In re Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.

Decision Date02 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. 14-01-00637-CV.,14-01-00637-CV.
Citation64 S.W.3d 103
PartiesIn re HOUSTON CHRONICLE PUBLISHING COMPANY, Relator.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

William W. Ogden, Houston, for relator.

George J. Parnham, Wendell A. Odom, Jr., Scott A. Durfee, Houston, for respondents.

Panel consists of Justices YATES, HUDSON and SEYMORE.

OPINION

CHARLES W. SEYMORE, Justice.

The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company (the "Houston Chronicle"), relator, seeks writ of mandamus to compel the 230th District Court of Harris County, Texas, to set aside a gag order entered in Cause Number 880205, The State of Texas v. Andrea Pia Yates. The order restrains trial counsel, defendant and certain witnesses from making extrajudicial statements to the media regarding the pending Yates criminal prosecution. The trial court has indirectly denied the Houston Chronicle access to those trial participants; however, we hold the order, as written, does not infringe on freedom of the press under the First Amendment. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. Background

In an undeniably tragic episode, Andrea Pia Yates was charged with the drowning deaths of her five small children, ranging in age from seven years to six months. It is alleged that Yates, while suffering from a severe form of post-partum depression known as post-partum psychosis, drowned her children in a bathtub at the family's suburban Houston home. Yates has recently been charged with the capital murder of three of the children. In her response brief, Yates admits that facts relating to a "confession" had been leaked to the press and information was being disseminated regarding her state of mind shortly before or at the time of the offense. The case garnered considerable media attention both in Houston and across the nation, with extensive reports, statements from the parties, counsel and other individuals. The citizens of Harris County, Texas have been inundated by newspaper, radio, television and internet reports.

It was this maelstrom of media attention that prompted the Honorable Belinda Hill, judge of the 230th District Court of Harris County, Texas, to enter the gag order. According to the record, Judge Hill initially was not inclined to grant a gag order, electing instead to admonish counsel for both sides that she intended to try the case in court, not in the press. Evidently, the parties did not heed the warning. Judge Hill became concerned that counsels' apparent willingness to continue engaging in media interviews would interfere with the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. In chambers, she presented counsel with a proposed gag order and requested suggestions for modifications. At the subsequent hearing in open court and on the record, Judge Hill took judicial notice of the fact that comments and opinions were being expressed to the media by the lawyers for both sides. She further noted that the media was reporting statements allegedly made by the defendant.

Counsel for the Houston Chronicle was present in the courtroom during this hearing, and requested opportunity to be heard regarding entry of the gag order. Judge Hill noted, however, that the Houston Chronicle was neither a party to the criminal proceedings nor a subject of her gag order. Judge Hill declined to entertain the Houston Chronicle's objections at that particular time; however, she indicated a willingness to visit with counsel after the hearing. The record does not reflect any further action taken or modifications sought by relator or either party prior to the date relator filed its petition for writ of mandamus.

In its petition, the Houston Chronicle alleges that the gag order is an unconstitutional restraint on its ability to gather news because it effectively denies access to trial participants. In particular, relator contends the order was entered without specific findings supported by evidence that such action was necessary to prevent imminent or irreparable harm to the judicial process. Also, relator questioned whether the trial court considered less restrictive alternatives. In her response, filed as a real party in interest, Andrea Pia Yates agrees that proper procedures were not followed before Judge Hill entered the order; however, she has not requested that we set aside the order as a violation of her own rights or interests. The State of Texas, as a real party in interest, also filed a response, contending that the Houston Chronicle has no standing to object to the order. Prior to our ruling on the merits of relator's arguments, we must address whether relator's complaints are the proper subject of a mandamus proceeding.

II. Mandamus Standard of Review

Mandamus is the proper remedy to correct a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court when relator has no adequate legal remedy. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992). To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must have a justiciable interest in the underlying controversy. Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 722 (Tex.1991). The Houston Chronicle has a justiciable interest in the gag order because it limits access to certain sources of information. A relator need not be a party to the underlying litigation or proceedings in order to seek mandamus relief. Id. at 723. While it has been held that mandamus is not available to compel an action which has not first been demanded and refused; see Axelson v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex.1990); we do not find that the Houston Chronicle was required to seek modification of the order below prior to filing its petition for writ of mandamus. See Terrazas at 724-25. Contrary to the State's position, nothing in the record suggests that Judge Hill intended to include the Houston Chronicle as a party. Relator has no adequate remedy at law in regards to the subject order; therefore its petition for writ of mandamus was procedurally correct.

Having determined that a mandamus proceeding is proper under these circumstances, we next address whether the Houston Chronicle has standing to complain of the gag order to which it is not a party.

III. Standing

The threshold question of whether relator has standing to attack a gag order to which it is neither a party nor the direct subject of restraint is one of apparent first impression for our Texas courts. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472-74, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), the Supreme Court held that "standing" requires a party to allege (1) a personal injury in fact, (2) a violation of its own rights, not those of a third party, (3) that the injury falls within the zone of interests protected by the constitutional guarantee involved, (4) that the injury is traceable to the challenged act, and (5) that the courts can grant redress for the injury. According to our survey of pertinent case law, a majority of courts have concluded that the media does have limited standing to raise the issue under these guidelines1.

Applying the standing test set forth in Valley Forge Christian College, supra, we note that relator has been "injured" in that the order restricts some of its news sources or potential sources. This violation, if found to exist, pertains to relator's own rights, and the injury falls within the zone of interests protected by the First Amendment. We hold relator has standing because it has asserted an interest that is at least "arguably" protected by the First Amendment.

Although the Houston Chronicle claims in general terms that the order is an unconstitutional prior restraint, it has not briefed the specific issue of whether a gag order constitutes a prior restraint of a newspaper's First Amendment rights when the order effectively denies media access to trial participants by restraining the trial participants. We will address this question because it is pivotal to our disposition of relator's petition and significant to the jurisprudence of our state.

IV. Right of Access to Trial Participants

As with the issue of standing, Texas courts have not yet determined whether constitutional rights are infringed by a gag order that does not directly restrain the media but limits the actions of trial participants. Our courts have previously addressed the issue of balancing First Amendment rights of the media with Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant when an order directly restrains the media. See, e.g. Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Walker, 834 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.1992) (holding that trial court may not issue a protective order to prohibit a newspaper from publishing information already disclosed in open court); San Antonio Express-News v. Roman, 861 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, orig. proceeding) (striking down gag order which prohibited media from disseminating identities of testifying minors who were identified in open court). It is undisputed that Judge Hill's order neither denies the Houston Chronicle access to the criminal proceedings nor restricts dissemination of any information. Therefore, we must determine whether the Houston Chronicle has a constitutional right to interview or interrogate trial participants.

In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), the Supreme Court affirmed the First Amendment "right of access" or "right to gather information" granted to the media regarding criminal trials. The Court described that right, however, as only a right to sit, listen, watch and report. The press has no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). In short, the media's right to gather information during a criminal trial is no more than a right to attend the trial and report on their observations. See Sioux Falls Argus Leader v. Miller, 610 N.W.2d 76 (S.D.2000) (holding that gag order on...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • In re Benton
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 16, 2007
    ... ... No. 14-07-00804-CV ... Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.) ... November 16, 2007 ... [238 S.W.3d 588] ...         Brian W. Wice, ... , July 12, 2007, the following article about these negotiations appeared in the Houston Chronicle: ... 238 S.W.3d 589 ...         Ashley Benton's attorneys will try again to negotiate a ... ...
  • Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, No. 03-04-00683-CV (Tex. App. 7/3/2009)
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 3, 2009
    ...of interests" standing requirement that is utilized in the context of an Administrative Procedure Act claim. But see In re Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 64 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (applying zone-of-interests test to a federal constitutional claim). We need ......
  • In re Graves
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 21, 2007
    ...906 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd). Judicial notice of pretrial publicity may also be appropriate. See, e.g., In re Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 64 S.W.3d 103, 105 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding). The Houston Chronicle case arose from the "undeniably tragic ep......
  • Bonilla v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • December 12, 2012
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT