Randolph v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 16 July 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-13033
• Citation: 488 Mass. 1,173 N.E.3d 317
• Parties: Leroy J. RANDOLPH v. COMMONWEALTH & another (and a consolidated case ).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

488 Mass. 1

173 N.E.3d 317

Leroy J. RANDOLPH

v.COMMONWEALTH & another ¹ (and a consolidated case ² ).

SJC-13033

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 3, 2021.

Decided July 16, 2021.

Michael J. Traft for Leroy J. Randolph.

Erin D. Knight, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Dennis Shedd, Lexington, for Richard Randolph.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

BUDD, C.J.

In December 1986, Richard Randolph was convicted of murder in the first degree following the killing of Brian Golden. The petitioner in this case is Richard's nephew, Leroy J. Randolph.³ In 2020, Richard obtained a court order pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7, requiring Leroy to submit a saliva sample for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing to establish whether the DNA found on the murder weapon belongs to Leroy. Leroy has appealed from the order. For the reasons stated infra, we affirm.

Statutory framework of G. L. c. 278A. A defendant who has been convicted of a crime but asserts "factual innocence" may request postconviction forensic testing pursuant to G. L. c. 278A. See G. L. c. 278A, § 2. An eligible defendant must engage in a two-step process beginning with a motion stage in which the defendant must present "information demonstrating that the analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is material to the moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case," among other factors.⁴ G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b ).

If the judge finds that the preliminary requirements at the motion stage have been satisfied, a hearing will be scheduled, prior to which the Commonwealth must file a response including any objections to the requested analysis. G. L. c. 278A, § 4 (c ). To prevail at the hearing, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence each of the factors enumerated in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b ),⁵ including "that the requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence that is material to the moving party's identification as the perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case." G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b ) (4). If the defendant seeks to analyze the DNA of a third party, G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c ), also must be satisfied by demonstrating that the requested analysis "will, by a preponderance of the evidence, provide evidence material to the identification of a perpetrator of the crime." "If such a showing is made, the court shall allow the requested forensic or scientific analysis, the results of which may be used to support a motion for a new trial." Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 801-802, 119 N.E.3d 1171 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 505, 5 N.E.3d 816 (2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 54, 55 N.E.3d 409 (2016).

General Laws c. 278A, § 18, allows for appeals from orders allowing or denying a motion for forensic or scientific testing. However, as discussed in more detail infra, § 18 does not reference explicitly appeals sought by third parties.

Background and procedural posture. We summarize the relevant facts of the underlying criminal case and the motion judge's findings, reserving certain details for discussion of specific issues.

The victim and his wife lived in an apartment below Richard's mother's residence. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 415 Mass. 364, 365, 613 N.E.2d 899 (1993). Following an evening of drinking, Richard, Leroy, and other Randolph family members confronted the victim's wife, resulting in an altercation between the two families. Id. at 364-365, 613 N.E.2d 899. From the third-floor landing, the Randolphs threw various items at the victim, including a knife that struck the victim in the eye and killed him. Id. at 365, 613 N.E.2d 899. Richard was accused of throwing the knife, and at trial the jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree.⁶ Id.

Richard filed his first motion for a new trial in 1991, supporting his contention that he was misidentified as the perpetrator with additional witnesses’ claims that Leroy had confessed to having thrown the knife. Id. at 367-368, 613 N.E.2d 899. The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing, and the denial was affirmed, as were his convictions, in 1993. Id. In 2000, Richard filed a second motion for a new trial alleging errors in certain of the jury instructions; that motion also was denied. Although a single justice allowed his "gatekeeper" petition to appeal from the denial pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the denial itself ultimately was affirmed.

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 303, 780 N.E.2d 58 (2002).

In 2019, pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, Richard sought and obtained leave to analyze DNA left on the murder weapon.⁷ The testing revealed that a match between Richard's DNA and DNA recovered from the murder weapon is extremely unlikely. Richard subsequently filed a motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c ), seeking a DNA sample from Leroy to determine whether Leroy's DNA is present on the knife; Leroy, who was served with a copy of the motion, filed an opposition. Following a nonevidentiary hearing in which Leroy participated, the motion was allowed. Leroy subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 18. Due to uncertainty regarding his right to appeal under § 18 from an order allowing a motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c ), Leroy additionally filed a petition in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. A single justice consolidated the appeals and reported the case to the full court to resolve the threshold procedural question as well as the substantive issue presented on appeal.

Discussion. 1. Procedure for third party appealing G. L. c. 278A order. Before turning to whether the motion allowing the third-party DNA sample to be collected from Leroy properly was allowed, we consider the proper procedure for bringing such an appeal. As discussed infra, G. L. c. 278A, § 18, is the appropriate avenue of appeal for Leroy as a third party to (and subject of) the c. 278A order at issue.

As with all questions of statutory interpretation, we begin with the language of the section in question. "[S]tatutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result." Commonwealth v. Wassilie, 482 Mass. 562, 573, 125 N.E.3d 682 (2019), quoting Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001). General Laws c. 278A, § 18, provides:

"An order allowing or denying a motion for forensic or scientific analysis filed under [c. 278A] shall be a final and appealable order. If the moving party^{[8 ]} appeals an order denying a motion for forensic or scientific analysis the moving party shall file a notice of appeal with the court^{[9 ]} within [thirty] days after the entry of the judgment."

The first sentence of the section makes clear that an order "allowing or denying" a motion under G. L. c. 278A is "final and appealable." However, the second sentence prescribes an appeal mechanism (i.e., filing a notice of appeal within thirty days) only for a "moving party" who appeals from "an order denying a motion." The section is silent as to whether the same mechanism applies to a third party seeking review of an order allowing a motion requiring him or her to provide a DNA sample pursuant to G. L. c. 278A.¹⁰

"As a general rule, only parties to a lawsuit, or those who properly become parties, may appeal from an adverse judgment." Corbett v. Related Cos. Northeast, Inc., 424 Mass. 714, 718, 677 N.E.2d 1153 (1997). See G. L. c. 231, § 113 ("A party aggrieved by a final judgment of the superior court ... may appeal therefrom to the appeals court ..." [emphasis added]). However, "[t]here are limited circumstances in which a nonparty has been permitted to appeal from a judgment, despite its failure to intervene, for example, where a nonparty has a direct, immediate and substantial interest that has been prejudiced by the judgment, and has participated in the underlying proceedings to such an extent that the nonparty has intervened ‘in fact.’ " Corbett, 424 Mass. at 718, 677 N.E.2d 1153. Here, we conclude that a third party who is ordered to provide a DNA sample pursuant to G. L. c. 278A has a right to appeal from that order, even where, as here, he or she has not intervened in the case.

To begin, as noted supra, the first sentence of G. L. c. 278A, § 18, states plainly that whether a motion under c. 278A is allowed or denied, that decision is appealable. It is true that the section thereafter references only the moving party with respect to appealing from a c. 278A order. However, where the motion has been allowed, the moving party has prevailed and would have no reason to appeal. Rather, only a person aggrieved by an order allowing a c. 278A motion, e.g., the Commonwealth or a third party from whom a DNA sample is sought, would be motivated to take an appeal in an attempt to have the order reversed. To hold that orders allowing c. 278A motions are appealable but that third parties aggrieved by such orders may not appeal from them would be an "absurd" and "unreasonable" result that "could not be what the Legislature intended." Wassilie, 482 Mass. at 573, 125 N.E.3d 682, quoting Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178, 114 N.E.3d 52 (2019). Cf. Corbett, 424 Mass. at 721-722, 677 N.E.2d 1153 (disallowing nonparty appeal where allowing appeal "would be in conflict with the express wishes of the Legislature").

Indeed, elsewhere in c. 278A the Legislature provided third parties with the right to participate in proceedings under c. 278A in order to protect their interests. Under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (c ), the court may order discovery of biological materials "after notice to ... any third party from whom discovery is sought, and an opportunity to be heard." Just as a third party is entitled to protect his or her interests by participating in the motion hearing, we conclude that he or she is entitled to appellate...