In re Edelman

• Decision Date: 21 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2–14–0847.,2–14–0847.
• Citation: 38 N.E.3d 50
• Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Melissa EDELMAN, Petitioner–Appellant, and John F. PRESTON, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

38 N.E.3d 50

In re MARRIAGE OF Melissa EDELMAN, Petitioner–Appellant

and

John F. PRESTON, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 2–14–0847.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

May 21, 2015.

Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing Aug. 14, 2015.

Denis J. McKeown and Joseph C. McKeown, both of Denis J. McKeown & Associates, of Waukegan, for appellant.

C. Jeffrey Thut, of Roach, Johnston & Thut, of Libertyville, for appellee.

OPINION

Presiding Justice SCHOSTOK

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In 2010, the circuit court of Lake County entered an agreed order enrolling a foreign judgment—the Connecticut judgment for dissolution of marriage between the petitioner, Melissa Edelman, and the respondent, John Preston—in Lake County. In 2013, Melissa filed petitions under Illinois law for contribution to college expenses, to increase child support, and to establish adult child support. The trial court dismissed the petitions on the basis that, under the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (Full Faith and Credit Act) (28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2006)

), Connecticut law governed any proceedings related to the judgment, and the petitions sought relief that was not available under Connecticut law. Melissa appealed, arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Act did not bar her from seeking relief under Illinois law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties married in 1990 and were divorced in 2002. At the time of the divorce, the parties and their two minor children lived in Connecticut. A judgment of dissolution that incorporated a marital settlement agreement was entered by a Connecticut court on May 16, 2002. Pursuant to the marital settlement agreement, the parties shared joint legal custody of the children and Melissa had primary residential custody of the children. The agreement provided that each party would pay the other $1 per year in child support and $1 per year in alimony.

¶ 4 In 2003, Melissa (who remarried) and the children moved to Illinois. In August 2004, a Connecticut court entered an order modifying the judgment of dissolution. The order required John to pay child support of $188 per week to Melissa, and to pay 25% of the children's medical expenses that were not covered by insurance. (Henceforth, we will refer to the judgment of dissolution, as modified in 2004, as the “Connecticut judgment.”)

¶ 5 In 2008, John also moved to Illinois. In July 2010, Melissa filed a petition in the Lake County circuit court to enroll the Connecticut judgment “in order to modify and/or enforce” that judgment in Illinois. At the same time, she filed a petition for a rule to show cause why John should not be held in contempt for failure to pay child support and over $18,000 of medical expenses not covered by insurance. John was served with the petition and filed an appearance.

¶ 6 On August 31, 2010, John filed a motion seeking to compel Melissa to cooperate in having the children participate in John's remarriage ceremony. That same date, the trial court entered an agreed order. The agreed order granted Melissa's petition to enroll the Connecticut judgment in Lake County; provided that the children would attend John's wedding; and set a briefing schedule and hearing date on Melissa's petition for a rule to show cause. In December 2010, the trial court found John in indirect civil contempt for failing to pay child support and uncovered medical expenses, and issued a rule to show cause. John filed a response. At some point in late 2010 or 2011, John moved to Florida. After delays caused by the withdrawal of various attorneys, in October 2011 the trial court entered an order finding that John had purged himself of contempt by paying Melissa over $21,000 in open court.

¶ 7 On May 22, 2013, Melissa filed another petition for a rule to show cause for failure to pay child support and uncovered medical expenses. That same day, she also filed a petition seeking John's contribution to college expenses pursuant to section 513(a)(2) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2)

(West 2012)). On June 11, 2013, John filed responses to these petitions. He also filed a motion to dismiss the latter petition pursuant to Illinois's version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Family Support Act) (750 ILCS 22/101 et seq . (West 2012)), arguing that Melissa could not seek college expenses, because Connecticut law applied to matters arising from the Connecticut judgment and Connecticut did not have a college contribution statute that would apply to him. Finally, John filed a petition to decrease his child support pursuant to sections 505 and 510 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/505, 510 (West 2012)).

¶ 8 On July 24, 2013, Melissa filed another petition, seeking to increase child support under sections 505 and 510 of the Marriage Act, and to establish adult child support under section 513(a)(1)

, on the basis that the older child was disabled.

¶ 9 On July 26, 2013, the trial court granted John's motion to dismiss Melissa's petition for contribution to college expenses. The trial court began by finding that the Connecticut judgment had been properly enrolled by the parties and that the court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction. It further found that, through the parties' prior agreement, Illinois had authority to modify the Connecticut judgment as to child support. Accordingly, the key issue was whether Illinois or Connecticut law should be applied to Melissa's petition for contribution toward college expenses. The trial court found that subsection (h)(2) of the Full Faith and Credit Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h)(2) (2006)

) required it to apply the law of Connecticut in any proceeding seeking the modification of the Connecticut judgment. It further found that Connecticut first enacted a statute permitting parents to seek contribution to college expenses in 2002, and that statute (Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–56c (2011)) by its terms applied only to marital settlement agreements entered after October 1, 2002. The judgment in the parties' divorce had been issued before that, in May 2002. Thus, the trial court reasoned, Melissa could not seek educational expenses under Connecticut law, and it could not order such relief.

¶ 10 Melissa moved for reconsideration, raising a host of arguments. On January 29, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying her motion. The trial court's ruling essentially reiterated its previous reasoning.

¶ 11 Melissa filed a notice of appeal, but we dismissed that appeal, finding that we lacked jurisdiction because her July 24, 2013, petition was still pending and the trial court had not made a finding permitting an immediate appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a)

(eff. Feb. 26, 2010). On July 30, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying Melissa's July 24, 2013, petition to increase child support and for adult child support, “for the reasons stated in the orders dated July 26, 2013, and January 29, 2014.” It also found that there was no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of its rulings. Melissa then filed the present appeal, challenging the trial court's orders of July 26, 2013, January 29, 2014, and July 30, 2014.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 The sole issues presented in this appeal concern the proper interpretation of various statutes relating to the modification of child support orders. We review such issues de novo. Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co., 208 Ill.2d 38, 43, 280 Ill.Dec. 523, 802 N.E.2d 774 (2003)

. To determine the intent of a statute, we begin by examining its language, which is the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting a particular law. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill.2d 96, 103, 253 Ill.Dec. 418, 745 N.E.2d 541 (2001). The statutory language must be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the language is clear and unambiguous we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill.2d 546, 556, 243 Ill.Dec. 224, 723 N.E.2d 256 (1999). We will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill.2d 439, 446, 261 Ill.Dec. 728, 764 N.E.2d 19 (2002). “One of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all provisions of an enactment as a whole,” and thus “words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.” J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill.2d 182, 197, 309 Ill.Dec. 6, 863 N.E.2d 236 (2007).

¶ 14 A. Family Support Act

¶ 15 We begin with the Family Support Act, which was designed to facilitate the reciprocal enforcement of child support orders between states. Collins v. Department of Health & Family Services ex rel. Paczek, 2014 IL App (2d) 130536, ¶ 17, 394 Ill.Dec. 522, 36 N.E.3d 813

. The Family Support Act is based upon the model Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Model Act), which has now been adopted by all 50 states. Id. Given the statutory goal of creating a unified approach in every state for the modification and enforcement of interstate child support orders, we must construe the Family Support Act in harmony with existing interpretations of the Model Act, including the case law of other states. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Gulla, 234 Ill.2d 414, 426, 334 Ill.Dec. 566, 917 N.E.2d 392 (2009) ).

¶ 16 1. Jurisdiction and Authority to Modify Interstate Child Support Order

¶ 17 The Family Support Act sets out various requirements that must be met before an Illinois court may modify a child support order that was initially entered in another state (the “issuing state”). See, e.g., 750 ILCS 22/611 (West 2012)

(governing modification where all parties and the child(ren) have left the issuing state and the parties reside in different states); 750 ILCS 22/613 (West 2012) (where...