In re D.Y.
| Decision Date | 10 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19 MO 0021,19 MO 0021 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF: D.Y., Delinquent Child. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Atty. Rhonda Santha, 6401 State Route 534, West Farmington, Ohio 44491, for Appellant.
Atty. James Peters, Prosecutor, Atty. Jamie Riley Pointer, Assistant Prosecutor, 101 North Main Street, Room 15, Woodsfield, Ohio 43793, for Appellee.
BEFORE: Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D'Apolito, Judges.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} Juvenile-Appellant D.Y. appeals from the delinquency adjudication and disposition entered in the Monroe County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division. Appellant raises two suppression issues, arguing the juvenile court should have suppressed his confession because it was coerced by a threat of incarceration and his Miranda rights were not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived. These arguments are without merit. In any event, these suppression issues were not preserved for purposes of appeal due to Appellant's entry of an admission to the burglary allegation in the complaint. An admission by a juvenile waives alleged errors in denying a motion to suppress in the same manner that a guilty plea by an adult defendant waives suppression issues. For all of the following reasons, the juvenile court's judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} In July 2019, a probation officer and a detective learned that a cabin outside of Woodsfield, Ohio had been entered without the owner's permission and items had been damaged. They spoke to two teenagers who were present and one who was in the vicinity and then made contact with Appellant for an interview. Appellant was 13.5 years old. They went to his residence, but neither he nor his father was home. The officers found Appellant walking home after swimming with friends. As they did not wish to interview him in the presence of others and he was defiant about accompanying them to be interviewed, they handcuffed him and transported him to the county sheriff's office.
{¶3} The interview was videotaped. The detective read a juvenile Miranda rights form to Appellant. The probation officer asked if he understood what was read to him, and Appellant said, "Yes, sir." The probation officer asked if there was anything he did not understand, and Appellant said, "No, sir." The probation officer also inquired whether he had any questions about what he heard, and Appellant replied, "No, sir." Appellant signed the form and then gave a statement about his involvement.
{¶4} A juvenile delinquency complaint was filed against Appellant for burglary (a third-degree felony) and criminal damaging (a misdemeanor). Appellant's counsel filed a motion to suppress his confession, stating Appellant was not fully aware of his rights or the consequences of waiving them. In orally supplementing the motion, counsel reviewed the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the detective preceded the Miranda warning by saying, "your truthfulness will determine whether you sleep at home tonight or somewhere else." (Tr. 4). Counsel concluded that the Miranda waiver was not knowing or voluntary. (Tr. 5).
{¶5} At the suppression hearing, the state presented the testimony of the detective and the probation officer. The video of the interview was admitted as an exhibit for the juvenile court's viewing. In addition to testifying about the conversations evidenced in the video, the detective testified: the drive to the police station took three to five minutes; he removed the handcuffs when they arrived; he saw the probation officer attempt to call Appellant's father multiple times; Appellant was permitted to use the restroom; Appellant had no shirt on because he had been walking back from the pool; and the interview room was approximately seventy degrees with air conditioning in July. (Tr. 13-18).
{¶6} The probation officer testified about his frequent contact with Appellant as Appellant was on probation at the time (through this juvenile court). (Tr. 33-34). He disclosed that Appellant had four prior local cases with charges initiated upon police reports, and he had previous charges in Indiana, including possession of marijuana. (Tr. 35, 45). The probation officer said the child's father is a single parent and noted it was often difficult to contact the father at work; he tried to call him three of four times that afternoon. (Tr. 37-38, 42). The probation officer said Appellant had strong verbal skills and a better understanding than other children that he supervises. (Tr. 54). Appellant had been in this situation before, and the probation officer said he had similar conversations with Appellant in the past, which contributed to his belief that Appellant understood his Miranda rights. (Tr. 45-46, 51). He opined Appellant was more intelligent than some others realized. (Tr. 46).
{¶7} Appellant presented testimony from the assistant school psychologist at his school. She acknowledged he had strong verbal skills and would be considered average with regards to academic abilities, IQ composite score, and most testing categories. (Tr. 72, 77). He tested weak in processing speed and fluid reasoning (responding to novel situations). (Tr. 65-70). She mentioned an attention deficit and was concerned as to whether Appellant could process the significance of the information provided to him about the rights he was waiving. (Tr. 70-71, 73).
{¶8} On August 20, 2019, the juvenile court overruled the suppression motion. The court reviewed the totality of the circumstances, including Appellant's age, the lack of a parent during the interview, his strong verbal skills, his frequent contact with the probation officer, his repeated encounters with law enforcement in the past year, the probation officer's three questions about his understanding of the waiver of rights, the lack of physical deprivation or inducement, and the low intensity of the interview. Upon viewing the video, the juvenile court observed that the total interview lasted only fourteen minutes with less than ten minutes of questioning (and additional time spent writing).
{¶9} On August 30, 2019, Appellant entered an admission to the burglary charge. The state dismissed the criminal damaging charge and withdrew its probation revocation requests in two other cases. In a September 3, 2019 order, the court imposed a suspended sentence of incarceration with an order to complete a program at a residential facility and to comply with probation and counseling. The within appeal followed.
{¶10} Appellant raises only suppressions issues on appeal, setting forth arguments as to why the court should have suppressed his confession. However, Appellant entered an admission, thereby admitting the allegations in the complaint instead of taking the case to trial. See Juv.R. 29(C)-(D). Before considering Appellant's suppression arguments, we must discuss the effect of the admission on the ability to appeal suppression issues. In doing so, we first review how a guilty plea by an adult defendant waives the right to appeal the court's denial of a suppression motion.
{¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court has often stated that when a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel, the defendant "may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." State v. Obermiller , 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 93, ¶ 55 (a capital case), quoting State v. Fitzpatrick , 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 78, quoting Tollett v. Henderson , 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). The Obermiller Court found that by pleading guilty, the defendant waived the right to raise any alleged constitutional suppression issues and was thus prohibited from raising arguments on appeal pertaining to the denial of his motion to suppress. Obermiller , 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 63 N.E.3d 93 at ¶ 56 ().
{¶12} A guilty plea is a "break in the chain of events" that previously occurred in the case. State v. Spates , 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272, 595 N.E.2d 351 (1992). "When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Id. Therefore, where an appellant claimed the trial court erred by denying a motion to suppress involuntary and coerced statements to the police, the Supreme Court concluded his guilty plea waived the right to contest these issues on appeal. State v. Ketterer , 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 116-117.
{¶13} This is distinct from the effect of a no contest plea, which "does not preclude a defendant from asserting upon appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in ruling on a pretrial motion, including a pretrial motion to suppress evidence." Crim.R. 12(I). "A valid guilty plea by a counseled defendant, however, generally waives the right to appeal all prior nonjurisdictional defects, including the denial of a motion to suppress." State v. Beasley , 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 15. This is a well-established principle.
{¶14} In a juvenile delinquency case, the court shall request the "party against whom allegations are being made in the complaint to admit or deny the allegations." Juv.R. 29 (C). "A failure or refusal to admit the allegations shall be deemed a denial, except in cases where the court consents to entry of a plea of no contest. " (Emphasis added). Juv.R. 29(C). This was added to the rule in 2001 after the General Assembly encouraged the Supreme Court to amend Rule 29(C) to permit no contest pleas with the consent of the court...
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