In re J.G.
| Decision Date | 15 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-143 / 12-1220,3-143 / 12-1220 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF J.G., Alleged to Be a Chronic Substance Abuser, J.G., Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Paul D. Miller, Judge.
J.G. appeals her involuntary commitment under Iowa Code chapter 125 (2011). REVERSED.
Willie E. Townsend, Coralville, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Gretchen Witte Kreamer, Assistant Attorney General, Janet M. Lyness, County Attorney, and Patricia Weir, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
J.G. appeals an order finding her to be a "chronic substance abuser"1 and ordering outpatient evaluation and treatment.
J.G.'s mother filed an application seeking J.G.'s involuntary hospitalization for chronic substance abuse. See Iowa Code §125.75 (2011). She supported the application with an affidavit attesting to her daughter's alcoholism and attempted suicide. She also attested that J.G. had a heart condition for which surgery was scheduled but later postponed because her "liver levels were to[o] high." Included with the application was a second affidavit signed by J.G.'s grandfather and containing similar attestations.
The district court issued an order for immediate custody and transport, and set the application for hearing. Follow-up testing revealed that J.G.'s blood alcohol concentration was .207 and her liver enzymes were "markedly elevated . . . consistent with excessive alcohol consumption." J.G. was placed in a detoxification unit at a substance abuse treatment center. A urine sample taken on her admission to the facility tested positive for marijuana.
After the first of two evidentiary hearings, the judicial hospitalization referee found J.G. to be a chronic substance abuser and ordered her placed at the facility on an outpatient basis for "evaluation and appropriate treatment." On appeal to the district court, which conducted a second de novo hearing pursuant to Iowa Code section 229.21(3)(c), the court ruled that J.G. was a chronicsubstance abuser under what was formerly Iowa Code section 125.2(5)(a) and again ordered her to undergo outpatient evaluation and treatment. J.G. moved for an expanded ruling, which the court denied. This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, the State contends the issues on appeal are moot because J.G. was discharged from outpatient treatment and the district court filed an order terminating the commitment. J.G. disagrees, asserting the appeal is not moot in light of the "collateral effects a commitment may have."
In general, an appeal is moot if the "issue becomes nonexistent or academic and, consequently, no longer involves a justiciable controversy." State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 2002). Ordinarily, we will not review moot issues, but there are exceptions. In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425, 428-29 (Iowa 2013).
In B.B., 826 N.W.2d at 428, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed the question of "whether an appeal from a finding that a person is seriously mentally impaired under chapter 229 becomes moot when the person is released from involuntary commitment and the proceedings are terminated." The court noted that other jurisdictions had adopted an exception to the mootness doctrine "if a judgment left standing will cause the appellant to suffer continuing adverse collateral consequences," including "the accompanying stigma" of an involuntary commitment. Id. at 429. The court adopted that exception, holding, "a party who has been adjudicated seriously mentally impaired and involuntarily committed is presumed to suffer collateral consequences justifying appellate review." Id. The court explained that the State could rebut the presumption by showing "'somenumber of prior involuntary commitment orders.'" Id. at 432 (quoting In re Joan K., 273 P.3d 594, 598 (Alaska 2012)).
This appeal does not involve an involuntary commitment for a "serious mental impairment" under Iowa Code chapter 229 but court-ordered treatment for chronic substance abuse under Iowa Code chapter 125. Nonetheless, we believe the rationale for adopting the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies equally to chapter 125 proceedings.
First, the court has interpreted these chapters similarly. See In re E.J.H., 493 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1992) (); see also In re R.P., 606 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa 2000) (evaluating procedures for the involuntary commitment or treatment of chronic substance abusers and stating "The Supreme Court has held that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty requiring due process protection." (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)). Second, the stigma associated with adjudication as a chronic substance abuser is not materially different from the stigma attending an adjudication based on a serious mental impairment. Indeed, the Iowa legislature's recent amendments to chapter 125 essentially equate substance abuse with mental illness, by defining "substance-related disorder" as "a diagnosable substance abuse disorder of sufficient duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within the most current diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American psychiatric association that results in a functional impairment."Iowa Code § 125.2(14) (2013). Compare Iowa Code chapter 125 (2011) with Iowa Code chapter 125 (2013); see 2011 Iowa Acts ch 121, §§ 24-50.
Applying this exception, we presume J.G. experienced collateral consequences as a result of her adjudication as a chronic substance abuser. We further conclude the State did not rebut the presumption by showing "'some number of prior involuntary commitment orders.'" B.B., 826 N.W.2d at 432 (quoting Joan K., 273 P.3d at 598). Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of J.G.'s appeal.
As noted, the application that precipitated these proceedings was accompanied by two affidavits, one from J.G.'s mother and one from her grandfather. See Iowa Code § 125.75(3)(b) (). J.G. contends the affidavits were "fabricated," rendering "the Application invalid under Iowa law" and "the [S]tate with no authority to proceed." We are not persuaded by this contention.
The mother's affidavit correctly stated that J.G. had a heart condition for which surgery was scheduled and then postponed. Although J.G. questioned the mother's attestation that the postponement was based on the status of her liver, that attestation was supported by the testimony of J.G's boyfriend, who stated the surgery was postponed in part because "the enzymes were off . . . in the liver." As for the mother's attestation that J.G. was an alcoholic, that attestation was supported by evidence of high blood alcohol content readings and aninconsistency between those readings and J.G.'s report of her alcohol consumption.
We recognize that certain portions of the mother's affidavit were unsupported and, in fact, contradicted by testimony at the second evidentiary hearing. For example, the mother attested to J.G.'s daily consumption of alcohol and the effects of that alcohol usage on J.G.'s intake of food and non-alcoholic drinks but she admitted she only saw her daughter "off and on." Additionally, she attested to a suicide attempt by J.G., an attempt that J.G.'s boyfriend categorically refuted. Without minimizing these inconsistencies, we are not convinced they rise to the level of outright fabrications.
The same holds true for the affidavit proffered by J.G.'s ninety-year-old grandfather. While he acknowledged that the attestations were primarily based on second-hand information from his wife and daughter, he also stated, "I had something to add to it."
In light of our conclusion that the affidavits were not fabricated, we further conclude that the affidavits did not render the application or subsequent hearings invalid.
J.G. contends the record lacks clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's determination that she was a chronic substance abuser. See Iowa Code § 125.82(4) (2011).2 "We will not set aside the trial court's findingsunless, as a matter of law, the findings are not...
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