In re Interest of C.A.J.

• Decision Date: 27 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 06–14–00089–CV,06–14–00089–CV
• Citation: 459 S.W.3d 175
• Parties: In the Interest of C.A.J., a Child
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

459 S.W.3d 175

In the Interest of C.A.J., a Child

No. 06–14–00089–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Date Submitted: February 25, 2015

Date Decided: February 27, 2015

Jason L. Horton, Horton Law Firm, Texarkana, TX, for appellant.

Ebb B. Mobley, Attorney at Law, Longview, TX, for appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Carter,^* JJ.

OPINION

Bailey C. Moseley, Justice

Alice Jenson brought suit to terminate Larry Jenson's parental rights to C.A.J.¹ After a bench trial, the trial court found (1) that Larry had been convicted for being criminally responsible for conduct that caused the serious injury of a child, (2) that Larry's behavior would constitute indecency with a child, (3) that Larry knowingly placed or knowingly allowed C.A.J. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being, (4) that Larry engaged in conduct or knowingly placed C.A.J. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered her physical or emotional well-being, and (5) that termination of Larry's parental rights was in C.A.J.'s best interest. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (L)(iv), (2) (West 2014). Accordingly, the trial court terminated Larry's parental rights to C.A.J. On appeal, Larry argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient² to support any of the statutory grounds for termination and the trial court's finding regarding the best interest of the child.

We overrule Larry's points of error and affirm the trial court's termination of his parental rights to C.A.J.

I. Sufficient Evidence Supports a Statutory Ground for Termination

A. Standard of Review

“The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1985). Due to the gravity of the parent-child relationship, we strictly scrutinize parental-rights termination proceedings; when construing the predicate grounds for termination of parental rights, “ ‘involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.’ ” In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20 ). To terminate an individual's parental rights to his child, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of both of the following statutory requirements: (1) that the parent has engaged in one of the statutory grounds for termination and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West 2014) ; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex.2012) ; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex.2002). The clear and convincing burden of proof has been defined as that “measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 2014) ; see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 23. Due process demands this heightened standard. E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.2002) ).

In a legal sufficiency review, termination findings are given appropriate deference. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002) ; Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex.App.–Austin 2005, no pet.). In such cases, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven.

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802–03 (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2011, no pet.). We assume that the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in favor of the findings if a reasonable fact-finder could do so. E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802–03 (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Conversely, we disregard evidence that the fact-finder may have reasonably disbelieved or testimony from witnesses whose credibility may reasonably be doubted. E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802–03 (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573.

The inquiry in a factual sufficiency review is whether the evidence, viewed in a neutral light, “is such that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the ... allegations.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 ; J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d at 846. If, in weighing disputed evidence, the fact-finder could have reasonably resolved the conflicts to form a firm conviction that the allegations constituting the grounds for termination were true, then the evidence is factually sufficient, and the termination findings must be upheld. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19 ; see J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In applying this standard in light of the clear and convincing standard, we must be careful not to “ ‘be so rigorous that the only factfindings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” In re R.A.L., 291 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex.2006) (per curiam)).

“Only one predicate finding under [S]ection 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.2003) ; In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2011, no pet.) ; In re N.R., 101 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2003, no pet.). “ ‘If multiple predicate grounds are found by the trial court, we will affirm based on any one ground because only one is necessary for termination of parental rights.’ ” K.W., 335 S.W.3d at 769 (quoting In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 388 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2011, no pet.) ).

While a parent's rights to “ ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management,’ ” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) ), of his children are constitutional interests “far more precious than any property right,” “ ‘the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount.’ ” A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361 (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex.1994) ); see In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex.2003). A child's emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.

B. The Evidence

The record of the termination hearing demonstrated that Larry was a drug addict. He admitted to the trial court that he had abused drugs like methamphetamine and marihuana on a regular basis for most of his life. Larry's mother testified that Larry tried to quit using drugs “[v]ery many ... times.” Larry's brother testified that Larry sought help through numerous drug treatment programs, but eventually succumbed to his addiction. As a result of his drug use, Larry had been confined in state jail three times, and he also served a sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary. Larry, who was thirty-four years old at the time of the termination hearing, testified, “I've spent more ... time in prison or in TDC or Texas custody from the time I've been a kid to now....” While Larry was incarcerated, his daughter, C.A.J., was born to Alice. By the time Larry was released, C.A.J. was one and one-half years old.

After Larry served his prison sentence, he resumed his relationship with Alice, C.A.J., and Alice's two other children by another man, E.C. and N.C. According to the testimony of Larry and his biological mother, Larry fell in love with all of Alice's children and, once again, decided to turn his life around by refraining from illegal drug use. During a period of sobriety, Larry married Alice and became a good provider and a loving father.

At the termination hearing, Alice testified that Larry used drugs “off and on” during their relationship. She explained that she would “kick him out,” but that he would “clean up and come home.” However, Larry claimed that he was sober for almost five years—until an argument led to his decision to leave Alice and relapse. Even though Larry knew that his drug use was a danger to C.A.J., E.C., and N.C., Larry admitted that he used drugs towards the end of his marriage to Alice. Larry testified that after he left Alice, he started socializing with old friends who were using drugs, put himself “in the wrong places at the wrong time,” had “a weak moment,” and resumed his drug use.

On June 1, 2012, Alice allowed Larry to take the children on a camping trip. While the children were in his care, Larry smoked methamphetamine. That night, while he was still under the influence of illegal drugs, Larry penetrated eleven-year-old E.C.'s vagina with his fingers while she was sleeping. Alice drove to the campsite on the following morning. She testified that Larry and his friends, who had recently arrived, were gathered in the parking lot while her three children were swimming in a lake, unsupervised by any adult. Because Alice believed that Larry's friends were using drugs, she gathered the children and drove away. Alice testified that Larry did not see the children after this camping trip and made no attempt to do so.

As of the entry of Alice and Larry's divorce decree in September 2012, E.C. had made no outcry of abuse. However, shortly after the divorce decree was entered, Larry became suicidal and purposefully overdosed on “a bunch of Valium and Soma and stuff.” Referring to Larry's indecent act with E.C., Larry's brother testified that Larry “tr[ied] to commit suicide because he couldn't live with the shame of what he'd done.” Larry's suicide attempt was unsuccessful. According to Alice, Larry confessed to the act of indecency with E.C. as soon as he was revived. Larry told the trial court that he was consumed with guilt and confessed his act to Alice and a few other family members because he “wanted to make sure [that E.C.] was okay...