In re Gallardo
| Decision Date | 19 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-14-00203-CV |
| Parties | IN RE REBECCA GALLARDO |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONBefore Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria
1
Relator, Rebecca Gallardo, proceeding pro se, seeks a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition to compel the trial court2 to grant Gallardo's plea to the jurisdiction. Specifically, Gallardo contends the trial court erred in failing to grant her plea to the jurisdiction and granting summary judgment against her because: (1) the real partyin interest, the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (the "Division"), has exclusive jurisdiction over benefit dispute agreements; (2) Texas Workers' Compensation Act case law precludes judicial actions taken outside of the Act's administrative processes and remedies; and (3) Texas Labor Code section 408.201 precludes judgments or other actions or claims regarding workers' compensation benefits. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.201 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (providing that workers' compensation benefits are exempt from garnishment, attachment, judgment, and "other actions or claims"). We conditionally grant the petition, in part, and deny it in part, as stated herein.3
On June 2, 2008, Gallardo sustained a work-related injury for which she sought workers' compensation benefits. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania ("ICSOP") was Gallardo's employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. Through a series of contested case hearings, the Division concluded that Gallardo was not entitled to receive supplemental income benefits.4 In February 2011, Gallardo filed a suit for judicial review of the Division's decisions on her first, second, third, and fourth-quartersupplemental income benefits. This case was filed in cause number 2011-CCV-60284-A in County Court at Law Number One of Nueces County, Texas.
The parties ultimately reached an agreement, and on April 12, 2012, the trial court signed a final judgment in accordance with the settlement agreement. The judgment provided, in relevant part, that Gallardo was entitled to supplemental income benefits for the first, second, and third quarters, but was not entitled to benefits for the fourth quarter. The judgment did not address Gallardo's entitlement to the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth quarter benefits. ICSOP paid Gallardo first, second, and third quarter supplemental income benefits.
Pursuant to the agreement, the parties executed a proposed DWC-24 Form on February 6, 2012, and submitted it to the Division for review on May 10, 2012. On May 15, 2012, the Division's Benefit Review Officer denied approval of the DWC-24 benefit dispute agreement by correspondence to the parties stating:
Please take notice that I have denied the DWC-24 as submitted on 05/10/12 by the parties. The agreement as submitted includes SIBS quarters 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th. The 5th and 6th quarters have previously been scheduled for a BRC, but not the 7th and 8th quarters. In addition, the agreement is signed 02/06/12 and I note that attorney Daniel Home [sic] no longer represents the Claimant. A party should request dispute resolution so all quarters noted herein can be addressed, and that the Division may be assured that these are the terms agreed to by all parties. I realize the 02/06/12 DWC-24 was part of another agreement outside the Division jurisdiction; therefore, if the parties wish to sign another agreement, all issues can be properly resolved at a BRC.
In July 2012, ICSOP filed suit against Gallardo and her former counsel, Daniel F. Horne and Stone & Horne, L.L.P., in trial court cause number 2012-CCV-61313-2 in the Court at Law No. 2 of Nueces County, alleging that Gallardo and her former counsel breached the settlement agreement because they refused to cooperate in executing anew DWC-24 for submission to the Division. This trial court proceeding gave rise to this petition for writ of mandamus appeal and the related appeal. ICSOP's causes of action against Gallardo and her counsel included breach of contract, conversion, and fraud in the inducement. ICSOP further sought specific performance of the settlement agreement. Gallardo filed an original answer to ICSOP's petition which included a plea to the jurisdiction, a counterclaim, and a motion for sanctions.
ICSOP filed a motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment seeking specific performance of the settlement agreement or the return of the settlement funds. See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. On December 12, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on ICSOP's motion for summary judgment, and, on January 24, 2014, the trial court signed an "Order Granting Final Summary Judgment" in favor of ICSOP. In the order granting summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Gallardo breached the settlement agreement and granted specific performance of the settlement agreement. The judgment specifically recites that: (1) Gallardo is entitled to supplemental income benefits for the first, second, and third quarters; (2) Gallardo is not entitled to supplemental income benefits for the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth quarters; (3) Gallardo's attorney's fees and expenses were capped at $12,500.00; and (4) Gallardo "shall cooperate with ICSOP in order to ensure that all necessary paperwork, including a [DWC-24] covering the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth quarters, is timely submitted and approved" by the Division. According to the order, the trial court retained jurisdiction "to enforce the terms of this decree of specific performance through further appropriate proceedings and orders, including, as and if needed, findings and orders of contempt."
Gallardo appealed the summary judgment in our appellate cause 13-14-00132-CV, which we have addressed by separate opinion issued this same date. Gallardo filed this petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition on April 1, 2014. The Court requested that the real parties in interest, the Division, ICSOP, Daniel F. Horne and Stone & Horne, L.L.P., Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., or any others whose interest would be directly affected by the relief sought, file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. The Division filed a response and an amended response, and ICSOP also filed a response. Gallardo has filed a reply to the Division's response and also filed a reply to ICSOP and Home's responses.5
Through this original proceeding, Gallardo raises three issues pertaining to the trial court's jurisdiction and its allegedly void summary judgment. First, Gallardo contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not resolving and granting her plea to the jurisdiction because only the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to approve workers' compensation DWC-24 agreements, and any other purported agreements merging with a DWC-24; therefore the Division order denying the DWC-24 agreement is not subject to judicial review in a common law cause of action filed outside of the Act's provisions. Second, Gallardo contends that the Act eliminated the need for judicially imposed causes of action outside the administrative processes and other remedies in the Act. Third, Gallardo contends that Texas Labor Code section 408.201 exempts workers' compensation from "other actions or claims" as in the instant case. By supplemental petition for writ ofmandamus, Gallardo further contends that a trial court order purporting to enforce a judicial review settlement agreement under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 that fails to comply with the filing requirements of Rule 11 and section 410.258 of the Texas Labor Code is correctable by mandamus review. Gallardo also contends that a trial court order interfering with another court's jurisdiction is enforceable by mandamus relief.
To be entitled to the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus, the relator must show that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion for which the relator has no adequate remedy at law. In re Frank Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). The relator has the burden of establishing both prerequisites to mandamus relief. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). This burden is a heavy one. Id.; Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., LLC, 328 S.W.3d at 888; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. The adequacy of an appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) . Because this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it must be guided by the analysis of principles rather than the application of simple rules that treat cases as categories. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). We evaluate the benefits and detriments of mandamus review and consider whether mandamus will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136. The second requirement for mandamus relief, that the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal, "has no comprehensive definition" and is decided on a case-by-case basis. See In...
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