In re Interest of L.W.
| Decision Date | 13 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | 06-20-00012-CV |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF L.W. and K.R., Children |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Natalie A. Anderson, Attorney at Law, Longview, for Appellant.
Jerry Reyes, Office of General Counsel, Austin, for Appellee.
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed a petition in the County Court at Law No. 2 of Gregg County seeking to terminate Mother's rights to her two children, L.W., and K.R.1 After a bench trial, the trial court found that (1) Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed L.W. and K.R. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being; (2) Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed L.W. and K.R. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being; (3) Mother failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of L.W. and K.R. after they were left in conservatorship of the Department; and (4) termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2) (Supp.).
On appeal, Mother contends that (1) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to terminate her rights under subsections D, E, and O and (2) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that termination was in the best interests of the children. Because we conclude that (1) sufficient evidence supports termination under grounds D and E, and (2) sufficient evidence supports the finding that termination was in the children's best interests, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
"The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions." In re E.J.Z. , 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Holick v. Smith , 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) ). "Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning ‘the care, custody, and control of their children.’ " Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) ). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at trial." Id. (quoting In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014) ). This Court is required to "engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is ... sufficient to support the termination of parental rights." Id. (quoting A.B. , 437 S.W.3d at 500 ). "[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent." Id. (quoting In re S.K.A. , 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick , 685 S.W.2d at 20 )).
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 ; In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012) ). " ‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is that ‘degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’ " Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (citing In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) )). "This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the evidence." Id.
"In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven." In re L.E.S. , 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) ; In re J.L.B. , 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) ). "We assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted." Id. (citing J.P.B. , 180 S.W.3d at 573 ).
"In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing." Id. (citing In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) ). "We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the ... allegations.’ " Id. (quoting H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d at 109 (quoting In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) ) (citing In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002) ). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id. (quoting J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266 ). " ‘[I]n making this determination,’ we must undertake ‘an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’ " Id. (quoting In re A.B. , 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 26 )).
"Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, ‘the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount.’ " Id. (quoting In re A.V. , 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) ) (quoting In re J.W.T. , 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994) ) (citing In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003) ). "A child's emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights." Id. ().
"Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001 [b](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. at 923 (). Even so, in In re N.G. , the Texas Supreme Court held that due process demands that we review the evidence supporting findings under Grounds D and E when they are challenged on appeal because termination of parental rights under these Grounds "may have implications for ... parental rights to other children." In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). As a result, we focus our analysis on Grounds D and E.
As this case began, Mother and Father had two children together, L.W. and K.R.2 In May 2018, just two weeks after K.R. was born, the Department contacted Mother because she had called the police and reported Father for domestic violence. Mother claimed that, while the children were present, she and Father got into a fight and she was "thrown to the floor" and "choked." When the police arrived, they took photographs of her injuries. Mother admitted that she and Father had a history of domestic violence, but she did not press charges because she only called law enforcement to scare Father.
The Department came to see Mother the next day and told her not to have any contact with Father. Yet, she admitted that she continued to give Father a ride to work. She testified that she knew if the Department found out about the rides that "the girls would have been removed" from her care. She also testified that, while Father moved in with his sister, Mother moved herself and the children to a domestic violence shelter in Gainesville, Texas.
In July 2018, when L.W. was one year old and K.R. was two months old, the Department filed its initial petition for protection, conservatorship, and termination. The children were removed form Mother's care and placed into the temporary care of Foster Mom.
Mother explained that a friend helped her get into Rahab's Retreat and Ranch, a domestic violence shelter that helps women get back on their feet by providing an in-house day care as well as counseling sessions and other programs. Mother confirmed that she had engaged in Department services at Rahab's for almost six months.3 Mother received a monitored return of the children, and she acknowledged that one of the provisions of the court-ordered monitored return was that she was required to stay at Rahab's with the children. She testified that she had no intention of staying at Rahab's once her children were returned to her. About a week after she got the children back, she left Rahab's without informing the Department, explaining that she "just wanted to get [the Department] out of the way and then ... return back to [Father]." Mother knew that leaving directly violated the trial court's order.
Other residents and employees of Rahab's testified regarding Mother's behavior and interactions with the children while there. Brooke Avery, a resident at Rahab's, testified that Mother "got really upset and ... pretty verbal" when K.R., who was having "bad stomach cramps," "pooped all over everything" after she was given medicine. Avery asked her mentors at Rahab's to "talk to [Mother], do something" because Mother was "verbally abusive." Avery heard Mother say that Avery witnessed Mother "slapping" the children, spanking them "hard," and being "rough" with K.R.
Dawn Meyers testified that,...
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