In re Jansen

• Decision Date: 25 April 2005
• Citation: 826 N.E.2d 186,444 Mass. 112
• Parties: William JANSEN, petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 186

826 N.E.2d 186

444 Mass. 112

William JANSEN, petitioner.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 7, 2005.

Decided April 25, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Glynis Macveety for, Pittsfield, the petitioner.

Joan M. McMenemy, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Lee D. Flournoy, Pittsfield (Jeremia A. Pollard, North Adams, with her) for Richard C. Lampron.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

SPINA, J.

We consider in this case a challenge to an order entered by a judge in the Superior Court, pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 17(a)(2), 378 Mass. 885 (1979),¹ that William Jansen submit to a buccal swab for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis² at the request of Richard C. Lampron, the defendant in pending aggravated rape cases, who contends that the DNA analysis will yield exculpatory evidence that is highly relevant to his defense. Jansen is not a codefendant in the criminal proceedings against Lampron, nor has he been charged separately with any offense. Jansen sought review of the judge's order by filing a petition for relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, with a single justice of this court, who reserved and reported the matter, without decision, to the full court.³ For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order.

During the evening of September 24, 1998, at a house in Lee shared by Lampron, Jansen, and Aaron Kincaid, the victim, Gail,⁴ was allegedly drugged and sexually assaulted.⁵ Being acquainted with all three men, Gail identified Lampron and Kincaid as the only two perpetrators, although Jansen was also present in the house at the relevant time. Kincaid purportedly showed a videotape of the incident to some friends, but it has since been destroyed.⁶

On March 25, 1999, Lampron was indicted on four charges of aggravated rape (G.L. c. 265, § 22), and on March 31, 1999 he was indicted on one charge of administering a drug with intent to stupefy or overpower to enable sexual intercourse (G.L. c. 272, § 3). He then fled the jurisdiction until March, 2002, when he was returned to Berkshire County. In the meantime, Kincaid was tried and convicted on four indictments charging aggravated rape, arising from the events of September 24, 1998. See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 657, 813 N.E.2d 875, S.C., 442 Mass. 1112, 818 N.E.2d 1067 (2004).

Among the items produced at Kincaid's trial was a hair "barrette"⁷ that Gail claimed was inserted in her vagina during the sexual assaults. DNA testing conducted at the behest of the State police crime laboratory during its investigation indicated that there was a mixed sample of DNA in sperm fraction on the barrette. Kincaid was the primary source of the DNA, a fact that he apparently did not challenge because his defense was that he had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with Gail on the night in question. The other source of DNA on the barrette was not identified at his trial.

Once Lampron was returned to Berkshire County, the Commonwealth filed a motion to obtain a blood sample, which was allowed. DNA testing on that sample could not definitively include or exclude Lampron as a minor source of DNA found on the barrette. On May 14, 2002, Lampron filed a motion for an order to take a blood sample from Jansen, claiming that such sample would lead to material and relevant evidence that was crucial to establishing Lampron's innocence. A judge denied his motion, concluding that Lampron had failed to demonstrate the requisite probable cause for the issuance of such an order.

Lampron then hired a private investigator to obtain a sample of Jansen's DNA. During the early morning of July 23, 2004, the investigator's associate saw a person whom he believed to be Jansen leave a residence carrying two white bags of garbage. The associate obtained one of the bags from the street and brought it to the investigator, who extracted several bottles and cans. The items were placed in plastic bags and marked for evidence. They were then turned over to Brian G.D. Wraxall, the executive director, chief forensic serologist, and technical leader of Serological Research Institute. In an affidavit, Wraxall stated that he extracted, prepared, and analyzed samples of saliva taken from the bottles and cans in the garbage of the person whom the investigator had identified as Jansen. He positively identified DNA on the bottles and cans as belonging to the same person who was the secondary DNA source on the barrette. Wraxall concluded that the primary donor was Kincaid, and the secondary donor was Jansen.⁸

To avoid any chain of custody problems involved in matching the DNA from the bottles and cans with the DNA on the barrette, Lampron filed a motion in the Superior Court for an order to compel Jansen to provide a buccal swab for DNA analysis. Both Jansen and the Commonwealth opposed Lampron's motion on the ground that the judge lacked the authority to enter such an order with respect to a private citizen. Following a hearing, the judge allowed the motion, concluding that in accordance with Mass. R.Crim. P. 17(a)(2), and pursuant to the standard set forth in Matter of Grand Jury Investigation, 427 Mass. 221, 226, 692 N.E.2d 56, cert. denied sub nom. A.R. v. Massachusetts, 525 U.S. 873, 119 S.Ct. 171, 142 L.Ed.2d 140 (1998), Lampron had made the requisite showing that there was "a reasonable basis for believing ( [ ]probable cause, if you wish)" that a buccal swab from Jansen would significantly aid Lampron's defense.⁹

Jansen and the Commonwealth both now contend that the judge lacked any authority to compel Jansen, a third party not charged with any criminal offense, to submit to a buccal swab for DNA analysis at Lampron's request. As such, they argue that the judge's order must be reversed. We disagree.

Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution provides that "every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him ... and to be fully heard in his defen[s]e by himself, or his counsel, at his election." The express purpose of art. 12 is to give criminal defendants the right to present evidence that may be exculpatory. See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 408 Mass. 185, 196, 557 N.E.2d 728 (1990). The Commonwealth has no obligation to collect evidence that may be helpful to a defendant. See Commonwealth v. Lapage, 435 Mass. 480, 488, 759 N.E.2d 300 (2001) ("While the prosecution remains obligated to disclose all exculpatory evidence in its possession, it is under no duty to gather evidence that may be potentially helpful to the defense"). Thus, a defendant has the constitutional right to present evidence at trial that some other individual may have committed the particular crime of which the defendant has been accused. See Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 66, 819 N.E.2d 176 (2004), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Harris, 395 Mass. 296, 300, 479 N.E.2d 690 (1985). The defendant must show that "the acts of the other person are so closely connected in point of time and method of operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of [the] defendant as the person who committed the crime." Commonwealth v. Hunter, 426 Mass. 715, 716-717, 690 N.E.2d 815 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 267, 385 N.E.2d 1001 (1979). Here, the means by which Lampron intends to make such a showing is a buccal swab from Jansen that, he expects, will provide exculpatory DNA evidence.

The source of the judge's authority to enter an order compelling Jansen to provide a buccal swab flows from rule 17(a)(2) and our common law. Rule 17(a)(2) provides that "[a] summons may... command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or other objects designated therein" (emphasis added).¹⁰ In Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 270, 806 N.E.2d 72 (2004), we stated that "[a] judge's power under rule 17(a)(2) includes the power to direct a nonparty to produce documentary evidence [or objects] prior to trial to allow the parties to inspect such documents or objects in preparation of trial." See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 339 n. 15, 780 N.E.2d 453 (2002) (rule 17[a][2] permits defendant to summons objects from third party). See also K.B. Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 1559 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 2004). Contrary to Jansen's unsupported assertion, we conclude that saliva is an "object" in the possession of a third party. See State v. Little, 249 Or. 297, 307, 431 P.2d 810 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955, 88 S.Ct. 1048, 19 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1968) (bodily substances, including blood, hair, and saliva, are tangible "objects"). See also Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1555 (1993) ("object" is "a discrete visible or tangible thing"). Cf. Fathke v. State, 951 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Alaska Ct.App.1998) (palm print and fingerprints easily viewed as "objects").

We have stated that a summons issued pursuant to rule 17(a)(2) is not a discovery tool, see Commonwealth v. Lampron, supra at 269, 806 N.E.2d 72, and it may not be used to subvert the pretrial discovery provisions of Mass. R.Crim. P. 14, 378 Mass. 874 (1978).¹¹ See Mass. R.Crim. P. 17(a)(2). See also Commonwealth v. Oliveira, supra. Rule 17(a)(2) is intended to expedite trial proceedings by avoiding delays caused when counsel undertakes the task of examining documents or objects produced in response to a summons. See Commonwealth v. Lampron, supra at 270, 806 N.E.2d 72. See also K.B. Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure, supra. Here, the judge's order requiring Jansen to provide a buccal swab in advance of trial comports with the intent of rule 17(a)(2) by avoiding the inevitable, and perhaps prolonged, delay of waiting for a laboratory to prepare and analyze Jansen's saliva for DNA comparison purposes once Lampron's trial has started.¹²

Before any books, papers, documents, or objects can be summonsed from a nonparty pursuant to rule 17(a)(2), the...