In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., s. A09–1776

Decision Date30 November 2011
Docket NumberNos. A09–1776,A09–1778.,s. A09–1776
Citation806 N.W.2d 811
PartiesIn re INDIVIDUAL 35W BRIDGE LITIGATION.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

West Codenotes

Prior Version Recognized as Unconstitutional

M.S.A. § 541.051

Syllabus by the Court

The 2007 amendments to Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (2010) do not clearly and manifestly express a legislative intent to retroactively revive an action for contribution previously extinguished by the statute of repose before the amendments were effective.

Jocelyn L. Knoll, George Eck, Eric A.O. Ruzicka, Colin Wicker, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant URS Corporation.

David F. Herr, James Duffy O'Connor, Kirk O. Kolbo, Leora Maccabee, Diana Marianetti, Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

This case arises out of the August 1, 2007, collapse of the Interstate 35W Bridge (Bridge) where it crosses the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Following the collapse, individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against appellant URS Corporation (URS), a contractor that performed work on the Bridge pursuant to a contract entered into with the State of Minnesota. URS then brought a third-party complaint against respondent Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (Jacobs), for indemnity and contribution on the basis that Jacobs' predecessor negligently designed the Bridge. Jacobs moved to dismiss the lawsuits as time-barred, and argued that the 2007 amendments to Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (2010) did not revive actions for contribution or indemnity that had been previously extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose. Jacobs also argued that it did not have common liability with URS to support an action for contribution. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed. Because we conclude that the 2007 amendments to Minn.Stat. § 541.051 do not retroactively revive URS's action for contribution against Jacobs, we affirm the court of appeals.

The factual background of this dispute begins with the design and construction of the Interstate 35W Bridge. In October 1962, Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc. (Sverdrup), entered into a contract with the State to prepare design and construction plans for the Bridge. Sverdrup certified the final Bridge design and construction plans in March 1965, and construction of the Bridge was substantially completed in 1967. Between 1966 and 1999, Sverdrup went through a series of name changes and mergers. In September 1999, Sverdrup Corporation merged with Jacobs, and Jacobs was the surviving corporation. Jacobs is the successor in interest to Sverdrup for the purpose of this proceeding.

In 2003, the State entered into a series of contracts with URS to inspect the Bridge to determine the nature and scope of maintenance needed to be performed on the Bridge. URS contracted with the State to perform a fatigue evaluation and fracture analysis of the Bridge. On August 1, 2007, the Bridge collapsed, resulting in the deaths of 13 people and injuries to 145 others. In 2008, the Legislature passed the compensation statutes, Minn.Stat. §§ 3.7391–.7395 (2010), to compensate “survivors” of the collapse.1 Subsequently, the State entered into settlement agreements with 179 survivors who made statutory claims for compensation. All of the survivors who settled pursuant to the compensation statutes signed releases with the State.

Individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against URS for negligence, breach of contract, and resulting damages.2 The district court consolidated the individual plaintiffs' cases for pretrial purposes and dismissed the plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. URS then brought a third-party complaint against Jacobs for indemnity and contribution asserting that Jacobs, which is the successor-in-interest to Sverdrup, was legally responsible for Sverdrup's negligent design that caused the Bridge to collapse. The asserted negligence included the selection of gusset plates that allegedly were only half the necessary thickness. In its lawsuit, URS argues that Jacobs is liable to URS as a joint tortfeasor for its proportionate share of the liability to the individual plaintiffs for their injuries.

Jacobs moved to dismiss the third-party causes of action for contribution and indemnity on the basis that those causes of action were extinguished by the statute of repose in section 541.051. Jacobs also argued that it acquired a vested right to immunity from suit upon expiration of the statute of repose, and that reviving actions against it would violate its due process rights under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. Finally, Jacobs argued it did not share common liability with URS to the plaintiffs that is necessary to support a contribution action. URS argued that it could bring third-party actions against Jacobs as a result of the 2007 amendments to section 541.051, which revived its causes of action for contribution and indemnity. After a hearing, the district court denied Jacobs' motion to dismiss the third-party causes of action and Jacobs appealed.3

In a published opinion, the court of appeals reversed the district court and dismissed URS's third-party actions for contribution and indemnity against Jacobs. In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 786 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn.App.2010). The court concluded that an essential element of the action for contribution is that Jacobs and URS share a common liability to the individual plaintiffs, and that the statute of repose for direct claims in section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), precludes common liability. Id. at 896. The court of appeals did not address whether the 2007 amendments to section 541.051 applied retroactively to revive URS's actions for contribution and indemnity against Jacobs. Subsequently, we granted URS's petition for further review and Jacobs' conditional request for cross-review.

I.

On appeal, URS argues that the court of appeals erred in granting Jacobs' motion to dismiss its action for contribution on the basis that there is no common liability between Jacobs and URS to the plaintiffs.4 Specifically, URS argues that the statute of repose for direct claims in section 541.051, subdivision 1(a), does not destroy common liability between URS and Jacobs to the plaintiffs. Jacobs argues that URS's cause of action for contribution was extinguished by the statute of repose in section 541.051 and therefore the cause of action is time-barred.

We review de novo decisions on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn.2003). The question before the court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Id. We consider only those facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. We also review de novo the interpretation of a statute. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn.2006). In construing the language of a statute, we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2010); Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999). Thus, if the language of a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, our role is to enforce the language of the statute, and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010).

Contribution is an equitable remedy that allows “one who has discharged more than his fair share of a common liability or burden to recover from another who is also liable the proportionate share which the other should pay or bear.” Hendrickson v. Minn. Power and Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104 N.W.2d 843, 846 (1960). The elements of contribution are “common liability of joint tortfeasors to an injured party and the payment by one of the tortfeasors of more than his share of that liability.” Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn.1979). In its contribution action, URS asserts that Jacobs is liable to URS as a joint tortfeasor for its proportionate share of the liability to the individual plaintiffs for their injuries resulting from the Bridge collapse.

The crux of this dispute is whether the statute of repose for direct claims in section 541.051 destroys common liability between URS and Jacobs to the individual plaintiffs. Because the question of whether URS's action for contribution against Jacobs was extinguished by the statute of repose for contribution and indemnity claims in section 541.051 is dispositive, we address that issue first.

Jacobs argues that URS's contribution action was extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose in section 541.051. Specifically, Jacobs argues that the Bridge was substantially completed in 1967, and that the repose period expired ten years later in 1977, or at a minimum fifteen years later in 1982. URS counters that the 2007 amendments to section 541.051 allowed its action for contribution to accrue after the June 30, 2006, effective date of the amendments, and therefore its action for contribution was not barred by the statute of repose. Jacobs responds that the 2007 amendments do not retroactively revive causes of action previously extinguished by the statute of repose. To answer the question presented, we must decide what version of the statute of repose is applicable and whether that statute bars URS's cause of action.

Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 sets forth time limitations for bringing an action for damages, including an action for contribution or indemnity, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property. Section 541.051 contains both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. A statute of limitations has the effect of limiting the time in which a party can pursue a remedy, and a statute of repose limits the time in which a party...

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