In re J.C.L.
| Decision Date | 15 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-11-00447-CV,10-11-00447-CV |
| Parties | IN RE J.C.L., A JUVENILE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
In this mandamus proceeding, we are asked to determine whether the respondent, Judge Robert Stem of the 82nd Judicial District Court, abused his discretion in failing to consider and hold a hearing on relator J.C.L.'s applications for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons stated herein, we conditionally grant relator's petition for writ of mandamus.
This is not the first time this matter has been before this Court. See generally In re J.C.L., No. 10-11-00407-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 28, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). As such, the majority of the operative facts in this case have been outlined in our opinion in relator's previously-filed mandamus. See id. at **1-3. In his previously-filed mandamus, relator complained about the trial court's decision to detain him because of: (1) his involvement in a one-car accident that resulted in the death of another minor, C.N.J.; (2) the allegation of delinquent conduct—criminally-negligent homicide; and (3) the conclusion that he is a danger to himself and the community. See id. at **1-2; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(1), 54.01 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (West 2011). We denied relator's mandamus on the basis that he had an adequate remedy other than mandamus relief to challenge his detention—in particular, a direct appeal pertaining to an application for a writ of habeas corpus that was pending in the trial court. See In re J.C.L., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756, at **4-7.
In this mandamus, relator notes that he filed his original habeas corpus application on October 25, 2011. The trial court notified him that a hearing would not be held on the application until the Robertson County District Attorney's Office responded. Nevertheless, relator sent letters to the trial court requesting a hearing on the application. While his application was pending in the trial court, relator was released from his ten-day detention on November 1, 2011; however, upon relator's release from detention, the trial court imposed several conditions upon relator, including a curfew, prohibiting relator from operating a motor vehicle under any circumstance, requiring relator to wear an electronic GPS monitoring device, and prohibiting relator from going anywhere other than home and school.1
In a letter dated October 25, 2011 but file-stamped November 4, 2011, the trial court informed the parties that relator's habeas corpus application was dismissed as moot because relator had been released from detention. Shortly thereafter, relator sent the trial court another letter requesting a hearing on his habeas corpus application. Relator specifically noted that:
On November 7, 2011, relator filed an amended habeas corpus application, challenging, once again, the legality of his detention and the conditions of release imposed by the trial court. In his amended application, relator also referenced our opinion in his previously-filed mandamus and included it in the appendix. Apparently, no action has been taken with respect to relator's amended application.
On December 2, 2011, relator filed this mandamus complaining that the trial court erred in concluding that his habeas corpus application was moot and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing on his habeas corpus application. We requested a response from the real party in interest, the Robertson County District Attorney's Office; a response was filed on December 21, 2011. On January 23, 2012, this matter was orally argued.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is "no adequate remedy by appeal." In re Prudential Ins.Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted). "A trial court has no 'discretion' in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts." Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). "Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. (citations omitted). And, generally speaking, an adequate legal remedy exists if the relator is able to raise the issue on appeal. See id. However, in some extraordinary cases, an appellate remedy may be inadequate when the benefits to mandamus review outweigh the detriments. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 462, 468-69 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136. Moreover, a relator has the burden of providing this Court with a sufficient record to establish his right to mandamus relief. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3, 52.7.
In his first issue, relator contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his original application for writ of habeas corpus is moot. We agree.
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question that we review de novo. See Trulock v. City of Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. See id.
"Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit in either federal or state court." Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. 2001) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)). For a plaintiff to have standing, a controversy must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S. Ct. 104, 106-07, 95 L. Ed. 36 (1950); see also Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (Tex. 2001). If a controversy ceases to exist or, in other words, "the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome," then the case becomes moot. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982); see O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct. 669, 683-84, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974) (); see also Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184. And if a case becomes moot, the parties lose standing to maintain their claims. Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1666-67, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983); Murphy, 455 U.S. at 481, 102 S. Ct. at 1183).
In his original habeas corpus application filed on October 25, 2011, relator argued that: "The State presented no evidence that the child was a flight risk, no evidence thatthe child was driving a vehicle and therefor, a danger to anyone, and no evidence that the child was not being adequately supervised by his parents." Relator also asserted that:
The juvenile system is designed to rehabilitate rather than incarcerate[;] protect, rather than punish. The Court in detaining the child in this case did the opposite. The Court decided to punish by incarceration and in so doing, did not protect the child. . . . [T]he juvenile system also seeks to avoid the taint of criminality and to prevent recidivism and promote rehabilitation. The best method of avoiding the attachment of criminal taint is by keeping the child completely out of the system. By detaining the child, in the instant case, the Court threw the child completely into the system.
Before he could get a hearing on his original habeas corpus application, relator was released from the juvenile detention center. However, after releasing relator from detention but without a hearing, the trial court imposed several conditions of release, which include a curfew, a prohibition from operating a motor vehicle, and requirements to wear a GPS-monitoring device and only go to school and his home. The trial court then issued a letter ruling dismissing relator's original habeas corpus application as moot.
The crux of relator's habeas corpus applications is that he has been and is currently being subjected to an unlawful restraint on his liberty. We agree that relator's liberty has been and continues to be restrained.3 In addition to being originally detained in the juvenile detention center, relator is currently subject to additional restraints on his liberty via the conditions imposed on his release. See Ex parte Williams,690 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. 1985) (" ") (quoting Ex parte Calhoun, 127 Tex. 54, 91 S.W.2d 1047, 1048 (1936)); see also Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349, 93 S. Ct. 1571, 1573-74, 36 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1973) (). As such, we find that a controversy—a continued restraint on relator's liberty—existed at the time of his release and remains in existence today. See Ex parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d at 244 ()4 ; see also In re Richards, 202 S.W.3d 779, 789 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, pet....
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