In re Interest of D.C.
| Decision Date | 13 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-18-00114-CV,06-18-00114-CV |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF D.C. AND E.C.-B., CHILDREN |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
Judy appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children, Dora and Ethan,1 rendered on the petition of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department). The termination of Judy's parental rights was based on findings by the trial court: (A) that she knowingly placed or allowed Dora and Ethan to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being; (B) that she engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the children's physical or emotional well-being; (C) that she failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of Dora and Ethan, who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of their removal from her under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect; and (D) that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interest.2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (Supp.).
On appeal, Judy argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the four findings listed above, that the trial court erred in admitting allegedly undisclosed evidence, and that the jury was erroneously overextended by being required "to continue to hear evidence for well over 12 hours and when it was clearly apparent that the jury was beyond their ability to retain information."
We conclude that (1) the trial court's termination findings were based on sufficient evidence, (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, and (3) Judy failed to preserve for our review her complaint of jury overexertion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
"The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions." Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning "the care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at trial." In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014). This Court is therefore required to "engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to support the termination of parental rights." Id. at 500. "[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent." In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20).
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Supp.); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012). "Clear and convincing evidence" is that "degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations soughtto be established." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007; see In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009). This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the evidence.
In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.). We assume the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573.
In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the fact-finder could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). We consider only that evidence and determine "whether [it] is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the . . . allegations." Id. at 108 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. "[I]n making this determination, [we] must undertake 'an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.'" A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26).
Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, "the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount." In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994)); see In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). "A child's emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights." In re C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26).
"To affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best interest finding—even if the trial court based the termination on more than one ground." In re N.G., No. 18-0508, 2019 WL 2147263, at *1 (per curiam); see In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (). However, due process demands that we also review the evidence supporting findings under Grounds D and E when they are challenged on appeal because termination of parental rights under these Grounds "may have implications for . . . parental rights to other children." N.G., 2019 WL 2147263, at *2, 3. Therefore, we begin with Grounds D and E.
Judy lived with her fiancée, Craig, and her children, sixteen-year-old Jack, fifteen-year-old Dora, and six-year-old Ethan.3 Shatera Gunn, an investigator with Child Protective Services(CPS), testified that this case began when Dora made an outcry of sexual abuse against Jack, who was already on community supervision for assaulting Judy. Dora told Gunn that she was asleep on the couch and "woke up with her pants and panties pulled down to her ankle and her bra unbuckled" next to Jack, who was sitting on the couch awake. Dora said that Jack was the only person in the room and, while she was uncertain, she "felt like [Jack] had rubbed her thigh." Dora testified that Jack offered to do her chores if she kept the incident secret.
According to Gunn, Judy and Dora's aunt did not believe the outcry and claimed the child had a history of lying and made the allegation up because she was upset at being punished for making bad grades in school and wanted to get someone else in trouble. Gunn testified that, although there was not enough evidence to criminally charge Jack with sexual assault, Dora never wavered from her version of the alleged assault.
Judy admitted that she sometimes left the children home alone and that Jack, Dora, and Ethan were home alone when Dora alleged Jack had unclothed her. Judy testified that she believed Dora was lying about the accusation because, although she had cried after the incident, she was "laughing and giggling and trying to get the attention of everyone around her" at the hospital. According to Judy, Dora claimed Jack had "raped" her, but said the next day "that it didn't happen, that she was mad at [Judy]." Judy testified that one of Dora's counselors had also reported that Dora recanted her allegation and that Dora tended to lie. During cross-examination, Judy admitted the possibility that Jack had engaged in inappropriate activities with the children when they were left alone and admitted that Beatrice, Dora, and Ethan were all afraid of Jack.
Kassi Lightfoot, the program director of the Fannin County Children's Advocacy Center (CAC), testified regarding a CAC forensic interview she had conducted with Dora and Ethan. Lightfoot said Judy refused her request to stay after Dora's interview, yelled at her, and fled the CAC with Dora. Lightfoot was concerned about Dora's safety because Judy was returning Dora home after Lightfoot explained it was unsafe for her to remain in the house with Jack given the allegation.
Gunn testified that a prior CPS case was already pending against Judy when the decision was made to remove Dora from the home while investigating her outcry. After the removal, Gunn said that Dora was physically attacked by Jack while they were at school. When asked about the attack, Judy said it was Dora's fault because "[s]he was picking on him at school, telling people that he had raped her."4 Dora had a black eye, said it was due to a medical condition, and denied that it was a result of Jack's assault at school....
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