In re Estate of Klessig
| Decision Date | 21 July 1922 |
| Docket Number | 22,814 |
| Citation | 189 N.W. 424,153 Minn. 27 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LOUIS KLESSIG, DECEASED; MINNA KLESSIG v. A. O. LEA, ADMINISTRATOR, ETC |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
To the claim of Minna Klessig against her father's estate, the administrator of the estate filed objections, which were sustained by the probate court for Waseca county, Senn, J. On appeal to the district court for Waseca county the case was tried before Childress, J., who when plaintiff rested denied defendant's motion to dismiss the matter, and a jury which returned a verdict for $2,000. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment and from that order, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
No agreement to compensate adult daughter for services at home.
1. The evidence fails to establish either an express or implied agreement to compensate the services of a daughter for the time she remained in the father's home after reaching her majority.
No reversal where excluded testimony would not have changed result.
2. The court rightly ordered judgment in favor of the estate, since the testimony claimed to have been erroneously excluded as well as that claimed to have been improperly received would not have changed the result.
Moonan & Moonan, for appellant.
A. W Johnson, for respondent.
The appeal is from a judgment dismissing a claim filed by appellant against her father's estate. The claim was disallowed by the probate court. On appeal to the district court a jury gave appellant a verdict for $2,000, but, on respondent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, judgment was ordered and entered in favor of the estate.
Louis Klessig, the father of appellant, was a farmer in the county of Waseca. His two oldest children were girls, the older of whom died when 22. Appellant, the younger, is now 42 years old. He also had four sons, the oldest of whom was 4 years younger than appellant. The farm at one time consisted of 320 acres. But there seems to have been only 160 acres left in 1915. The children had to assist in farm work as soon as able, their schooling being limited. The girls being the older naturally had to carry the heavier burdens as long as the boys were small. As each of the three older sons reached about the age of 22 he married and left the old home. Arthur, next the youngest, settled down on the farm, the father having in 1910 moved into the village of New Richland where he built a home. In 1915 the father conveyed the farm to Arthur. He paid only $500 for the one 80. The deed to the other 80 was left in escrow until part of the consideration of $4,500 was paid. Arthur gave a purchase money mortgage to his father on this for $2,500. This mortgage and a note of $500 given by Arthur and two shares of stock worth $100 constituted the only estate left by Louis Klessig. It appears that the town property was conveyed to the youngest son Roland. The oldest son has resided on the west coast since he left home. The second son died some years before the father, leaving a child now 9 years old who is with his mother in Michigan. Appellant learned dressmaking when 21, and sewed for others to some extent while living with her parents. Shortly after they moved to New Richland, she established herself in the dressmaking trade. The above may serve as an outline of the situation in which appellant and her father were during his lifetime.
In the verified claim filed in the probate court appellant stated that it was for ten years' labor performed in expectation of compensation in the way of a legacy pursuant to a promise of decedent that he would leave her an interest in an 80-acre tract of land worth $150 an acre. In the district court she filed a complaint, wherein she stated that she performed this labor for which her father promised to pay by devising or conveying property to her, and that for the purpose of carrying out this agreement he delivered deeds of real property to a third party to be delivered to appellant after the death of her father, but that this deed was without her consent taken away by her father from the third party.
The record is absolutely barren of any express agreement on the part of decedent to pay appellant for services, either in money or by way of devise or conveyance of real estate. It is true that she testified that she expected to be paid, but that is no proof of an agreement to pay on his part. No better is her statement that she knew provisions had been made for her without specifying when or from whom such knowledge was obtained. There is no fact or circumstance prior to 1912 that even suggests an inference of an intention to compensate appellant for her work while a member of her father's household.
Klessig was a German farmer living in a German community. It is common knowledge that among those people the women, in addition to doing the housework, labor in the fields, many of them doing more than a man's share there. The thrifty German farmer is not at all likely to bargain for his young daughter's services when he may have them for nothing. The decedent's joshing reference to appellant as his hired man, made to a neighbor was of no significance to the neighbor and should not be to a court or jury. The only fact of any importance is that appellant continued to perform hard work as a member of her father's family for ten years after attaining her majority. But the presumption arising therefrom is that the services were rendered gratuitously. Einolf v. Thomson, 95 Minn. 230, 103 N.W. 1026, 104 N.W. 290, 547; Begin v. Begin, 98 Minn. 122, 107 N.W. 149.
It is however, not necessary to prove an express contract for compensation. The presumption that the services are gratuitously rendered by a child, so long as it remains in the parental home a partaker of its benefits and comforts, may be overcome by facts and circumstances from which an implied promise to compensate may be inferred. In this case there must not only be an inference of intention to pay, but also that payment could not be demanded until after decedent's death, for otherwise the statute of limitations, pleaded as a defense, would be a bar, no service having been...
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