In re Hamilton

• Decision Date: 01 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. COA11–1463.,COA11–1463.
• Parties: In the Matter of Aaron Evans HAMILTON.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

725 S.E.2d 393

In the Matter of Aaron Evans HAMILTON.

No. COA11–1463.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 1, 2012.

Appeal by Petitioner from order dated 29 August 2011 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Transylvania County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 April 2012.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine F. Jordan, for the State.

Charles W. McKeller for Petitioner.

STEPHENS, Judge.

Procedural History and Factual Background

On 20 August 2001, Petitioner Aaron Evans Hamilton pled guilty to a charge of taking indecent liberties with a child. Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of 19 to 23 months, suspended for three years with a term of intensive supervised probation and 30 days in jail. Registration (“the registration requirement”) with the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry (“the registry”) was one of the terms of Petitioner's probation. Petitioner initially registered on 27 August 2001. After successfully completing his probationary sentence on 19 August 2004, Petitioner was discharged.

Petitioner continued to register with the registry annually as required by law. He was never convicted of another sexual offense or of any other criminal offense. On 17 May 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for termination of sex offender registration pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.12A.

Following a hearing on 29 August 2011, the trial court made only a single finding of fact:

The relief requested by [P]etitioner does not comply with the provisions of the federal Jacob Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071, as amended, and any other federal standards applicable to the termination of a registration requirement or required to be met as a condition for the receipt of federal funds by the State.

This finding is one of eight pre-printed options for findings of fact following a hearing on a petition for termination of the registration requirement. Here, the trial court simply struck through the word “complies” and wrote in “does not comply” in its place. The court then concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to relief and denied his petition for termination of the registration requirement. The court announced its finding of fact, conclusion of law, and ruling in open court, and entered an order on the same date. From this order, Petitioner appeals.

Discussion

Petitioner makes two arguments: that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the petition for mootness and in finding that the relief requested does not comply with the provisions of the Jacob Wetterling Act. As discussed below, we vacate and remand.

Standard of Review

Resolution of issues involving statutory construction is ultimately a question of law for the courts. Where an appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation, full review is appropriate, and we review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo ....

When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required. However, when the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment. Moreover, when confronted with a clear and unambiguous statute, courts are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.

The best indicia of the legislature's intent are the language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish. Moreover, in discerning the intent of the General Assembly, statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized whenever possible. In pari materia is defined as upon the same matter or subject.

In re Borden, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 718 S.E.2d 683, 685 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

“When the trial court sits as fact-finder without a jury: it must (1) find the facts on all issues joined in the pleadings; (2) declare the conclusions of law arising from the facts found; and (3) enter judgment accordingly.” Gainey v. Gainey, 194 N.C.App. 186, 188, 669 S.E.2d 22, 23 (2008). In turn,

[t]he standard of appellate review for a decision rendered in a non-jury trial is whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment. Findings of fact are binding on appeal if there is competent evidence to support them, even if there is evidence to the contrary.

Sessler v. Marsh, 144 N.C.App. 623, 628, 551 S.E.2d 160, 163 (2001) (citations omitted), disc. review denied,354 N.C. 365, 556 S.E.2d 577 (2001).

Mootness

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the petition for mootness. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that, “[d]ue to the lack of need for a petition for removal from the registry, the trial court should have dismissed the petition for mootness and declared that Mr. Hamilton's registration requirement had ended.” We disagree.

The doctrine of mootness is well-established in our State:

Whenever, during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law.

Unlike the question of jurisdiction, the issue of mootness is not determined solely by examining facts in existence at the commencement of the action. If the issues before a court or administrative body become moot at any time during the course of the proceedings, the usual response should be to dismiss the action.

In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147–48, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978) (citations omitted).

Here, Petitioner filed a petition seeking removal from the registry on 17 May 2011, thus creating the question in controversy. On that date, Petitioner apparently believed that there was a real question in controversy for the trial court to decide, as did the State, which appeared at the hearing in the matter. No party argued mootness before the trial court. From the date the petition was filed until the present, we see no change in facts, law, or other circumstances, and Petitioner has not argued that any such changes have occurred. In sum, Petitioner has failed to show mootness, and a careful reading of his brief reveals that Petitioner is actually asserting a different argument, to wit, that his registration requirement should have automatically terminated ten years after the date of his initial registration because sections 14–208.7 (as amended) and 14–208.12A do not apply to him. After careful consideration, we reject this argument as well.

Our State first established the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry in 1995, and the registration scheme has been amended numerous times in the intervening years. At the time of Petitioner's conviction in 2001, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.7 provided, inter alia, that Petitioner was subject to the registration requirement for a period of ten years after which the registration requirement would automatically terminate, so long as Petitioner had not reoffended.

In 2006, two changes were made to the registration scheme relevant to Petitioner's appeal. First, section 14–208.7 was amended to provide that registration of convicted sex offenders could continue beyond ten years, even when the registrant had not reoffended. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.7(5a) (2007) (providing that the registration requirement “shall be maintained for a period of at least ten years following the date of initial county registration”). This change became effective 1 December 2006, but the implementing language did not specify whether it applied retroactively to those persons already on the sex offender registry as of the effective date.

Second, the automatic termination of the registration requirement language was deleted from section 14–208.7, and section 14–208.12A was added to the registration scheme. Section 14–208.12A provides that persons wishing to terminate their registration requirement must petition the superior court for relief.

(a) Ten years from the date of initial county registration, a person required to register under this Part may petition the superior court to terminate the 30–year registration requirement ¹ if the person has not been convicted of a subsequent offense requiring registration under this Article.

...

(a1) The court may grant the relief if:

(1) The petitioner demonstrates to the court that he or she has not been arrested for any crime that would require registration under this Article since completing the sentence,

(2) The requested relief complies with the provisions of the federal Jacob Wetterling Act, as amended, and any other federal standards applicable to the termination of a registration requirement or required to be met as a condition for the receipt of federal funds by the State, and

(3) The court is otherwise satisfied that the petitioner is not a current or potential threat to public safety.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.12A (2012).² The implementing language of this statute states that it became effective 1 December 2006, and further specifies that it “is applicable to persons for whom the period of registration would terminate on or after [the effective] date.” Petitioner's period of registration was not scheduled to terminate until 2011, and thus, section 14–208.12A plainly and explicitly applies to Petitioner. Further, while Petitioner contends the 2006 amendment to section 14–208.7, deleting the automatic termination language and adding language that the registration requirement last for “at least ten years” is ambiguous, we are not persuaded. The General Assembly did not explicitly state that this amendment was to apply retroactively to persons already on the registry. However, reading section 14–208.7in pari materia with ...