In re Eight-Hour Law

• Citation: 21 Colo. 29,39 P. 328
• Parties: In re EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
• Decision Date: 21 February 1895
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

39 P. 328

21 Colo. 29

In re EIGHT-HOUR LAW.

Supreme Court of Colorado

February 21, 1895

QUESTION SUBMITTED by the house of representatives to this court, as to the legality of a law providing that eight hours shall constitute a day's labor.

PER CURIAM.

The question in this instance is accompanied by a copy of house bill No. 191. It will therefore be assumed that the house desires advice with reference to this bill. It does not appear, however, either by the question itself, or the preamble, that the inquiry relates in any way to the constitutionality of the bill, as now pending before the house, the first section of which provides: 'Section 1. Eight hours shall constitute a legal day's work for all classes of mechanics, workingmen and laborers employed in any occupation in the state of Colorado.' We infer from the communication that it is the desire of the house to have the opinion of this court upon some proposed amendment, not as yet offered, but about which there is a difference of opinion among the members of the house. If we are correct in this the amendment should be first offered, and a copy submitted to the court, as the inquiry must have reference to pending legislation. Moreover, we think the solemn occasion contemplated by the section of the constitution, by virtue of which the question is propounded cannot be said to have arisen until the bill has progressed sufficiently to show some probability of its passage by at least one house of the general assembly. For the court to investigate the constitutionality of a bill that did not command the support of at least a majority of one house would be a waste of time.

Aside from the foregoing, the question is not sufficiently specific. If there is a doubt as to the constitutionality of proposed legislation suggested by any member, such doubt must be occasioned by some particular provision or provisions of the constitution. This instrument contains hundreds of sections, and, unless the inquiry be specific, the court might spend days and weeks in the investigation of provisions that have occasioned no doubt whatever in the minds of the members of the house. In this connection, the language of the court in response to an interrogatory propounded by the Fifth general assembly is particularly in point: 'It could not have been the intention to authorize an ex parte adjudication of individual or corporate rights by means of a legislative or executive...