In re H.S.
| Citation | 159 N.E.3d 344 |
| Decision Date | 21 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2020-G-0239,2020-G-0239 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF: H.S., Delinquent Child |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Natalie E. Harper, Geauga County Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Appellee, State of Ohio).
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Abigail J. Christopher, Assistant Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Appellant, H.S.).
{¶1} Appellant, H.S., previously adjudicated a delinquent child, appeals from the December 10, 2019 judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, denying her motion to seal her juvenile record. For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} In May 2015, appellant was charged with seven counts: Complicity to Commit Aggravated Arson, in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(1) and R.C. 2923.03(A)(3), a felony of the first degree, if committed by an adult; Complicity to Commit Aggravated Arson, in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2) and R.C. 2923.03(A)(3), a felony of the second degree, if committed by an adult; Complicity to Commit Vandalism, in violation of R.C. 2909.05(A) and R.C. 2923.03(A)(3), a felony of the third degree, if committed by an adult; Tampering with Evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree, if committed by an adult; Burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), a felony of the third degree, if committed by an adult; Breaking and Entering, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), a felony of the fifth degree, if committed by an adult; and Theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree, if committed by an adult. Appellant entered a plea of "true" to all seven counts.
{¶3} Disposition was held in October 2015, and appellant was committed to the Department of Youth Services ("DYS") for a minimum of three years and a total maximum period ending on her twenty-first birthday and ordered to pay restitution. After serving 15 months, the court granted appellant early release from DYS and ordered the remainder of appellant's DYS time suspended. She was placed on probation and subject to several conditions, including participation in counseling and NA/AA meetings, 40 hours of community service, and attending college full time or maintaining full employment.
{¶4} In January 2018, the court terminated her probation. In July 2019, appellant filed a motion to seal her juvenile record. The state opposed the motion and the court held a hearing on August 21, 2019. Ultimately, the court denied appellant's motion. Appellant timely appealed, assigning one error for our review, which states:
{¶5} The lower court abused its discretion by denying H.S.'s motion to seal her juvenile records based only on the seriousness of the offense. R.C. 2151.355. (12/10/2019 Entry p.1).
{¶6} An appellate court reviews a lower court's decision to deny a motion to seal for abuse of discretion. State v. S.J. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga, 2020-Ohio-183, 151 N.E.3d 1021, ¶6. "A trial court abuses its discretion when its judgment fails to comport with either reason or the record." In re T.M. , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0067, 2017-Ohio-156, 2017 WL 168918, ¶14. "An abuse of discretion may be found when the trial court ‘applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.’ " Cobb v. Shipman , 11th Dist. Trumbull, 2015-Ohio-2604, 35 N.E.3d 560 ¶19, quoting Thomas v. Cleveland , 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454 ¶15 (8th Dist.). "When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court." In re Jane Doe 1 , 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 137-38, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991). "When, however, it is necessary for an appellate court to interpret and apply statutory provisions, its standard of review is de novo." State v. M.J. , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2018-A-0046, 2019-Ohio-1420, 2019 WL 1599036, ¶5.
{¶7} R.C. 2151.356 governs the sealing of juvenile records. As appellant was not adjudicated a delinquent child for committing a violation of section 2903.01 (aggravated murder), 2903.02 (murder), or 2907.02 (rape) of the Revised Code, R.C. 2151.356(A) is not applicable. Nor is appellant's record required to be sealed, pursuant to R.C. 2151.356(B). Instead, subsection (C) applies to the case sub judice, which provides, in pertinent part:
{¶17} Appellant asserts the trial court based its decision to deny her motion to seal based solely on the serious nature of the offenses, and notes that during the hearing the court stated, "there's nothing more she needs to do for rehabilitation as far as this court is concerned." Accordingly, she argues, the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion.
{¶18} However, to argue the court denied her motion to seal based only on the seriousness of the offense mischaracterizes the court's rationale. During the hearing, the court considered all the factors provided in R.C. 2151.356(C)(e) : appellant's age, the nature of the case, the cessation of or continuation of delinquent, unruly, or criminal behavior, her education and employment history, and, falling under R.C. 2151.356(C)(2)(e)(iv), the applicability of the arson registry statute, R.C. 2909.14, which the court ultimately found inapplicable to this case. Thus, any argument that the court did not consider all the required factors is not supported by the record.
{¶19} Furthermore, appellant argues the court cannot deny a motion to seal when the only factor weighing against the movant is the seriousness of the offense because, as the court noted, that factor will never change. Appellant argues this and other courts have held that the nature of the offense cannot be the sole basis to deny an application to seal a record, citing M.J. , supra ; State v. M.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105589, 2018-Ohio-582, 2018 WL 898922 ; and State v. Clellan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-44, 2010-Ohio-5867, 2010 WL 4925879.
{¶20} While in each of these cases the appellate court noted that the lower court may not base its decision to deny a motion to seal based solely on the seriousness of the offense, those cases applied the adult sealing statute, R.C. 2953.32. Unlike the juvenile sealing statute applicable here, R.C. 2952.32 requires the sentencing court to, inter alia, "[w]eigh the interests of the applicant in having the records pertaining to the applicant's conviction or bail forfeiture sealed against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records." R.C. 2953.32(C)(1). Moreover, the ultimate reason the appellate courts in M.J., M.H. , and Clellan reversed the lower courts' denials was that the lower courts failed to weigh, or, as in Clellan, abuse its discretion in weighing, the legitimate need to keep the record public against the movant's interests as required by the adult sealing statute.
{¶21} Furthermore, in M.J., the appellant likewise cited M.H. and Clellan , as well as several other similar cases from other appellate districts, for the proposition that the court cannot base its decision solely on the nature of the offense. In interpreting those cases, this court clarified the rule, stating:
{¶22} The foregoing cases stand for the overarching proposition that a trial court cannot deny an application without considering, on record, each of the factors set forth in the statute. As such, a court cannot deny an application solely on the nature of the offense; if, however, the trial court adequately considered and placed its findings on the record, it must consider the nature of the offense as a factor in denying a motion. After all, the nature of the offense that is the subject of the application is inherently germane to the trial court's ultimate ruling, to wit: it serves to establish whether the applicant is an eligible offender. M.J., supra, at ¶21.
{¶23} This further demonstrates the distinction between R.C. 2953.32, the adult sealing statute, and R.C. 2151.356, the juvenile sealing statute. In R.C. 2953.32, the court considers the nature of the offense in order to determine whether the offender is eligible for their record to be sealed. The legislature apparently afforded the court greater consideration of the nature of the offense in juvenile cases, pursuant to R.C. 2151.356. Unless the juvenile offender committed an offense...
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