In re HG
Decision Date | 13 October 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-1793.,98-1793. |
Citation | 601 N.W.2d 84 |
Parties | In the Interest of H.G., Minor Child. H.G., Minor Child, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Nancy L. Burk, Toledo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, and Brent D. Heeren, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by CARTER, P.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, CADY, and SCHULTZ,1 JJ.
A child who married during the pendency of a child in need of assistance proceeding appeals from a ruling by the juvenile court denying her application for termination and discharge. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
H.G. was adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance on December 23, 1996. She was fourteen years old. The adjudication was based on the failure of her mother to exercise a reasonable degree of supervision and provide needed treatment to alleviate a serious mental disorder or emotional damage.2 Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found H.G. should remain in the custody of her mother with supervision to the Department of Human Services (DHS). H.G. was pregnant at the time of the dispositional hearing.
The initial permanency plan required the family to participate in numerous services. H.G. was also ordered to attend school and participate in prenatal and other services, as well as attend all prenatal doctor visits. H.G. gave birth on October 8, 1997.
The case was periodically reviewed by the court following the dispositional hearing. Based upon recommendations made by the DHS, supervision was continued.
In July of 1998, a DHS caseworker recommended a modification of the disposition. H.G. was sixteen years old, and pregnant with her second child. She had not been attending school regularly. The DHS felt H.G. was in need of more structure. It recommended H.G., and her child, be placed at a residential facility.
Following a hearing on the State's motion to modify the dispositional order, the juvenile court found a more restrictive placement was required. The court placed custody of H.G. with the DHS for placement at the House of Mercy in Des Moines. H.G., however, was allowed to remain with her mother until the placement was available.
The day before H.G. was to be transported to the residential facility, she married a twenty-three-year-old man. The application for an underaged marriage was approved by the mother and granted by a district court judge. The clerk of court issued the marriage license.
H.G. then filed an application with the juvenile court for discharge and release based upon her marriage and emancipation. Despite the marriage, the DHS continued to recommend residential placement. The juvenile court denied the application without granting a hearing. The court determined it continued to maintain jurisdiction over the case because H.G. had met the definition of a child in need of assistance at the time the proceeding was commenced.
H.G. appealed. The issue we face is whether the marriage of a child during the pendency of a child in need of assistance proceeding terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
We review child in need of assistance cases de novo. In re E.H. III, 578 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1998). We review "both the facts and the law, and we adjudicate rights anew." In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Iowa 1994) (quoting In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 1993)). Our focus is upon protecting the best interests of the child. In re E.H. III, 578 N.W.2d at 248.
Our legislature has given "exclusive jurisdiction" over child in need of assistance proceedings to the juvenile court. Iowa Code § 232.61(1) (1997). A child in need of assistance is defined as an "unmarried child" who needs assistance from the state due to certain statutorily defined circumstances. Id. § 232.2(6). These circumstances generally involve deficiencies in parenting, and range from parental abandonment to numerous types of harm visited upon the child as a result of the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. § 232.2(6)(a)-(o).
A child in a child in need of assistance proceeding is defined as a person under eighteen years of age. Id. § 232.2(5). Thus, both age and marital status help define the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in a child in need of assistance proceeding. In determining this jurisdiction, "the age and marital status of the child at the time the proceeding is initiated is controlling." Id. § 232.61(2).
In this case, the juvenile court properly acquired jurisdiction over H.G. She met the age and marital status requirements at the time the petition was filed. The question is whether her marriage during the pendency of the proceeding divested the juvenile court of its jurisdiction and required the court to discharge her from the custody and supervision of the DHS. H.G. claims the court was required to discharge her under the statutory emancipation she acquired through her marriage, and because she could no longer meet the definition of a child in need of assistance.
83 N.W.2d at 198-99. The statute governing child in need of assistance proceedings is silent about the impact of marriage after jurisdiction has been obtained.
There is no question H.G. no longer meets the definition of a child in need of assistance. Iowa Code § 232.2(6). She is now married and only an "unmarried child" falls within the definition of a child in need of assistance. The juvenile court could not acquire jurisdiction of H.G. because of her marital status. However, there is an important distinction between acquiring jurisdiction and retaining jurisdiction.
Generally, once a court obtains jurisdiction over a person and the subject matter of a case, it retains jurisdiction until a final disposition has been made. Jensen v. Jensen, 260 Iowa 371, 377, 147 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1967). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be ousted by the parties or by any procedures employed by the parties during the course of the proceeding. State ex rel. Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Read, 228 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 1975). This is true even if the subsequent procedure would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching at the commencement of the action. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 111, at 412-13 (1995).
Although the legislature specifically conferred child in need of assistance jurisdiction on the juvenile court by using the age and marital status of a child at the time the proceeding is initiated, it did not utilize either factor as grounds to subsequently terminate the proceeding and discharge the child. Instead, termination of a child in need of assistance proceeding prior to expiration hinges upon a finding by the juvenile court that "the purposes of the order have been accomplished and the child is no longer in need of supervision, care, or treatment." Iowa Code § 232.103(4). We believe the legislature did this for a purpose.
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