In re Doe
| Decision Date | 17 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D20-2368 |
| Citation | 310 So.3d 1033 |
| Parties | IN RE Petition of Jane DOE for a Judicial Waiver of Parental Notice of Termination of Pregnancy. Jane Doe, Appellant. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jonathan E. Hackworth of Hackworth Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Jane Doe, a minor, challenges the trial court's final order dismissing her petition for judicial waiver of the notice and consent requirements of section 390.01114, Florida Statutes (2020). We affirm the trial court's order.
Section 390.01114, the Parental Notice of and Consent for Abortion Act, requires a physician to provide actual notice to a minor's parent or legal guardian before terminating the pregnancy of the minor. § 390.01114(4)(a). Furthermore, section 390.01114(5)(a) requires that "[a] physician must obtain written consent from a parent or legal guardian before performing or inducing the termination of a pregnancy of a minor."1 However, "[a] minor may petition any circuit court in which the minor resides for a waiver of the requirements of this section." § 390.01114(6)(a). And "the court shall issue an order authorizing the minor to consent to the performance or inducement of a termination of the pregnancy" if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor is the victim of child abuse or sexual abuse at the hands of her parent or legal guardian or it "finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy" or "that the requirements of this section are not in the best interest of the petitioner."
§ 390.01114(6)(c)-(d). Only the latter two considerations are at issue in the instant appeal.
In her petition, the only basis for judicial waiver that Doe alleged was that notification of a parent was not in her best interest due to her "fear of mother kicking me out of the house." However, at the hearing on the motion, Doe testified that she did not live with her mother and that, in fact, her mother lived in Guatemala. Doe stated that she came to this country with her father and that he would get angry and punish her if he knew she was pregnant. But she also testified that she did not live with her father, that he "lives in another state and [she doesn't] really know where he went," and that she no longer speaks with him because since he moved, both she and he had changed their phone numbers. As to her current living situation, Doe testified that she lives with her seventeen-year-old boyfriend, who is the man who impregnated her. She testified: As to the "lady" and "gentleman," Doe stated, Neither the court nor Doe's counsel sought clarification of whether the "it" that the lady and gentleman did not want Doe to do referred to her terminating her pregnancy or to her having the child.
Doe's counsel and the trial court questioned Doe regarding her maturity level. She testified that at the time of the hearing, she was twelve days shy of fifteen years old, that she was in school, and that her grades were "[s]ometimes A's, C's, and B['s]." When her counsel asked her if she was aware of the possible health consequences of the procedure, she responded, When asked specifically about the long-term effects of the procedure, she stated:
She testified that she did not work but that her boyfriend did and that he "support[s] me and giv[es] me everything." She also stated that no one influenced her decision and that she made the decision "because I don't have any other choice." In its order dismissing the petition, the trial court found as follows:
[Doe] presented as a very young, immature woman who was unable to articulate any potential effects of the procedure other than pain. She did not know any long-term effects. While she indicated her Mother lived in Guatemala and she did not know the location of her Father, the Court does not find credible that she is unable to contact either parent. She also did not provide clear and convincing evidence that it would not be in the minor child's best interest to notify her parents. Her testimony only indicated that they would be upset and her Father would punish her. In her petition, she indicates her reason was a "fear of her mother kicking her out of the house," but in her testimony she says that her Mother allegedly lives in Guatemala, so those reasons do not meet her burden to prove it would not be in her best interest.
On appeal, Doe first argues that the trial court erred in making this ruling because her testimony below established that she was sufficiently mature to make the decision to terminate her pregnancy. We review the trial court's findings for an abuse of discretion. See In re Doe, 139 So. 3d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ; In re Doe, 113 So. 3d 882, 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). "The minor has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is sufficiently mature." In re Doe, 67 So. 3d 268, 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the evidence presented by Doe did not establish sufficient maturity in this case. In determining whether the minor is sufficiently mature to make this decision without parental consent,
[f]actors the trial court shall consider include:
In the instant case, Doe was not yet even fifteen years old at the time of the hearing. Although she made decent grades in school, her answers to the questioning of counsel and the trial court were vague, and our review of her testimony supports the trial court's finding that she was unable to articulate her understanding of the procedure, the medical risks involved, and the long- and short-term consequences of her decision. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to refute the trial court's assessment of her demeanor as "present[ing] as a very young, immature woman," and we must take that assessment into...
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