In re Doe
| Decision Date | 27 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 31563.,31563. |
| Citation | 142 Idaho 594,130 P.3d 1132 |
| Parties | In the Interest of Jane DOE, a Child Under Eighteen Years of Age. State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, Human Services Division, Petitioner-Respondent-Respondent on Appeal, v. Jane Roe, Respondent-Appellant-Respondent on Appeal, and Jane Doe, a child under eighteen years of age, Party in Interest-Appellant on Appeal. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Dial, May & Rammell, Chtd., Pocatello, for appellant. Aaron N. Thompson argued.
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent State of Idaho. James P. Price argued.
John C. Souza, Pocatello, for respondent Roe. John C. Souza argued.
The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the Department) filed a petition to terminate Jane Roe's parental rights. The Department's only witness, a licensed social worker and Department employee, testified that it was not in the best interests of Roe or of the child, Jane Doe, to terminate the relationship. However, the magistrate judge granted the petition, finding that termination was in the best interests of both Doe and Roe. Roe appealed to the district court. The district court reversed because it found that the magistrate court's order was clearly erroneous. We agree with the district court and reverse the order of the magistrate court.
Doe was born prematurely on May 31, 2001 in Preston, Idaho. Due to complications from her premature birth Doe and her mother, Roe, were transported to McKay-Dee Hospital in Ogden, Utah. Doe was subsequently diagnosed with spina bifada. While Doe was treated at McKay-Dee Hospital, Roe resided in the hospital's guest house. Roe was asked to leave the guest house because of several complaints that she was having parties in her room. McKay-Dee Hospital staff then contacted the Department because of concerns that Roe was not providing adequate care to Doe. Shortly thereafter, the Department intervened and placed Doe in shelter care. Dee Kiggins, a licensed social worker and Department employee, was assigned to the case and began the process of reuniting Doe with Roe.
At the time of Doe's birth, Roe was on juvenile probation. In August 2001, Roe received juvenile detention for violating her probation because of her behavior while at McKay-Dee Hospital. Thereafter, Roe lived in a group home. According to Kiggins, Roe called weekly to inquire as to Doe's well-being and would request more time with Doe than she was receiving. In December 2001, there was a six-month review hearing to determine the progress being made toward reunification. At this time, the magistrate court determined that Doe would remain in foster care while Roe was on juvenile probation. The judge also ordered a case plan for reunification, with a concurrent assessment of the foster parents as a permanent placement if reunification did not occur.
In February 2002, Roe began visits with Doe. These visits progressed from supervised visits, to unsupervised visits, then to overnight and extended ten-day and thirty-day visits. According to Kiggins, the visits went well. A twelve-month permanency hearing was held in August 2002. At that time the magistrate judge found that Roe had completed her case plan and Roe was released from juvenile probation. Additionally, Doe was placed with Roe under protective supervision. During this time, the Coles, Doe's foster parents, helped Roe by baby-sitting Doe while Roe worked and while Roe completed community service, by occasionally taking Doe to medical appointments, and by occasionally providing diapers for Doe.
In February 2003, Roe was arrested for selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant. After this incident Roe admitted that she had sold methamphetamine in the presence of Doe on one occasion and that she had used alcohol (Roe was not yet 21), marijuana, and methamphetamine while she had protective custody of Doe. Roe testified that her use of these substances occurred when Doe was not present. Roe later plead guilty to possession with the intent to deliver and was sentenced to three years fixed and four years indeterminate. This sentence was suspended and Roe was placed on six years' felony probation. Upon Roe's arrest, Doe was placed in foster care with Roe's sister and then with the Coles.
After Roe's arrest, she got married. She also began a new reunification plan under Kiggins' supervision. As part of this new plan, Roe, along with her husband, submitted to drug assessment and drug testing ordered by Kiggins and their probation officer. Both Roe and her husband thereafter took approximately three or four drug tests and they all came back negative. Additionally, the new reunification plan required that Roe receive only supervised visitation. Such visitation continued for a few months before Roe received unsupervised visitation and then overnight and extended visits. Kiggins testified that the next step in visitation would be a thirty day visit and then protective supervision for six months to a year.
A hearing was held in August 2003 to determine a permanent plan for Doe. In its subsequent order, the court found that Doe was out of the care and custody of Roe for eighteen of the last twenty-two months; however, there were compelling reasons not to pursue termination of parental rights.1 Further, the magistrate judge ruled that it was not in the best interest of Doe or Roe to approve a permanent plan for termination and adoption. The court also found that, despite Roe's criminal activities, she had a strong emotional bond with Doe and she continued to do her best to provide appropriate parenting. The court then explained it would wait until Roe was sentenced before it decided on an appropriate permanent plan.
Roe was sentenced in September. The magistrate judge then held a review hearing in October 2003. At the review hearing, the court approved the permanent plan recommending termination of parental rights. However, the court also ordered the Department to continue efforts to reunify Roe and Doe. In November 2003 the Department filed its petition to terminate Roe's parental rights. At that time, the Department also petitioned to terminate the rights of Doe's father because he had previously appeared before the magistrate judge and consented to the termination of his parental rights.
In its petition, the Department argued that Roe neglected Doe and that termination was in the best interests of both Roe and Doe. However, at the termination hearing, the Department's only witness, Kiggins, testified that termination was not in the best interests of Roe or Doe. In opposition, the CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocates) advocate testified that it was in the best interests of Doe to remain with the foster parents and for Roe's parental rights to be terminated. The magistrate court ordered parental termination under I.C. § 16-2005(e) because it found that termination was in the best interests of both Roe and Doe. In doing so the judge dismissed Kiggins' testimony, observing that her testimony was based on emotion and that, out of over 100 child protection cases, Kiggins had never recommended termination. The judge also terminated the parental rights of Doe's father.
Roe appealed. The district court reversed the magistrate court's order. It found that there was insufficient evidence to uphold the magistrate court's findings and, consequently, that the court's order was clearly erroneous. Through her Guardian ad Litem, Doe appeals the district court's order. On appeal, the Department is advocating for Roe.
A trial court may terminate a parent-child relationship when it determines there is clear and convincing evidence supporting the grounds for termination. Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 807, 992 P.2d 1205, 1207 (1999) (citations omitted). On appeal, such a decision will be upheld unless the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. Id. Therefore, an appellate court will uphold a trial court's findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, even if such evidence is conflicting. Id. On review, all reasonable inferences are viewed in support of the trial court's decision. Id.
When the issues before this Court are the same as those previously considered by the district court sitting in an appellate capacity, we "will review the trial record with due regard for, but independently from, the district court's decision." Id. at 807-808, 992 P.2d at 1207-8 (citations omitted).
Idaho Code Section 16-2005(e) allows a court to grant an order terminating a parent-child relationship when the court finds "termination is ... in the best interest of the parent and child, where the petition has been filed by a parent or through an authorized agency, or interested party." In the current case, we are dealing with a unique set of circumstances. The Department, which is an authorized agency, petitioned to terminate Roe's parental rights to Doe. However, as it explained on appeal, the Department filed its petition under pressure from the magistrate judge and federal and state law. Both federal and state law require the Department to petition for parental termination when the child is in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months unless a court finds compelling reasons not to file the petition. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E); I.C. § 16-1623(i) (redesignated in 2005 as I.C. § 16-1629(9)). In the current case, Doe was out of Roe's care for eighteen of the last twenty-two months and the magistrate judge found that compelling reasons did not exist.2 Therefore, despite its reluctance, the Department was obligated under the law to file its petition.
At trial, the Department's only witness, Kiggins, testified that termination was not in the child's best interest. Kiggins is a trained and licensed social worker, has intimate knowledge of the case, and was the only witness with knowledge of the family situation. Therefore, her...
To continue reading
Request your trial