In re Hallbom's Estate
| Decision Date | 30 June 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 29463.,No. 29456.,29456.,29463. |
| Citation | 249 N.W. 417,189 Minn. 383 |
| Parties | In re HALLBOM'S ESTATE. PAGEL v. MacLEAN et al. (McCRIMMON et al., Interveners). |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Kandiyohi County; Harold Baker, Judge.
Final accounting of Edward A. Pagel, administrator of the estate of Jacob E. Hallbom, deceased. An order of the Probate Court approving the account was reversed by the District Court on appeal of Selma Hallbom, and the administrator appealed to the Supreme Court (179 Minn. 402, 229 N. W. 344), which affirmed the judgment of the District Court. To review that decision, certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States (282 U. S. 819, 51 S. Ct. 25, 75 L. Ed. 732). During the pendency of the case, Selma Hallbom died, and John G. Mac-Lean was appointed special administrator of her estate, and was substituted in her stead. The Supreme Court of the United States (283 U. S. 266, 51 S. Ct. 416, 75 L. Ed. 1023) vacated the judgment, and remanded the cause to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which remanded the case (183 Minn. 429, 237 N. W. 21) to the District Court, wherein Ebba Pagel and others were impleaded, and wherein Lillie F. McCrimmon, administratrix of the estate of Fred R. Hallbom, deceased, and others intervened. From a judgment of the District Court, John G. MacLean, administrator of the estate of Selma Hallbom, deceased, and Ebba Pagel and others separately appeal. The appeals were consolidated in the Supreme Court.
Affirmed.
L. J. Van Fossen and Orin M. Oulman, both of Minneapolis, for appellant.
Charles A. Swenson, of Atwater, for respondent Edw. A. Pagel, Admr., and interveners-respondents.
George L. Barnard, of Willmar, for interpleaders-respondents.
On appeal from probate court, judgment was entered in the district court that the proceeds of war risk insurance on the life of the deceased soldier became an asset of his estate as of the date of his death. From that judgment separate appeals (consolidated here) have been taken, one by surviving brother and sisters of the deceased, and another by John G. MacLean, as special administrator of the estate of Selma Hallbom, mother of the soldier, who died pending this proceeding for the probate of her son's estate.
Jacob E. Hallbom, a soldier of the United States during the World War serving in the area of hostilities in France, took out war risk insurance in the sum of $10,000. The one named beneficiary was Peter J. Hallbom, his father. The insured departed this life October 20, 1925. Thereafter the father, as beneficiary, received monthly installments until he, too, passed away February 22, 1928. Selma Hallbom, mother of the soldier and wife of Peter, the beneficiary, survived both.
Edward A. Pagel, as administrator of the estate of the deceased soldier, in his final account reported to the probate court that claims had been allowed against the estate, but not paid because objection had been made to their payment "from funds derived from U. S. War Veterans insurance." The probate court held that the commuted fund ($9,116) was a part of the estate of the deceased soldier and subject to the payment of his debts. Selma, the soldier's mother, appealed to the district court, which held that the fund was not subject to the soldier's debts but should pass free of them to the soldier's heirs within the permitted class of beneficiaries (38 USCA § 511). Upon appeal by the administrator to this court (In re Estate of Hallbom, 179 Minn. 402, 229 N. W. 344) we affirmed the judgment. Our opinion then was that they took as beneficiaries and not as heirs at law.
To review that decision, certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Pagel v. Hallbom, 282 U. S. 819, 51 S. Ct. 25, 75 L. Ed. 732. While the petition was pending, the mother, Selma Hallbom, died testate August 7, 1930. By her will all her estate was left to her children, Ebba, Annie Corey, Clara Hallbom, and Charles Hallbom, and a granddaughter, Selmal Gabrielson, who have been interpleaded. John G. MacLean was appointed special administrator of her estate and was substituted in her stead as a respondent in the Supreme Court. Because of the change in the situation resulting from the death of Selma Hallbom, the Supreme Court declined decision on the merits (Pagel, Adm'r, v. MacLean, 283 U. S. 266, 51 S. Ct. 416, 418, 75 L. Ed. 1023), but vacated our judgment in the matter and remanded the cause, "in order that the state court may be free to deal adequately with the questions which must be determined in order to make appropriate distribution of the fund involved."
The case returning here, we filed an ex parte opinion (In re Estate of Hallbom, 183 Minn. 429, 237 N. W. 21), remanding the case to the district court with the suggestion that the surviving brother and sisters of the deceased soldier be made parties. Thereupon the case went back to the district court and the decision there already indicated. Upon the grounds hereinafter stated, we affirm. The matter is determined by federal law. That law as it now stands required the decision below.
1. Our former decision (179 Minn. 402, 229 N. W. 344) is invoked by appellants as res judicata. It does not have that effect because no issue becomes res judicata until made so by final judgment. In this case there is as yet no such judgment. Dunnell, Minn. Dig. §§ 398, 5159 et seq.
2. Our former decision must now be considered erroneous because in disagreement with the rule settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. But, say appellants, it nevertheless remains the law of the case. Their argument is that, even though the decision was not an end of the matter so as to make it res judicata, it yet stands as the decision of an appellate court, so settling the law of the case as to be controlling in district and probate courts and also here. That view is erroneous because, on a federal question, this is but an intermediate appellate court, rather than the tribunal of last resort. The law is that a rule "laid down by an intermediate appellate court on appeal is not binding on that court on a second appeal where the highest appellate court has, since the first appeal," even in another case, "decided the precise question" otherwise. So, also, "a decision of an intermediate appellate court, which has been reversed or modified on appeal, and held for naught, is not binding upon it, upon a subsequent appeal of the same case." 1 A. L. R. 1275, citing Zerulla v. Supreme Lodge O. M. P., 223 Ill. 518, 79 N. E. 160; Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah, 64, 24 P. 755. See, also, 8 A. L. R. 1033, and 67 A. L. R. 1395. In Sands v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 159 Minn. 25, 198 N. W. 402, it was explained that, although we adhere strictly to the "doctrine of the law of the case," the rule is one of practice and not substantive law. So it expresses no "limitation of power." There we overruled a former decision in the same case in deference to the federal rule settled by a later and controlling decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. In contrast is Goneau v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 159 Minn. 41, 198 N. W. 403, 405, where the federal rule was considered not inconsistent with our former decision. So the latter retained its effect as law of the case. All else aside, our former decision in the instant case was vacated by the Supreme Court and so is of no effect.
3. The War Risk Insurance Act (see, as to origin, 40 Statutes at Large, 398), in respect to the present issue, has been much changed by amendment and now provides (38 USCA § 514): "If no person within the permitted class be designated as beneficiary * * * by the insured either in his lifetime or by his last will and testament or if the designated beneficiary does not survive the insured or survives the insured and dies prior to receiving all of the two hundred and forty installments or all such as are payable and applicable, there shall be paid to the estate of the insured the present value of the monthly installments thereafter payable said value to be computed as of date of last payment made under any existing award."
The effect of that section is settled by Singleton v. Cheek, 284 U. S. 493, 52 S. Ct. 257, 259, 76 L. Ed. 419, 81 A. L. R. 923. "By that amendment," the court said, ...
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