In re Jaime Rosas On Habeas Corpus
Decision Date | 14 February 2018 |
Docket Number | F073674 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | In re JAIME ROSAS On Habeas Corpus. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINIONAPPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael E. Dellostritto, Judge.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jessica N. Blonien and Krista L. Pollard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.
Michael Satris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent.
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Appellant Attorney General of California appeals the superior court's order granting respondent Jaime Rosas's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The order vacated a disciplinary decision of the California Department of Corrections (CDC) that had found respondent guilty of battery with a deadly weapon pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3005, subdivision (d)(1).1 We affirm because the facts do not establish battery.
In July 2013, two correctional officers were conducting body searches of prison inmates. An officer noticed a bulge in respondent's sock and asked him if he had anything there. Respondent denied that he was concealing anything in his sock. Respondent was ordered to remove his sock, and he again denied that he was concealing anything there. After being again ordered to remove his sock, respondent took it off and placed it on a counter. An officer picked up his sock to inspect it and was pricked by something, which caused bleeding. Another officer found an inmate manufactured syringe hidden inside respondent's sock.
In August 2013, a CDC rules violation hearing occurred. At the conclusion of the hearing, the CDC found respondent guilty of battery with a deadly weapon. The CDC made its findings based upon a preponderance of the evidence consistent with the facts above. In finding that respondent committed battery with a deadly weapon, the CDC expressly defined battery as "Violence" was defined, in part, as
Because of this violation, the CDC assessed various punishments against respondent, including a forfeiture of 360 days of credits.
In December 2014, respondent petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the CDC's decision. Respondent contended, in part, that he had lacked sufficient criminal intent to support the CDC's finding.
The superior court issued an order to show cause regarding whether any evidence supported the guilty finding of a violation of section 3005, subdivision (d)(1), for battery on a peace officer with a deadly weapon.
In response to the order to show cause, appellant filed a declaration in the superior court from a high-level CDC officer that sought to explain the CDC's interpretation of section 3005, subdivision (d)(1). According to the CDC's declaration,
In the superior court, appellant argued that some evidence supported the guilty finding. Appellant contended that, under the governing regulations, an inmate commits battery with a deadly weapon when an inmate commits an act that has the potential for injury, and someone is injured by that act. Further, appellant asserted that its interpretation of its own regulations was reasonable and entitled to judicial deference.
The superior court rejected appellant's arguments and found no "use of force" sufficient for battery under the facts presented. The court granted respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court vacated the disciplinary decision and ordered appellant to restore the 360-day credit loss.
Appellant filed this present appeal.
I. The Trial Court Correctly Found Insufficient Evidence Of Battery.
Appellant asserts that respondent is not entitled to habeas relief. Appellant requests that we reverse the superior court's order granting the petition.
(In re Dikes (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 825, 830.) However, because this appeal concerns an issue of law, we review this matter de novo. (In re Borlik (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 30, 35.) (Ibid.)
To satisfy procedural due process, a prison disciplinary decision that revokes time credits must be supported by "some evidence in the record." (Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 454.) (In re Dikes, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.)
Appellant argues that battery under the Regulations, unlike its counterpart under the Penal Code, does not require force or violence. Appellant asserts that respondent is guilty because he willfully set into motion the events which caused harm to the correctional officer. According to appellant, due process was satisfied because "some evidence" supported a finding of battery under this definition. We find appellant's contentions unpersuasive.
Pursuant to section 3005, subdivision (d)(1), prison inmates may not "willfully commit or assist another person in the commission of an assault or battery to any person or persons, nor attempt to threaten the use of force or violence upon another person." Neither this section nor the Regulations in general define battery. (See §§ 3000, 3005.) However, section 3005 cites Penal Code section 242, among other Penal Code sections, as an authority reference. (§ 3005, Notes.)
Penal Code section 242 defines a battery as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." Battery is a general intent crime. (People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107; James v. State of California (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 130, 142.) Battery cannot be found when the force or violence was accomplished with a lesser state of mind, such as criminal negligence. (People v. Lara, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 107.) (Ibid.) (People v. Lindsay (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 849, 855.)
Here, respondent concealed a syringe in his sock and then denied that he had anything in that sock when confronted by correctional officers. As ordered, respondent removed his sock and placed it on a counter. An officer manipulated the sock and was pricked by the syringe. As the superior court noted, these facts do not establish any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. Based on this record, respondent did not commit a battery.
We disagree with appellant that we should give deference to the CDC's definition of battery. Generally a...
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