State v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company

• Decision Date: 07 May 1912
• Citation: 147 S.W. 118,242 Mo. 339
• Parties: THE STATE v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

147 S.W. 118

242 Mo. 339

THE STATE v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 7, 1912

Appeal from Vernon Circuit Court. -- Hon. B. G. Thurman, Judge.

Affirmed.

Robert T. Railey for appellant.

(1) Said Act of 1911 is in conflict with section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States in this: That it denies to defendant the equal protection of the laws, and attempts to deprive it of its property without due process of law. The above act discriminates in favor of individuals, tenants in common and copartnerships, similarly situated and engaged in the same business as corporations, by permitting the former to contract for labor and to pay for same at any date agreed upon, while corporations, engaged in identically the same business, employing the same number and class of workmen, are compelled to pay them semi-monthly. Tiedeman's Lim. of Police Powers, sec. 178, p. 572; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), pp. 484, 709; State v Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; State v. Julow, 129 Mo 163; State v. Tie Co., 181 Mo. 536; State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561; Ex parte House, 227 Mo. 635; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; People v. Coler, 116 N.Y. 1; Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 334; Ives v. Railroad, 94 N. E. (N.Y.) 431; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378; People ex rel. v. Otis, 90 N.Y. 48; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389; People v. Orange Co., 67 N. E. (N.Y.) 129; People v. Zimmerman, 92 N.Y.S. 497; Comm. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; Johnson v. Mining Co., 127 Cal. 555; Ex parte Kubach, 85 Cal. 274; Ex parte Whitwell, 19 L.R.A. (Cal.) 727; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294; Braceville v. People, 147 Ill. 66; Coal Co. v. Harrier, 207 Ill. 624; Frerer v. People, 141 Ill. 171; Richie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459; Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334; Iron Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379; Shaver v. Pa. Co., 71 F. 931; State v. Robins, 71 Oh. St. 273; Jones v. Hotel Co., 79 F. 477; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146; Brick Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297; Low v. Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179; State v. Coal Co., 33 W.Va. 188; Block v. Schwartz. 27 Utah 387; State ex rel. v. Kreutzberg, 58 L.R.A. (Wis.) 748; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45. (2) The word "corporation" mentioned in the Acts of 1911 of Missouri, page 150, must be treated as though it meant the names of all the individuals who are members of said corporations. It has long been settled that the word "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies to a corporation. Beach on Monopolies and Industrial Trusts, sec. 230; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. (U.S.) 514; Railroad v. Railroad, 112 U.S. 414; Railroad v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 154; Johnson v. Mining Co., 59 P. 304. (3) The Act of 1911, page 150, cannot be construed as an amendment of all the charters of all the corporations, which employ mechanics, laborers or other servants. Nor can it, under the Constitution and laws of Missouri, be considered as an amendment of the charter of any corporation, whether organized under the laws of this State or elsewhere. Secs. 2 and 5, art. 12, Constitution; sec. 34, art. 4, Constitution; sec. 53 and pars. 24, 25 and 26, Constitution; secs. 2975, 2977, 2993, 3048, 3049, 2360, 3051, 3052, R. S. 1909; Sloan v. Railroad, 61 Mo. 31; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; State v. Tie Co., 181 Mo. 536; Ex parte House, 227 Mo. 635; Leach v. Tie Co., 111 Mo.App. 650; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), 709, 710; Tiedeman's Lim. of Police Powers, sec. 191, p. 584; Taylor on Private Corporations (5 Ed.), secs. 450, p. 430; 2 Cook on Corporations (4 Ed.), secs. 492 to 496; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 754-5, 116 U.S. 138; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146; Braceville v. People, 147 Ill. 66; Railroad v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Johnson v. Mining Co., 59 Pac. (Cal.), 304; Freeman's Criticism, 62 Am. St. Rep. 181; Railroad v. Smith, 173 U.S. 698; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 173; V. B. & T. Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297; Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176; State ex rel. v. Kreutzberg, 90 N.W. 1098; People v. Marcus, 185 N.Y. 257; Low v. Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127. (4) The Legislature cannot even pass a law which will prohibit a railway company from compelling an adult to quit its service or to withdraw from a labor union, nor on the other hand can the Legislature pass an act which will prohibit an employee from refusing to work for any corporation, if any adults are employed in behalf of same who are not members of a labor union. In other words, the right of personal contract is so sacred that the Legislature cannot interfere with same except in cases where the health, safety or welfare of the public are involved. State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 175; Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 173; V. B. & T. Co. v. Perry, 76 P. 1848; Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176; State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530; People v. Marcus, 185 N.Y. 257. (5) No statutory enactment which interferes with the right of private contract can be upheld in those States where the Legislature is not authorized to amend the charters of corporations. Under this head, no legislative enactment can withstand the test of judicial criticism or be sustained as constitutional, which deprives a corporation or individual of the right to hire men who are sui juris by the month, and to pay them accordingly, or less frequently if agreed upon. Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; Iron Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379; Braceville v. People, 147 Ill. 66; Railroad v. Long, 82 N. E. (Ind.) 757; Johnson v. Mining Co., 127 Cal. 555; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146. The following cases relating to the same subject and practically announcing the same principles held the acts under consideration unconstitutional. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; State v. Tie Co., 181 Mo. 536; Froer v. People. 141 Ill. 171; Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; Low v. Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127; Railroad v. Wilson, 19 S.W. 911; Leach v. Tie Co., 111 Mo.App. 650; People v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 1; People v. Zimmerman, 92 N.Y.S. 497; Ives v. Railroad, 94 N. E. (N.Y.) 431; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179; State v. Coal Co., 33 W.Va. 188; Street v. Varney, 160 Ind. 338; Coal Co. v. Harrier, 207 Ill. 624; In re Eight-Hour Law, 21 Colo. 29; Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 334; Ballard v. Oil Co., 34 So. 533; Shaver v. Pa. Co., 71 F. 931; Jordan v. State, 103 S.W. 633; State v. Goebroski, 56 L.R.A. 570; Block v. Schwartz, 76 P. 22; Tiedeman's Lim. of Police Powers, sec. 178, p. 572; Cooley's Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), 709 and 710. (6) Said act violates section 28, article 4, Constitution, in that, in its title it includes all employees of all corporations doing business in the State of Missouri, while the body of the act is misleading, indefinite and uncertain, and only extends the special privileges to mechanics, laborers and other servants. State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 29; State v. Coffee Co., 171 Mo. 643; State v. Fulks, 207 Mo. 26; St. Louis v. Wortman, 213 Mo. 13; State v. Rawlings, 232 Mo. 557; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 387; Cooley's Const. Lims. (7 Ed.), p. 205; Williams v. Railroad, 233 Mo. 667. (7) The act under consideration is in conflict with section 8, article 1, Constitution of the United States and the various laws passed by Congress thereunder, in this: That defendants are engaged in interstate commerce, and own and operate various lines of road as a part of their respective systems, which run into other States than Missouri; that some of the States, notably Kansas, Illinois, Colorado, Louisiana and Texas, have no such laws as that contemplated in the above act; and hence the latter, if enforced, will interfere with the proper and efficient management of the property of said defendants to the detriment of the public; and that by reason of the premises the State of Missouri is without jurisdiction to pass the act under consideration. Sec. 8, art. 1, Constitution of the United States; Howard v. Railroad, 207 U.S. 463; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 178; State v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 658.

Elliott W. Major, Attorney-General, for the State; Lee B. Ewing of counsel.

(1) Every act of the Legislature, duly passed, is presumed to be valid and constitutional. The burden is upon him who seeks to attack its constitutionality to clearly show that it is violative of some constitutional provision. Ex parte Loving 178 Mo. 203; State v. Cantwell, 179 Mo. 280; State v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 477; State v. Thompson, 144 Mo. 322; State ex rel. v. County, 144 Mo. 280; Railroad v. Andrews, 174 U.S. 96; Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207. (2) Where these is a doubt as to the constitutionality of an act, it will be resolved in favor of the validity of the act. And no act of the Legislature will be deemed unconstitutional unless it appears so beyond a reasonable doubt. If reasonable minds might differ as to the constitutionality of legislation, it will be upheld as constitutional by the courts. State v. Cantwell, 179 Mo. 280; Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 203; State v. Able, 65 Mo. 357; County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 192; Coal Co. v. State, 17 L.R.A. (W. Va.) 385; Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207; Railroad v. Williams, 199 N.Y. 127; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 123. (3) The expediency or inexpediency of an act is a question for the Legislature, and not for the courts. The judiciary cannot inquire into the motives and necessities which may have superinduced the passage of an act. Brown v. Cape Girardeau, 90 Mo. 383; County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 192; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. 604; Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Baldwin (U.S.) 74; Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207; Institute v. City, 183...