In re Interest of M.K., No. 02-19-00459-CV
| Decision Date | 23 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-19-00459-CV |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF M.K., A CHILD |
On Appeal from the 211th District Court Denton County, Texas
Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Birdwell, JJ.
After a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother's and Charles's parental rights to their daughter, Mary.1 Only Charles has appealed.
In Charles's first issue, he contends that the termination is improper because the Department of Family and Protective Services never proved his paternity. And in Charles's second through ninth issues, he asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove the eight grounds on which the trial court relied to terminate his rights. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (N), (O), (P).2
Because Charles's paternity had been determined in an earlier suit, we overrule his first issue. And because the evidence supports the trial court's (D) and (E) endangerment findings, we overrule Charles's second and third issues. Finally, because our rulings on Charles's first three issues make it unnecessary to dispose of his remaining issues, we deny them as moot. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In his first issue, Charles contends that because the Department never established that he was Mary's father, the Department never established that he had any parental rights to terminate. We disagree.
The Department brought two sequential termination proceedings against Charles.
In the first one, the trial court implicitly adjudicated Charles as Mary's father, awarded Charles possessory conservatorship, and ordered Charles to pay child support. In the current case, Charles relies on this order's failure to expressly adjudicate his paternity to support his argument.
In the second termination proceeding, precisely because Charles's paternity had already been resolved, the pleadings and evidence never questioned that issue, and the case proceeded with the implicit understanding that Charles was Mary's father. On appeal, Charles relies on the resulting absence of evidence squarely addressing his paternity to further support his contention.
Although Charles argues this issue in terms of evidentiary sufficiency, we disagree with his premise. The trial court determined Charles's paternity in the first proceeding, and Charles never appealed that order. By the time the Department filed the second suit, Charles's paternity was already res judicata.
In 2015, the Department filed a petition in which it identified Charles as Mary's "alleged father," asked to determine Charles's paternity, and sought to terminate his parental rights.3 An "alleged father" is "a man who alleges himself to be, or is alleged to be, the genetic father or a possible genetic father of a child, but whose paternity has not been determined." Id. § 101.0015(a). When a proceeding to adjudicate a child's parentage is filed, "[t]he court shall render an order adjudicating whether a man alleged or claiming to be the father is the parent of the child." See id. § 160.636(a); see also id. § 160.601. Thus, one way or another, this first suit was going to resolve Charles's paternity.
DNA testing later corroborated that Charles was Mary's father.
After the DNA results, the parties entered an agreed order in late 2016 in which the court:
Although the agreed order does not expressly adjudicate Charles as Mary's father, it does so implicitly. Only "parents" pay child support. See id. § 154.001(a). A "parent" is "an individual who has established a parent-child relationship under Section 160.201." Id. § 160.102(11). And a "father-child relationship is established . . . by . . . an adjudication of the man's paternity." Id. § 160.201(b)(3). Whatever the order's arguable flaws, Charles agreed to pay child support, and by so agreeing, Charles was also agreeing that he was Mary's father. Given the DNA results, Charles had no basis to dispute his paternity in any event. Charles also acknowledged that he was conceding his paternity when both he and his attorney signed the agreed order above signature lines that expressly identified Charles as Mary's father.
When construing a judgment, courts should consider the record and the written instrument's entire content. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam). And courts should construe judgments as a whole toharmonize and give effect to all portions. Id. Using these principles, we hold that the 2016 order established—that is, adjudicated—Charles as Mary's father. See id.
After the trial court signed this order, Charles never appealed it. Thereafter, neither the parties nor the court ever questioned Charles's paternity; it was treated as a given.
In late 2018, the Department filed a motion to modify under the same cause number as the first proceeding and again sought termination. This time, though, the Department identified Charles specifically as "[t]he father of the child [Mary]." And in this second proceeding, unlike in the first, the Department did not ask to adjudicate Charles's paternity.
Charles entered a general denial in which he identified himself as "Respondent Father." Charles also admitted being Mary's father in a July hearing that preceded the November 2019 trial.
Throughout the termination trial itself, Charles was identified as Mary's father. At one point, when asked why Mary's attorney had recommended suspending Charles's and Mother's visitation rights earlier in the case, a witness responded, "The recommendation was to suspend visits due to it[s] being traumatic for [Mary] to see the—her biological parents." And during trial, the 2016 order adjudicating Charles's paternity was among the exhibits admitted—without objection. Precisely because Charles's paternity had already been resolved in the first suit, paternity was not litigated in the second.
Even in his notice of appeal, Charles identified himself as "Respondent Father," yet he now seeks to relitigate his paternity.
We hold that by the time the Department filed its second termination petition, Charles's paternity was res judicata. See Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. 2017); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). The time to dispute paternity had passed.
We overrule Charles's first issue.
In his remaining issues, Charles attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the eight grounds for termination.
In a termination case, the State seeks not just to limit parental rights but to erase them permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except the child's right to inherit. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, "[w]hen the State seeks to sever permanently the relationship between a parent and a child, it must first observe fundamentally fair procedures." In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2012) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391-92 (1982)).
Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b), .206(a); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012). Due process demands this heightened standard because "[a] parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value 'far more precious than any property right.'" E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 555 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59, 102 S. Ct. at 1397). Evidence is clear and convincing if it "will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.
For a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship, the party seeking termination must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent's actions satisfy just one of the many predicate grounds (currently up to 21) that are listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the child's best interest under Section 161.001(b)(2). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005).
Regarding Subsection 161.001(b)(1) grounds, the supreme court recently articulated an important qualification: if the trial court finds grounds under Subsection (b)(1)(D) or (E)—both of which involve endangering a child's physical or emotional well-being—an appellate court must review the (D) or (E) grounds on appeal because they have potential collateral consequences for other children the parent may have. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (); In re N.G.,577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curium) ("[I]f a court of appeals affirms the termination on either [(D) or (E)] grounds, it must provide the details of its analysis.")....
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