Sands v. Am. Ry. Express Co.

• Decision Date: 04 April 1924
• Docket Number: No. 23782.,23782.
• Citation: 159 Minn. 25,198 N.W. 402
• Parties: SANDS v. AMERICAN RY. EXPRESS CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

159 Minn. 25

198 N.W. 402

SANDS

v.AMERICAN RY. EXPRESS CO.

No. 23782.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 4, 1924.

Appeal from District Court, Stearns County; John A. Roeser, Judge.

Action by P. W. Sands against the American Railway Express Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

The doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of practice and not a principle of substantive law nor a limitation of power. When the question is one of federal law the court on appeal from a judgment will follow its interpretation of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in view of later holdings of that court, though it brings a result different from that reached on a former appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial in the same case.

The evidence does not sustain a finding of actual conversion making the express company liable for the full value of property lost, notwithstanding the limitation of liability in the express receipt issued pursuant to the Cummins Amendment of August 9, 1916, 39 Stat. 441, c. 301 (U. S. Comp. St. § 8604a), overruling Sands v. American Railway Exp. Co., 154 Minn. 309,193 N. W. 721. Davis, Kellogg, Severance & Morgan, of St. Paul, and Henry H. Sullivan, of St. Cloud (A. M. Hartung, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Paul Ahles, of St. Cloud, for respondent.

DIBELL, J.

Action in the district court of Stearns county to recover for the loss of trunks. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. On a former appeal the order denying a new trial was affirmed. 154 Minn. 308, 193 N. W. 721. Upon the going down of the remittitur judgment was entered for the plaintiff upon the verdict for the full value of the property. The defendant appeals from the judgment.

1. At the first hearing on the former appeal it was held that there was an actual conversion. The effect of the failure on the part of the shipper to sign the shipping receipt was left undecided. A reargument was granted. We then held that under the Cummins Amendment of August 9, 1916, 39 Stat. 441, c. 301 (U. S. Comp. St. § 8604a), the express receipt was binding upon the shipper, though he did not sign it, following American Railway Exp. Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584, 43 Sup. Ct. 206, 67 L. Ed. 414. We adhered to the holding that there was an actual conversion which rendered the express company liable irrespective of the declaration of value.

It is now contended that the determination upon the former appeal upon the question of actual conversion is the law of the case, and that we should not reconsider it on an appeal from the judgment. We have held strictly to the so-called doctrine of the law of the case, and have refused upon a second appeal to reconsider what has been determined upon a prior one. This doctrine, however, is a rule of practice and not a principle of substantive law. It does not express a limitation of power. Standard Lithographing Co. v. Twin City Motor Speedway Co., 145 Minn. 5, 176 N. W. 347;Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 32 Sup. Ct. 739, 56 L. Ed. 1152. The question involved is one of federal law. If the view of the Supreme Court of the United States is contrary to the view reached upon a former hearing, our duty is to follow its guide, interpreting its decisions in the light of its later holdings, though in doing so we do not abide by the rule of practice embodied in the phrase ‘the law of the case,’ and though we reach a different result...