Providence Teachers' Union Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hemond

• Decision Date: 19 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2018-326-Appeal,PM 17-3514,2018-326-Appeal
• Parties: PROVIDENCE TEACHERS’ UNION LOCAL 958, AFT, AFL-CIO et al. v. Nicholas HEMOND et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

227 A.3d 486

PROVIDENCE TEACHERS’ UNION LOCAL 958, AFT, AFL-CIO et al.

v.Nicholas HEMOND et al.

No. 2018-326-Appeal

PM 17-3514

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 19, 2020

Justice Flaherty, for the Court,

The plaintiffs, Providence Teachers’ Union Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO, and Jennifer Leyden (collectively the Union), appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying their motion¹ to vacate an arbitration award and granting a motion of the defendants, Nicholas Hemond and the City of Providence (collectively the City), to confirm the same award.² On appeal, the Union argues that the trial justice erred in holding that the decision of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (the Retirement Board) granting Leyden’s application for an ordinary disability retirement retired Leyden as a matter of law. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel, and after thoroughly examining the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the order of the Superior Court, and we remand the case to that tribunal for entry of an order vacating the arbitration award.

IFacts and Travel³

During her nineteen-year tenure as a Providence school teacher, Leyden was assaulted by students on three separate occasions. After each incident, Leyden sought psychiatric treatment, and each time she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder

. Finally, after the third assault, Leyden became totally disabled, suffering symptoms that "included terror about returning to the classroom, difficulty sleeping, flashbacks, and panic attacks." For the first year that she was absent from her employment, Leyden received her full salary as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Union. After that benefit expired, Leyden applied for, was awarded, and received workers' compensation benefits.

On September 30, 2009, Leyden timely applied to the Retirement Board for both an accidental disability retirement and an ordinary disability retirement. In those applications, Leyden claimed that she was disabled due to a workplace injury. Three independent medical examinations confirmed that Leyden was in fact totally disabled and that she would never be able to return to work as a teacher. However, the Retirement Board denied Leyden’s application for an accidental disability retirement.⁴ After Leyden appealed that decision to the Superior Court, a trial justice vacated the Retirement Board’s denial and remanded the case to the Retirement Board for reconsideration of Leyden’s application.

After a two-year delay in her case, allegedly caused by a backlog of applications to the Retirement Board, and almost six years after Leyden became disabled, the Retirement Board again denied Leyden’s application for an accidental disability retirement. However, this time the Retirement Board voted to approve Leyden’s alternative application for an ordinary disability retirement.

The Retirement Board notified Leyden of its decision and advised her that she would be required to fill out and execute several forms before it could process her disability pension benefits. Also, and significant to our analysis of this appeal, the Retirement Board’s letter advised Leyden that, if she had not done so already, she would be required to terminate her employment with the City before she could receive her pension. Leyden did not submit a resignation letter or formally request to retire, nor did she fill out any of the other required forms.

While she was continuing to receive workers' compensation benefits, Leyden began to see a new doctor. Leyden maintained that, under the new physician’s care, she was improving and that she wanted to return to work. In July 2015, Leyden submitted a note from her primary care physician to the Providence School Department in which that doctor opined that Leyden could return to work with no restrictions. According to Leyden, she then spoke to someone at the School Department’s Human Resources Office, who told her that there would be "no problem" and that the necessary paperwork would be completed so that she could get a teaching assignment for the upcoming school year.

However, when Leyden later went to the School Department, another employee informed her that that School Department considered her to be retired. Still another School Department employee told Leyden that the computer records indicated that she was not retired but that she was receiving workers' compensation. That employee informed Leyden that, if she wished to retire, she would need to send a letter stating her intent to retire and the effective date of her retirement. A frustrated Leyden then contacted the Union for assistance. The Union filed a grievance, in which it alleged that the School Department had violated the collective bargaining agreement when it denied Leyden’s reinstatement to her former teaching position.

In response to the grievance, the School Department informed Leyden that, because of conflicting information about whether she was permanently disabled or not, it was scheduling an independent medical examination. Leyden reported for the examination and, according to Leyden, the examining physician informed her that she was fit to return to work. Subsequent to the examination, however, and in a confusing turn of events, the office of that independent medical examiner informed Leyden that the School Department had "canceled" the examination and therefore the doctor had shredded his report. In January 2016, the parties submitted the grievance to arbitration, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator was selected, and a hearing took place on August 23 of that year.

On February 16, 2017, the arbitrator, in a written decision, ruled in favor of the School Department. He held that, because Leyden had been retired, the grievance was not substantively arbitrable because, as a retiree, she was no longer a member of the bargaining unit and, thus, the Union had no standing to represent her. In so doing, the arbitrator accepted the City’s argument that the Retirement Board had retired Leyden as a matter of law when it granted her request for an ordinary disability pension.

The Union filed a motion in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitrator’s award under the terms of G.L. 1956 chapter 9 of title 28. In response, the City filed an objection and moved to confirm the arbitrator’s award. The trial justice agreed with the arbitrator that the grievance was not substantively arbitrable.⁵ She therefore granted the City’s motion to confirm the award, and she denied the Union’s motion to vacate the award. The Union timely appealed.

IIStandard of Review

"It is well settled that, in the typical case, the judiciary’s role in the arbitration process is limited." Providence School Board v. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO, 68 A.3d 505, 508 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Drago Custom Interiors, LLC v. Carlisle Building Systems, Inc., 57 A.3d 668, 670 (R.I. 2012) ). "When, as here, an arbitration provision is contained ‘in a written contract between an employer and an association of employees, a labor union, trade union, or craft union, the provisions of chapter 9 of title 28’ govern judicial review." Id. (deletions and brackets omitted) (quoting § 28-9-1). "Specifically, upon timely application for an order confirming an arbitration award, ‘the court must grant the order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in §§ 28-9-18 and 28-9-19, or unless the award is unenforceable under the provisions of § 28-9-13.’ " Id. (quoting § 28-9-17). Normally, the conditions for vacating an arbitrator’s award are extremely narrow. See ABC Building Corporation v. Ropolo Family, LLC , 179 A.3d 701, 705-06 (R.I. 2018) (stating that a similar arbitration statute, G.L. 1956 § 10-3-12, provides narrow conditions when an arbitration award shall be vacated).

"However, ‘the issue of whether a dispute is arbitrable is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. ’ " Providence School Board , 68 A.3d at 508 (brackets omitted) (quoting State Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers , 866 A.2d 1241, 1247 (R.I. 2005) ). Additionally, "questions about the meaning of statutes are reviewed de novo by this Court." Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 533 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Planned Environments Management Corp. v. Robert , 966 A.2d 117, 121 (R.I. 2009) ). Thus, we review the issue before this Court on appeal de novo.

IIIDiscussion

The issue that we must confront is whether or not the Retirement Board is cloaked with the authority to unilaterally retire a teacher pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 16-16-14. In the City’s view, the language "may retire" in § 16-16-14 provides the Retirement Board with this authority. In the Union’s view, nothing in either chapter 8 of title 36 of the general laws, governing the administration of the retirement system, or § 16-16-14 grants this authority to the Retirement Board. We agree with the Union.

Pursuant to chapter 16 of title 16, related to teachers' retirement, a teacher who seeks to retire may travel one of three paths. First, a teacher can apply for a service retirement based on the teacher’s age and length of service. Section 16-16-12. Second, a teacher who is permanently disabled as a result of an injury that was sustained in the performance of duty may apply for an accidental disability retirement. Section 16-16-16. Finally, and relevant to this case, a teacher whom the Retirement Board has found to be permanently disabled, but not as a result of an injury that was suffered in the performance of duty, may apply for an ordinary disability retirement. Section...