Linehan, In re

• Decision Date: 27 May 1999
• Docket Number: Nos. C1-95-2022,C3-96-511,s. C1-95-2022
• Citation: 594 N.W.2d 867
• Parties: In re Dennis Darol LINEHAN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 867

594 N.W.2d 867

In re Dennis Darol LINEHAN.

Nos. C1-95-2022, C3-96-511.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 27, 1999.

Syllabus by the Court

As the Sexually Dangerous Person Act, Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998), requires a finding that a person lacks some control over his or her sexually dangerous actions, civil commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Person Act does not violate substantive due process under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Appellant's commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Person Act is affirmed.

Eric S. Janus, St. Paul, Lisbeth J. Nudell, Minneapolis, Michael F. Cromett, Roseville, for appellant.

Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Michael A. Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, John L. Kirwin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for respondent.

Daniel W. Homstad, amicus curiae for Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, Minneapolis, MN.

Amicus curiae Thersa Nelson, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union Counsel, Minneapolis, MN.

Considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

BLATZ, C.J.

In this remand from the United States Supreme Court, appellant Dennis Darol Linehan contends that the Minnesota Sexually Dangerous Person Act (SDP Act), Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998), is unconstitutional on substantive and procedural due process grounds. He also argues that the SDP Act violates the ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. We again address appellant's constitutional challenges to the SDP Act.

In order to adequately address appellant's contentions, we must first detail his extensive history of harmful sexual conduct. Appellant was sexually and physically abused as a child, and started his long course of harmful sexual conduct in his teens. In 1956, at age 15, appellant pulled down the shorts of a 4-year-old girl and was sent to reform school. In 1960, at age 19, he had intercourse with a 13-year-old girl. In 1963, appellant engaged in windowpeeping. Later that year, he and a friend beat and repeatedly raped L.H.

On June 10, 1965, after windowpeeping, the 23-year-old appellant killed 14-year-old B.I. while attempting to sexually assault her. In a one month window before his arrest, appellant committed two additional sexual assaults, including one rape. He pleaded guilty to kidnapping B.I. and was sentenced to a maximum prison term of 40 years. While serving his sentence, on June 20, 1975, appellant escaped from Stillwater Correctional Facility's minimum security unit and assaulted 12-year-old T.L. in a ditch off the side of a Michigan road. He was convicted of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual misconduct and was imprisoned in Michigan. He was returned to Stillwater prison five years later.

Shortly before the end of appellant's Minnesota prison term in 1992, the state moved to civilly commit appellant under the Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act (PP Act). Minn.Stat. §§ 526.09-.10 (1992). In order to be committed under the PP Act, as that act was interpreted by this court, a person must evidence an "utter lack of power to control [his or her] sexual impulses." State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940). This standard will be referred to as the "utter inability test."

In appellant's initial commitment and 60-day review hearings, the district court heard extensive testimony about appellant's mental state from a number of psychologists and psychiatrists. While the experts offered conflicting testimony as to appellant's sexual impulsivity, none were asked whether appellant met the Pearson utter inability test and none testified that appellant evidenced an utter lack of control over his sexual impulses. Nonetheless, the district court found that appellant met the Pearson criteria and ordered him civilly committed under the PP Act for an indefinite period of time.

The court of appeals upheld the district court's determination, In re Linehan, 503 N.W.2d 142 (Minn.App.1993), but we reversed, holding that appellant could not be committed under the PP Act because the state failed to present "clear and convincing evidence that appellant has an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses." In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn.1994) (hereinafter Linehan I ). Upon his release, appellant was paroled to a special residence on the grounds of Stillwater Correctional Facility. At Stillwater, he remained under "intensive supervised release" at a residence with substantial security precautions. Appellant participated in an out-patient sex offender program and was subject to drug testing.

In the wake of appellant's release, the legislature passed the SDP Act. Act of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 7-8 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998)). The SDP Act establishes a new procedure for civil commitment of persons who suffer from certain disorders and dysfunctions and are dangerous to the public. It states:

(a) A "sexually dangerous person" means a person who:

(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a; [ ¹

(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and

(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a.

(b) For the purposes of this provision, it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person's sexual impulses.

Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c.

Upon enactment of the SDP Act, the state once again moved to have appellant civilly committed, this time as a sexually dangerous person. After hearing and rejecting constitutional challenges to the SDP Act, the district court held extensive initial commitment and 60-day review hearings. It found the requisite past course of harmful sexual conduct based on appellant's eight prior convictions. In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, slip op. at 5-9 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct., July 27, 1995) (hereinafter Initial Commitment Hearing). The district court also found that appellant suffered from an Axis II antisocial personality disorder, based in part on the appellant's own expert's testimony. Id. at 9-13. Finally, the court considered appellant's current aggressive behavior and his "lack of control in connection with sexual impulses" to be highly persuasive predictors of his future behavior. Id. at 23-24, 26. The court therefore found it highly probable that appellant would engage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct and ordered appellant civilly committed under the SDP Act. Id. at 26. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's rulings. In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.App.1996).

On appeal, we upheld the district court's findings following appellant's 60-day review hearing and ordered appellant indeterminately committed as a sexually dangerous person. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.1996) (hereinafter Linehan II ). In a separate opinion, we upheld appellant's initial civil commitment pursuant to the SDP Act against substantive due process, equal protection, ex post facto, and double jeopardy challenges under the federal and state constitutions. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn.1996) (hereinafter Linehan III ). We concluded that an utter inability to control one's sexual impulses was not integral to narrowly tailoring the SDP Act to meet substantive due process requirements, and that distinguishing between sexually dangerous persons with and without mental disorders did not offend equal protection. Id. at 182-87. Further, the SDP Act was adjudged a civil and not a criminal law, and therefore held not to implicate the double jeopardy or ex post facto doctrines. Id. at 187-89. Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari for both cases from the United States Supreme Court.

Shortly before granting appellant's writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), a challenge to a Kansas statute providing for civil commitment of sexually violent predators. Hendricks challenged his civil commitment under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kansas Act) on substantive due process grounds, and claimed that the Act established criminal proceedings in violation of the ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.

The language of the Kansas Act is very similar to the language of the Minnesota SDP Act. The Kansas Act defines a sexually violent predator as one:

who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp.1998).

In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas Act was constitutional and did not violate substantive due process or the ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. In reviewing the substantive due process claim, the Supreme Court noted that states have civilly confined certain persons since the late 18th century. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072. However, the Court clarified that it had sustained civil commitment statutes when the statutes "have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.' These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." Id. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (citations omitted). Under this scheme, the Supreme Court upheld the Kansas statute against Hendricks' substantive due process challenge. Id. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072.

The Supreme Court also determined that Kansas' commitment proceeding was civil in nature, focusing on both the legislature's stated intent and the purposes of the...