In re Estate of Bean
| Decision Date | 14 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-02-00071-CV.,06-02-00071-CV. |
| Parties | In the ESTATE OF Mary Ann BEAN, Deceased. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
J. Randal Bays, Conroe, for appellant.
J.R. "Rusty" Phenix, Henderson, for appellee.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
This is a probate proceeding concerning the estate of Mary Ann Bean. Bean's last will and testament, naming William Richard Shore, Jr., as independent executor, was admitted to probate in the County Court at Law of Rusk County, and Shore qualified as the independent executor. Shore is also a devisee under Bean's will. Three other devisees, James J. DeWitt, Tom G. DeWitt, III, and Marlo DeWitt Senick (the DeWitts), filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment and order for partition and distribution of the estate. The trial court granted that petition and rendered a declaratory judgment that a portion of Bean's will, and its first codicil, transferring real property to Shore, failed for lack of specificity. Shore was ordered to partition and distribute the estate within thirty days in accordance with the court's judgment.
Shore appeals, asserting three grounds on which the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render its judgment. First, he contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the declaratory judgment construing the decedent's will because it appointed an independent executor to administer the independent estate. Second, he claims the trial court was without jurisdiction to order the partition and distribution of the decedent's estate because twenty-four months had not passed since the appointment of the independent executor. Finally, he contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the application since it failed to require all devisees of the decedent's estate be cited to appear as required by Texas law. Shore also contends this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling because the trial court failed to follow Texas law by applying an improper legal standard in its construction of the decedent's will. Shore also challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court based its judgment.
We conclude a trial court is not divested of jurisdiction to construe a will merely because an independent executor has been appointed, but because we sustain the other two grounds on which Shore challenges the trial court's jurisdiction, we do not reach his other contentions.
Bean executed a will June 5, 1995, naming Shore independent executor of her estate. She executed a codicil to that will June 17, 1997, which modified several sections of paragraph 6 of the 1995 will. She executed a second codicil March 22, 2000. Bean passed away shortly thereafter, on May 16, 2000.
On May 22, 2000, Shore applied to the court for probate of the will and issuance of letters testamentary. James J. DeWitt, named as successor independent executor in the will, filed an application opposing Shore's appointment and seeking to have himself appointed independent executor of Bean's estate. On June 21, 2000, the court appointed Shore independent executor.
The DeWitts filed their application for partition and distribution of the estate and for declaratory judgment July 12, 2001.1 The hearing was held on this application September 27, 2001. On February 20, 2002, the court entered its declaratory judgment and order for partition and distribution of Bean's estate. In this judgment, the court declared paragraph 6(3) of the 1995 will, and paragraph A of the first codicil, invalid, and ordered all mineral interests and real property interests referred to in such provisions pass under the residuary clause of Bean's will.2 The provisions of paragraph 6(3) and the amendments found in the first codicil, according to the judgment, "fails [sic] for a lack of a description of the property sought to be conveyed under the terms of such will and codicil and therefore, any conveyance under such provision fails because there are no means to identify such conveyance with any degree of certainty."
Paragraph 6(3)of the will, with the relevant modifications made by codicil, reads:
Regarding the eighty (80) acres I own in the J. Bennett Survey, I give a life estate to my great-nephews, TOM G. DeWITT III, JAMES J. DeWITT, and WILLIAM R. SHORE, JR., during their natural lives without bond as life tenants the right to collect, receive, receipt for, use, enjoy, possess and consume the income from the gas well on the property, and I do give them during such time as they are entitled to receive the income and share the income equally, complete powers of management, sale, exchange, conveyance, reinvestment, the power to execute oil, gas and mineral leases with provisions for pooling and unitization and any other provision they might think wise or expedient even though the terms of any such lease or agreement might extend beyond the term of their estates or lives, but they shall preserve the corpus of the estate so bequeathed to them in this section so that upon the death of the life tenants, the remainder corpus or principal and any undistributed income shall become subject to the use, enjoyment, consumption and disposition of BRENHAM SHORE, or the Trustee that might be serving for him until he becomes of legal age. Any act of the life tenants shall bind both themselves and those who take in remainder; and third persons shall be entitled to rely upon the fact that the acts of the life tenants will bind those who take in remainder, if need be, as well as the life tenants.
At the death of WILLIAM R. SHORE, JR., I bequeath his one-third share to BRENHAM SHORE, in fee simple.
Upon the death of either TOM G. DeWITT III or JAMES J. DeWITT, I bequeath his one-third share of the life estate to the survivor and WILLIAM R. SHORE, JR., equally as a life estate. Upon the death of the survivor, then to BRENHAM SHORE, in fee simple. [Deleted per the First Codicil (June 17, 1997)].
Upon the death of either TOM G. DeWITT III or JAMES J. DeWITT, I bequeath his one-third share of the life estate to MARLO ANN DeWITT and WILLIAM R. SHORE, JR., equally, as a life estate. Upon the death of the survivor, then I bequeath the entire life estate to BRENHAM SHORE, in fee simple. [Added per First Codicil (June 17, 1997)].
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law an appellate court reviews de novo by examining the pleadings and any other evidence relevant to the determination. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002).
The Texas Probate Code confers on "[a]ll courts exercising original probate jurisdiction" the "power to hear all matters incident to an estate." TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. § 5(f) (Vernon Supp.2004). Matters incident to an estate include all actions to construe wills and generally all matters relating to settlement, partition, and distribution of estates. TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. § 5A (Vernon Supp.2004). The authority of the trial court over the matters of an estate under independent administration, however, is limited. As long as the estate is represented by an independent executor, further action should not be had in the court except where the Probate Code, or other law, specifically and explicitly provides for some action in the court. See Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 145(h) (Vernon 2003); Baker v. Hammett, 789 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ). Deference is allowed in order to free the independent executor from judicial supervision and to effect the distribution of the estate with minimal cost and delay. See Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex.1975); Baker, 789 S.W.2d at 683.
We conclude, however, that an action for declaratory judgment construing a provision of a will is permissible, despite the limitation in the Probate Code of the types of actions a court can take with respect to an estate for which an independent executor may be appointed. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) provides in pertinent part:
A person interested under a deed, will, written contract ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 1997). More specifically, devisees, such as the DeWitts, are among the classes of persons who are given the power to seek a declaration of rights with respect to the estate to, among other things, determine any question arising in the administration of the estate, including questions of construction of the will. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.005(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004); In re Estate of Wilson, 7 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1999, pet. denied). We therefore conclude that, pursuant to the UDJA, the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction to construe Bean's will merely because it had appointed an independent executor. Shore's contentions to the contrary are overruled.
The Probate Code provides:
[A]t any time after the expiration of two years from the date that an independent administration was created and the order appointing an independent executor was entered, a person interested in the estate may petition the county court, as that term is defined by Section 3 of this code, for an accounting and distribution. The court may order an accounting to be made with the court by the independent executor at such time as the court deems proper. The accounting shall include the information that the court deems necessary to determine whether any part of the estate should be distributed.
Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 149B(a) (Vernon 2003). Until two years has passed, the court is without jurisdiction to order an independent executor to distribute...
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