child was unable to manage her personal and financial affairs. After a hearing on both petitions, the trial court determined that Child is disabled and appointed Father conservator of Child's person and Ron Nance ("Nance" or, collectively with Father, "Appellees"), a disinterested person, conservator of Child's estate and finances. Thereafter, on March 17, 1999, the Appellees filed a petition for the imposition of a constructive trust on funds received by Provost as a result of Mother's death. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court, in a memorandum opinion, made the following findings:
Charlie Mae Brown ("Decedent") died intestate on April 2, 1998. She had one daughter, LaJuana Yvette Brown ("LaJuana"), who is a mentally retarded child. An order was entered on September 10, 1998, appointing Alton Brown ("Brown"), natural father of LaJuana, as Conservator of the Person of LaJuana Yvette Brown, and Ron Nance ("Nance") as Conservator of the Estate of LaJuana Yvette Brown ("the Conservators").
Decedent was diagnosed with cancer in 1991 and, as a result, began to make provisions for her daughter. It is uncontested that the Decedent believed that her sister, Delisa Provost ("Provost"), would be the caretaker of LaJuana after her death. Believing that Provost would be the legal guardian of LaJuana, Decedent made the following financial provisions: (1) She named Provost as beneficiary on one life insurance policy totaling $125,000; (2) She named Provost as beneficiary in trust for LaJuana Brown on another life insurance policy amounting to $23,750; (3) She added Provost's name as a POD beneficiary to a bank account totaling $12,000; (4) She named Provost and LaJuana as co-beneficiaries of her retirement plan totaling $97,620 ($48,810 each).
On March 17, 1999, the Conservators filed a petition requesting that this Court impose a constructive trust on the monies received by Delisa Provost as a result of the death of Charlie Mae Brown. The Conservators assert that Provost was the designated beneficiary of these accounts only because Decedent believed that Provost would hold the monies in trust for LaJuana.
On that same day, the Conservators also filed a petition for this Court to order Provost to return all the Decedent's personal property to the Estate. Provost, along with Decedent's other family members, had removed the Decedent's property from her home, and had divided it up amongst themselves. The Conservator of the Person of LaJuana did receive some, but not all, of the Decedent's property to be used for the benefit of LaJuana. The Conservators assert that all property of the Decedent's Estate should be used for the benefit of LaJuana and that such property, or, in the alternative, the reasonable value of such property, should be returned to the Estate.
. . . .
In addressing the burden of proof required for the imposition of a constructive trust, Provost asserts that the Conservators have not met the necessary "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard. The proof offered by the Conservators, however, consists of admissions made by Provost indicating that she knew the monies were to be used for the benefit of LaJuana, and that she had, in fact, promised the Decedent that she would use the monies as requested.
The record in this case establishes that the Decedent and Provost enjoyed a close relationship. The Decedent even believed that Provost would be the one to care for LaJuana, her only daughter, after her death. The record further establishes that the Decedent was preparing for her death and wanted to ensure that her daughter would be cared for the remainder of her life. In making those preparations, the Decedent told Provost that she was arranging her finances so that Provost would have the necessary funds in trust to care for LaJuana. Provost herself testified to the terms of the oral trust. Thus, upon review of the record, the clear, cogent and convincing evidence reveals that the Decedent named Provost as the legal beneficiary of her life insurance policies, retirement account and bank account, but that Decedent imposed an oral trust upon the proceeds by instructing Provost to hold those funds as trustee for LaJuana Brown. The Court, however, finds that Provost is no longer considered a suitable trustee for these funds, due to the following facts:
1. The failure of Provost to properly account for the assets she has already received as a result of the death of Charlie Mae Brown;
2. The failure of Provost to turn over even the $23,750 expressly held by her in trust for LaJuana Brown;
3. The failure of Provost to cooperate with this Court in a full and open manner;
4. The fact that, to date, Provost has apparently not found any circumstance in which any of the assets of the Decedent's estate should be made available for the support, maintenance or well-being of LaJuana;
5. A disinterested person has been appointed as Conservator for the Estate of LaJuana Brown;
6. Provost has a conflict of interest due to her strong negative feelings against Brown, the father and Conservator of the Person of LaJuana, and her fear that Brown might benefit from the proceeds of the Decedent's estate. Provost has a further conflict of interest because of her strongly-held belief that the assets of the Decedent's estate should come to her, her parents and her siblings upon the death of LaJuana rather than to Brown; and
7. Provost resides in California whereas LaJuana resides with her father in Tennessee.
After issuing its memorandum opinion, the trial court ordered Provost to relinquish all assets she received as a result of Decedent's death to Nance, as conservator of Child's estate. Provost now files an appeal to this Court,1 presenting the following issues, as we perceive them, for our review:
I. The trial court erred when it determined that a constructive trust existed and that Appellant should not be the trustee of the funds left in trust for Child; or, in the alternative,
II. The trial court erred when it ordered Appellant to relinquish the funds from the life insurance policies, bank accounts, and retirement accounts because the plain language of the policies designate her the beneficiary.
For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
When a trial court sits without a jury in a civil action, we review its findings of fact de novo upon the record, affording its findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2005). However, we review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo affording the trial court's conclusions no presumption of correctness. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Estate of Adkins v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).
Further, the Appellees had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a constructive trust based on parol evidence. Browder v. Hite, 602 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); see also Story v. Lanier, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. W2003-02194-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 761, at *47-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2004). This Court has previously discussed the requirements of this standard of evidence:
The "clear and convincing evidence" standard defies precise definition. Majors v. Smith, 776 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). While it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S. Ct. at 1401; Rentenbach Eng'g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19...
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