In re J.T.
| Decision Date | 24 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2020-253-Appeal.,MH-20-400,2020-253-Appeal. |
| Citation | 252 A.3d 1276 |
| Parties | IN RE J.T. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Corrigan, Jr., for Petitioner.
Amy E. Veri, Esq., for Respondent.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court.
The respondent, J.T.,1 appeals from a District Court order committing him to a residential living facility for adults with developmental disabilities. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons outlined in this opinion, we affirm the order of the District Court.
The Rhode Island Department of Behavioral Healthcare, Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals (BHDDH) filed a petition in Sixth Division District Court for civil court certification to retain respondent, a person with developmental disabilities, in a residential facility. The petition asked that respondent be retained at a residential group home operated by the Justice Resource Institute (JRI), located in Cranston, Rhode Island. The petition further asserted that, before being admitted to the JRI home, respondent had been in the custody of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families since 2004, serving a sentence at the Rhode Island Training School (RITS) for an adjudication of delinquency, based on first-degree and second-degree child molestation charges. The petition stated that respondent had been admitted to the JRI facility on his release from the RITS on September 12, 2008.
Although respondent initially remained at the JRI voluntarily, when he signed a form in 2009 indicating that he intended to leave, BHDDH filed a petition with the District Court to retain respondent at the JRI, which petition was granted. The respondent remained at the JRI under court order from 2009 through July 2019, when BHDDH's subsequent petition to continue retention of respondent was denied. BHDDH then filed a new application in September 2019 to retain respondent at the JRI, which was granted by the District Court. BHDDH ultimately filed its petition for retention of respondent at the JRI in September 2020, which is the subject of the instant appeal. A hearing on the petition was held on September 25, 2020, before a judge of the District Court.2
Daniel Manfra, M.D., who was qualified as an expert in psychiatry, testified that he was asked to perform an assessment and evaluation of respondent for the purpose of the potential need to renew a court order and that he reviewed certain records and met with respondent. He testified that respondent's primary diagnosis was "that of intellectual disability disorder, which in his case is substantiated, not only by structural abnormalities found on brain imaging, but valid IQ estimates" and, "most importantly, by a documented consistent history in impairment in adaptive functioning," including "impairments in learning, impairments in self care, in appropriate social interactions, impairments in safety."
As to respondent's adaptive functioning, Dr. Manfra noted that, after the prior retention order was vacated in July 2019, respondent "impulsively left and sporadically returned to the group home, never having an established plan of what he was going to do, where he was going to stay, where he was going to register[3 ] or what medications he was going to take[.]" According to Dr. Manfra, respondent often failed to take his medications, both psychiatric and nonpsychiatric. Doctor Manfra further stated that respondent would not take medications when he left the group home, and that he "would often leave the group home at inopportune times, during severe thunderstorms, and then not know what to do and called the group home."
The doctor testified that he met with respondent on September 9, 2020, and "was struck by the lack of planning and forethought about his ideas to leave the group home[.]" He described various ideas that respondent had, such as staying with his mother or an ex-girlfriend or at a hotel. He particularly noted respondent's "inability to grasp the gravity of the situation, and how to properly register [as a sex offender], and why he should do that, and a plan for that." Doctor Manfra also stated that respondent's "over estimation of his own capabilities," including his ability to be independent, was striking.
Doctor Manfra offered his opinion that respondent required care and treatment at a residential facility, with a residential group home being "the only thing that will, at this point, lessen his risk." The doctor stated that he and the group home director had considered less restrictive options for respondent but believed that residential care was the only suitable option at that time. He agreed that, without twenty-four-hour supervision, respondent posed a serious risk of harm to himself and others because of his developmental disability.
After hearing testimony from Dr. Manfra and respondent himself, the hearing judge found, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent "has a developmental disability, and is in need of care and treatment in a facility[,]" and that his "continued unsupervised presence in the community would, by reason of that developmental disability, create a likelihood of serious harm, and that all alternatives have been investigated," deeming those alternatives unsuitable. He ordered respondent to "return to the group home."
An order was entered on September 25, 2020, finding that respondent was developmentally disabled, ordering that he reside at the JRI group home, and directing that he "not leave the group home * * * without the permission of the head of the facility."4 The respondent filed a notice of appeal to this Court on October 6, 2020.
On appeal, respondent makes two claims. First, he asserts that he is entitled to a de novo hearing in Superior Court, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 40.1-22-10(f).5 Second, respondent claims that the hearing judge erred in considering his "juvenile adjudication, uncharged conduct[,] and community notification requirement when determining that he is developmentally disabled," and further erred "in relying upon such evidence when determining that [his] discharge from JRI creates a serious risk of harm to himself or others."
It is well established that this Court reviews "questions of statutory interpretation de novo ." Crenshaw v. State , 227 A.3d 67, 71 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Epic Enterprises LLC v. Bard Group, LLC , 186 A.3d 587, 589 (R.I. 2018) ). "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. (quoting Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium , 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2012) ). "However, when faced with an ambiguous statute, ‘it is incumbent upon [this Court] to apply the rules of statutory construction and examine the statute in its entirety to determine the intent and purpose of the Legislature.’ " Id. (quoting Powers v. Warwick Public Schools , 204 A.3d 1078, 1086 (R.I. 2019) ).
Furthermore, "in effectuating the Legislature's intent," this Court reviews and considers "the statutory meaning most consistent with the statute's policies or obvious purposes." Providence Teachers’ Union Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hemond , 227 A.3d 486, 494 (R.I. 2020) (brackets omitted) (quoting Bailey v. American Stores, Inc./Star Market , 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1992) ).
This Court has not had the occasion to construe any portion of § 40.1-22-10, and, thus, respondent presents a question of first impression. What is clear to us is that § 40.1-22-10 was not artfully drafted and contains several ambiguities that we must construe.
Initially, it is clear that respondent is a "person aggrieved by the decision of a district court order for further residential care under the provisions of this section[,]" § 40.1-22-10(f), given that the proceeding that resulted in the order that he must continue to reside at the JRI facility was conducted under the guidance of this chapter. Furthermore, § 40.1-22-10(f) is clear that respondent has a right to "appeal the findings and order of the district court de novo to the court having appellate jurisdiction wherein the facility is located."
However, because § 40.1-22-10(f) does not address or specify if the appeal shall be to the Superior Court or to this Court, we must first identify the designated forum. Again, as set out supra , § 40.1-22-10(f) states that the aggrieved party may appeal the order "de novo to the court having appellate jurisdiction wherein the facility is located." It is readily apparent that we are faced with ambiguous statutory language. The inartful drafting of the pertinent statutory language here renders it plainly "susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning." Balmuth v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth , 182 A.3d 576, 585 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island , 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011) ). Again, "because we are confronted with a genuine ambiguity, and not one divined by crafty lawyering, we ‘will employ our well-established maxims of statutory construction in an effort to glean the intent of the Legislature.’ " Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project , 25 A.3d 482, 505 (R.I. 2011) ).
Article 10, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution declares that this Court "shall have final revisory and appellate jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity." This article was adopted "to make the Supreme Court primarily a court of appellate jurisdiction." D'Arezzo v. D'Arezzo , 107 R.I. 422, 426, 267 A.2d 683, 685 (1970). The...
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...party, and that he in fact agreed to it. Accordingly, this issue is waived, and we will not consider it on appeal. See In re J.T. , 252 A.3d 1276, 1282 (R.I. 2021) (explaining that, "in accordance with this Court's longstanding ‘raise-or-waive’ rule, if an issue was not properly asserted, a......