In re Estate
| Decision Date | 01 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Kno-19-492 |
| Citation | 239 A.3d 623 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Robert W. KERWIN |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Barbara K. Wheaton, Esq., Joshua D. Dunlap, Esq., and T. Griffin Leschefske, Esq. (orally), Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellant Sandra K. Smith
Matthew Warner, Esq. (orally), Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Portland, for appellee Lorraine C. Kerwin
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and HORTON, JJ.
[¶1] Sandra K. Smith appeals from a judgment of the Knox County Probate Court (Emery, J. ) granting in part her petition for discovery of property pursuant to 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110 (2020)1 but limiting the scope of the examination of Lorraine C. Kerwin. Smith asserts that (1) she timely filed her notice of appeal and (2) the court erred in limiting the scope of the examination. We conclude that the notice of appeal was timely, and we affirm the judgment.
[¶2] The underlying facts are not contested and are drawn from the Probate Court record. Robert W. Kerwin (the decedent), who had an adult daughter, Smith, from a previous marriage, married Kerwin in 2005. In 2006, Kerwin and the decedent established a trust through which real estate in Knox County was held and for which Kerwin was a trustee. The decedent's will provided that any of his property not already in the trust would pour over to the trust at his death; it provided nothing for Smith.
[¶3] After the decedent died in 2018, Kerwin filed in the Probate Court an application for informal probate of a will and appointment of a personal representative. Smith filed a claim against the estate concerning the Knox County real estate in February 2019. Kerwin, as the estate's personal representative, disallowed the claim on March 18, 2019. Two months later, Smith filed a petition for discovery of property, pursuant to 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110. In that petition, Smith asserted that the transfer of real estate to the trust was potentially the result of undue influence or fraud, and she asked the court to require Kerwin to appear for examination under oath and produce certain documents relating to a coin collection and the decedent's transfer of the Knox County real estate to the trust.
[¶4] On September 11, 2019, the Probate Court entered an order granting in part Smith's petition requesting examination about the creation of the decedent's trust. It set a date for the hearing but limited Smith's examination of Kerwin:
The court was "reluctant to grant the petition because it probe[d] circumstances that occurred thirteen (13) years ago" and stated that the Maine Rules of Probate Procedure gave it authority to place reasonable limitations on the examination.
[¶5] On November 20, 2019, the Probate Court held the hearing on Smith's petition, and Kerwin appeared for examination. At the end of the hearing, Smith confirmed with the court that the hearing was the last opportunity for her to question Kerwin. The court entered on the docket, "Hearing on 3-110 held." Smith filed a notice of appeal, dated December 9, 2019, from the "final judgment entered on November 20, 2019, and ... the Court's interlocutory, procedural order of September 11, 2019." We issued a show cause order directing Smith to explain whether this appeal was justiciable given that it was unclear whether the Probate Court had entered an order, finding, or judgment on November 20. After Smith responded, we allowed the appeal to proceed, notified the parties that the issue of justiciability should be addressed in their briefs, and permitted the Probate Court to act on any motion filed to supplement the record or correct the docket.
[¶6] Smith subsequently filed a motion in the Probate Court asking it to clarify that the November 20 hearing concluded the proceedings. On February 10, 2020, the court granted Smith's motion and directed the Register of Probate to supplement the record and enter on the docket the following:
[¶7] First, we must address whether the notice of appeal was timely filed from a final judgment. The parties disagree about what constitutes the final judgment: Smith asserts that the judgment was the court's oral statement on the record at the conclusion of the November 20 hearing, and Kerwin argues that the September 11 order was the judgment.
[¶8] Generally, litigants must wait until final judgment to appeal a decision. See Taylor v. Walker , 2017 ME 218, ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539. We have explained that "[a] final judgment ... is a decision that fully decides and disposes of the entire matter pending before the court ... , leaving no questions for the future consideration and judgment of the court." Carroll v. Town of Rockport , 2003 ME 135, ¶ 16, 837 A.2d 148. Probate proceedings are unique in that each petition initiates an independent proceeding, and "an order disposing of the matters raised in the petition should be considered a final, appealable order even if there are other pending proceedings involving the same estate or if the estate has yet to be fully administered." Estate of Sheltra , 2020 ME 108, ¶ 17, 238 A.3d 234 (quotation marks omitted). We look beyond the text of the docket entry to determine "whether an order to enter judgment reflects an adjudication of the dispute before the court" rather than "an opinion or a statement of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law." Murphy v. Maddaus , 2002 ME 24, ¶ 12, 789 A.2d 1281 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted).2 It is "the consummating effect" that "identifies an appealable final judgment." Id. ¶ 13.
[¶9] The case here involves a unique probate discovery proceeding that concluded without a typical final order or judgment. See 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110. For appeal purposes, a final judgment is entered whenever the independent proceedings initiated by the petition are complete. See Estate of Sheltra , 2020 ME 108, ¶ 17, 238 A.3d 234. The September 11 order did not conclude the proceedings on the petition because that order anticipated that a hearing would take place at a later time. Rather, the November 20 hearing constituted the final conclusion of the independent proceedings. See Murphy , 2002 ME 24, ¶ 12, 789 A.2d 1281. At that time, the Probate Court indicated on the record that no further hearings would be held; the docket entry stated, "Hearing on 3-110 held"; and the February 10 order confirmed that. Because Smith filed her notice of appeal within twenty-one days after November 20, her appeal is timely. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
[¶10] Should there be any remaining ambiguity about the timeliness of Smith's appeal, considering the sui generis nature of the process established by section 3-110, Rule 2B of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure further supports this conclusion. It provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after a verdict or an order, finding, or judgment of the court, but before entry in the docket shall be treated as filed on the date of entry into the docket." M.R. App. P. 2B(a)(1). Even if the docket entry for the November 20 hearing was unclear as to the finality of the proceedings, Smith's notice of appeal—filed after the hearing but before the February 10 order confirming the completion of the proceedings—is timely pursuant to Rule 2B(a)(1). See M.R. App. P. 2B(a)(1), (c)(1).
[¶11] We now turn to the merits of this appeal. Smith asserts that the Probate Court's citation to the headnote in O'Dee v. McCrate , 7 Me. 467, 467 (1831), indicates that the court erroneously believed it was required to exclude from the examination questions concerning "any conveyance of real estate to [the person] in trust, by the testator, prior to his decease."
18-C M.R.S. § 3-110(1).
[¶13] At the outset, we note that this appeal involves a narrow issue of law unique to the probate courts and a statute with its genesis in antiquity.3 Based on the language of the statute and the relief it affords, it is apparent that section 3-110 is a discovery vehicle. See 18-C M.R.S. § 3-110(1) ; see also O'Dee , 7 Me. at 471. The scope of discovery is always within the discretion of the court, and we review the Probate Court's decision here for abuse of discretion. See Picher v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland , 2013 ME...
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