In re in the Estate of Neal
Decision Date | 09 November 2017 |
Docket Number | NO. 02-16-00381-CV,02-16-00381-CV |
Parties | IN THE ESTATE OF LARRY RONALD NEAL, DECEASED |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF WISE COUNTY
Larry Ronald Neal executed a will in which he bequeathed his personal property to his niece, Valorie Jean White. That much is undisputed. The determinative question in this appeal is whether under the will, Larry also devised his real property to Valorie. We conclude that he did not. We therefore reverse the part of the trial court's final judgment that awarded Larry's real property toValorie and determined that no part of Larry's estate passed by intestacy, and we render judgment that Larry's real property passed through intestacy to his heirs.
Larry died in 2014. Upon his death, Appellee Gary Neal, Larry's brother and his estate's executor, filed an application to probate Larry's 2009 will. The will contained the following language:
I, Larry Ronald Neal, . . . do hereby make . . . this to be my Last Will and Testament . . . .
I direct my Executor to pay my judicially enforceable debts, funeral expenses[,] and the administrative expenses of my estate as soon after my death as practicable. . . .
In September 2015, the trial court signed an order that admitted the will to probate, appointed Gary as independent executor, and directed the court's clerk to issue letters testamentary.
The next month, Appellant Lori Neal Freitag, Larry's daughter, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment under chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.2 In her pleading, Lori contended that Article II of Larry's will entitled Valorie to receive Larry's personal property only. Lori argued that the will did not dispose of Larry's real property and that the real property therefore passed by intestacy to her and to Larry's two sons. She also pleaded that Gary, as independent executor, was taking the opposite position.
Gary filed an answer to Lori's petition and, through a counterclaim, also sought declaratory relief. He argued that because Article II of the will gave Valorie "all other things owned" by Larry, the will entitled Valorie to receive Larry's real property. He also contended that Article IV supported his interpretation of Article II because Article IV gave him the authority to sell andmanage "real or personal" property. He asserted that Larry's will "unambiguously contemplate[d] disposition of the entirety" of Larry's estate.
The trial court held a bench trial on the parties' requests for declaratory relief.3 After the trial, the court rendered judgment in Gary's favor. The court found that all of Larry's real and personal property passed to Valorie under the will.
Lori raises two issues on appeal: the trial court erred by finding that Larry's real property passed to Valorie under the will, and the trial court erred by considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the will's language. With respect to the first issue, she argues that Article II, the will's sole provision expressly relating to the disposition of Larry's property, omits any reference to real property and unambiguously bequeaths only personal property. In response, Gary contends that the will contains "gift language encompassing all things owned by [Larry] at the time of his death." Gary also argues that we must apply a legal presumption against the passing of property through partial intestacy and that Article IV, which grants him authority to sell or manage real property, informs Larry's intent to dispose of real property through the language of Article II.
We review a trial court's construction of unambiguous language in a will de novo. Jinkins v. Jinkins, 522 S.W.3d 771, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]2017, no pet.). When a trial court's construction of an unambiguous term in a will is erroneous, we will reverse the trial court's judgment and render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. See In re Estate of Slaughter, 305 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.).
The principles that we use in construing a will are familiar and settled:
Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 372-73 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (footnotes omitted); see also Jinkins, 522 S.W.3d at 780 ( ).
Id.; see In re Estate of Tyner, 292 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) ("single clause [in a will] will not govern, but must be read in the context of the entire instrument") that language of a . When the meaning of language used in a will has been settled by usage and sanctioned by judicial decisions, it is presumed to be used in the sense that the law has given to it, and should be so construed, unless the context of the will shows a clear intention to the contrary. Stephens v. Beard, 485 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. 2016).
The question here is whether Larry gave Valorie his real property or only his personal property. Real property includes 4 Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 22.030 (West 2014); see also Tex. TaxCode Ann. § 1.04(2) (West 2015) ( ). Personal property includes an interest in goods, money, a chose in action, an evidence of debt, and a real chattel. Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 22.028 (West 2014); see Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.04(4) ( ). When a testator bequeaths "property" without qualification as to real or personal, the bequest "encompasses everything of exchangeable value that the testator owned." In Estate of Setser, No. 01-15-00855-CV, 2017 WL 444452, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ellet v. McCord, 41 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1931, writ ref'd)). On the other hand, we will enforce a testator's expressed intent to pass less than all of the testator's property through a will. See Carr v. Rogers, 383 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. 1964) ( ).
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