In re Danforth
| Decision Date | 08 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | A14-0951 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Stephen Danforth, a/k/a Stephen Rabideau |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Roderick N. Hale, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Theresa Couri, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this appeal from an order of civil commitment, appellant argues that the commitment statute constitutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder and is unconstitutional on other grounds under the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. He further contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the results of his risk assessment testing, a prior conviction, and his correspondence andpossession of certain print materials while in prison. Because we conclude that appellant's arguments lack merit under federal and Minnesota precedent, we affirm.
In October 2013, a petition was filed to commit appellant Stephen Danforth as a person with a sexual psychopathic personality and a sexually dangerous person, as defined in Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subds. 15, 16 (Supp. 2013). At the time, Danforth was serving a prison sentence stemming from a 1996 conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and was due for supervised release in April 2014.
Before the commitment hearing, Danforth moved for the exclusion of evidence regarding his clinical and actuarial risk assessment, his 1996 conviction, and his correspondence and possession of certain print materials while he was in prison. Danforth also moved to dismiss the petition on various constitutional grounds, alleging, inter alia, that the commitment statute violated his substantive and procedural due process rights and constituted an illegal bill of attainder. Prior to the commitment hearing, the district court denied Danforth's motion to exclude evidence, but deferred ruling on his motion for dismissal of the petition on constitutional grounds.
The commitment hearing was held on February 24-25, 2014, with court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Paul Reitman, as the sole witness. Dr. Reitman testified that Danforth has numerous convictions for the sexual abuse of young children stretching back to the 1970s and was currently serving a prison sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a six-year-old victim. He further testified that, while in prison, Danforth had made attempts to procure books with nudity, had been in contact with amedia company that condoned pedophilia, and was found to be in possession of photographs of young boys. Based upon his psychological testing of Danforth, he concluded that Danforth has a high risk of recidivism, especially in light of his repeated refusals to participate in sex offender treatment during his incarceration. On cross-examination, Danforth's counsel challenged Dr. Reitman's opinions regarding Danforth's risk of recidivism as determined by his risk assessment testing, asserting that Danforth's advanced age of 59 years and stale conviction history from more than a decade earlier did not support Dr. Reitman's assessment. Dr. Reitman countered that Danforth's continued preoccupation with the nudity of young boys, as demonstrated by his correspondence seeking books and periodicals with nude boys while in prison, indicated that he was still at a high risk of recidivism, notwithstanding his age and the fact that his convictions were committed more than a decade earlier.
After the commitment hearing, the district court denied Danforth's motion to dismiss the commitment petition on constitutional grounds. Based on Dr. Reitman's testimony and the exhibits in evidence, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Danforth satisfied the requirements for commitment as a person with a sexual psychopathic personality under Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 15, and as a sexually dangerous person under Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16. Danforth appeals from the commitment order.
To commit someone as a person with a sexual psychopathic personality, the district court must find: (1) a habitual course of misconduct involving sexual matters; (2)an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses; and (3) dangerousness to others. Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 15; In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn. 1994). An individual may be committed as a sexually dangerous person if the person: (1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct; (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16. After a petition for commitment is filed, the district court holds a hearing at which a court-appointed examiner testifies, other witnesses can be called and cross-examined, and the district court receives any relevant documentary evidence. Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.07, subd. 2 (Supp. 2013), 253B.08 (2012 & Supp. 2013). The district court will commit a person to the secure confinement of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) if it finds clear and convincing evidence that the person has a sexual psychopathic personality or is a sexually dangerous person, unless that person establishes his or her suitability for a less-restrictive treatment program. Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3 (Supp. 2013); see also In re Civil Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 25-26 (Minn. 2014).
Danforth brings a number of constitutional challenges to the commitment statute. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Minn. 2014). "Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional and . . . our power to declare a statute unconstitutional must be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." Hamilton v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn. 1999). We will uphold a statute unless the challenger can demonstrate beyond areasonable doubt that the statue is unconstitutional. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2007).
Danforth claims that the commitment statute is a bill of attainder in violation of state and federal constitutional law because it inflicts punishment upon a group of individuals identified by virtue of their past conduct.
A bill of attainder is "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs. of Am. v. State, 685 N.W.2d 467, 474 (Minn. App. 2004), aff'd, 713 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 2006). Bills of attainder are unconstitutional under the United States and Minnesota constitutions. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Minn. Const. art. I, § 11. Before a statute may be declared unconstitutional as a bill of attainder, it must be shown that (1) the statute singles out or specifies an identifiable individual or group; (2) the purpose of the statute is punishment; and (3) there is no judicial trial necessary for the application of the statute. Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs., 685 N.W.2d at 474 ).
First, Danforth has failed to show that the civil commitment statute singles out or specifies an identifiable individual or group of people. In order to constitute a bill of attainder, the law must designate individuals "by name or described in terms of conduct which, because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons." Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 847, 104 S. Ct. at 3352 (quotation omitted). In otherwords, "[a] legislative prohibition is not a bill of attainder if it can be avoided by simply not engaging in the affected conduct." Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs., 685 N.W.2d at 475.
Danforth argues that the commitment statute improperly designates him for commitment based upon his past convictions of criminal sexual conduct and that he is therefore unable to avoid application of the statute. But while the definitions of "sexual psychopathic personality" and "sexually dangerous person" in the statute are based in part upon a person's past misconduct, more than just past conduct is required before a person can be found to satisfy these definitions. The statute also requires the commitment court to find future dangerousness, coupled with additional factors, and is intended to "'limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.'" Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 23 (quoting In re Linehan (Linehan IV), 594 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 1999)). A district court is required to evaluate an offender's present circumstances and condition in assessing future dangerousness. See Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 876 n.4 (). Because the statute requires proof of a current condition and an assessment of future dangerousness, not all sexual offenders or persons with a history of sexual misconduct may be civilly committed under the statute.
Second, Danforth has failed to show that civil commitment as a person with a sexual psychopathic personality or as a sexually dangerous person constitutes "punishment." The Supreme Court has defined "forbidden punishment" in terms of threequestions: "(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes; and (3) whether the...
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