In re Jennifer Lane Bicknell Et Al., Case
| Citation | 2001 Ohio 4200 |
| Decision Date | 12 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | CA2000-07-141,CA2000-07-140,01-LW-0504 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF: JENNIFER LANE BICKNELL et al., CASE |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Scott E. Knox, 13 E. Court Street, Suite 300, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for appellants, Jennifer Bicknell and Belinda Lou Priddy
David R. Langdon, 1140 Covedale Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45238 and Michael J. DePrimo, P.O. Drawer 2440/100 Parkgate Drive Tupelo, Mississippi 38803, for amicus curiae, American Family Association of Ohio
Appellants, Jennifer Lane Bicknell ("Bicknell") and Belinda Lou Priddy ("Priddy"), appeal a decision of the Butler County Probate Court which denied appellants' petitions to change their names.
Appellants filed individual applications with the Butler County Probate Court, requesting to have their surnames changed to the name "Rylen," which is a combination of some of the letters of their last names. The applications of both women provided identical reasons for requesting the name change:
Applicant desires to legally have the same last name as her long[-] term partner of nine (9) years. This name change will only add to the level of commitment they have for each other as well as that of their unborn child. Also so that this tender and new family will have a unified name in the eyes of the law.
A hearing was held before a magistrate on February 28, 2000. At the hearing, appellants testified that they have been living together in a committed relationship for nine years. They have made a verbal commitment to each other and have exchanged rings to signify the commitment. Appellants also testified that Bicknell underwent artificial insemination and is expecting a child. They stated that they are planning to parent the child equally and consider themselves both mothers to the child. Priddy testified that she also plans to have a child in the future.
The magistrate issued a written decision on March 1, 2000, denying both name change petitions. Appellants filed objections to the magistrate's decision on March 14, 2000. The trial court granted a continuance to allow appellants to submit additional evidence. Appellants presented the testimony of Patricia Williams at a hearing held on May 16, 2000. Ms. Williams, a clinical social worker, testified that a common surname helps with family identity and can make social situations less difficult for children.
The trial court issued a written decision denying appellants' name change petitions on June 16, 2000. The trial court found that it was not "reasonable and proper" to change the names of unmarried cohabitants because to do so would give an "aura of propriety and official sanction" to their cohabitation.
Appellants appeal the trial court's decision and raise the following three assignments of error:
Assignment of Error No. 1:
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPLICANT-APPELLANTS IN FAILING TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD FOR ALLOWING NAME CHANGES.
Assignment of Error No. 2:
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT ALLOWING THE APPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE OF NAME IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
Assignment of Error No. 3:
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DECISION DENYING MS. PRIDDY AND MS. BICKNELL THE USE OF THE NAME CHANGE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
An appellate court may only reverse a trial court's decision on a name change application if the trial court abused its discretion. In re Hall (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 1, 3. The term "abuse of discretion" implies that the court's decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621.
In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court applied an incorrect standard by considering public policy and by not considering the best interest of the child. Appellants first argue that the only ground for denial of a name change petition occurs when the name change is requested for fraudulent purposes.
In Ohio, there are two ways in which a person may change his name. First, a person may change his name at common law by simply adopting another name. Pierce v. Brushart (1950), 153 Ohio St. 372, 380. In Pierce, the Ohio Supreme Court stated the common law standard for a name change: Id.
Second, a person may obtain a statutory name change pursuant to procedure outlined in R.C. 2717.01. The statutory name change procedures are in addition to the common law method of effecting a name change and do not abrogate it. State ex rel. Robinson v. Clark (1994), 91 Ohio App.3d 627, 629; In re Paxson (June 30, 1992), Scioto App. No. CA91-2008, unreported, 1992 WL 154139.
The statutory name change provision states:
A person desiring a change of name may file an application in the probate court of the county in which the person resides. The application shall set forth that the applicant has been a bona fide resident of that county for at least one year prior to the filing of the application, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the requested new name.
Notice of the application shall be given once by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county at least thirty days before the hearing on the application. The notice shall set forth the court in which the application was filed, the case number, and the date and time of the hearing.
Upon proof that proper notice was given and that the facts set forth in the application show reasonable and proper cause for changing the name of the applicant, the court may order the change of name.
Once the statutory application requirements have been met, the standard for granting a statutory name change is whether the change is "reasonable and proper." R.C. 2717.01(a). Since R.C. 2717.01 provides that the court "may" order the name change, the statute vests discretion with the trial court in determining whether to grant the request.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred by considering whether the requested name changes were against public policy. Instead, they argue that the meaning of the term "proper" in relation to a statutory name change means only that the change is not requested for fraudulent reasons.
There is a dearth of case law in Ohio interpreting the statutory "reasonable and proper" standard for an adult name change. Recently, one court determined that a court should consider public policy issues when ruling on a name change petition. In re Name Change of Handley (P.C.2000), 107 Ohio Misc.2d 24, 26-27. In Handley, the applicant requested to have his name judicially changed to Santa Claus. Id. The court found that the public has a proprietary interest in the name Santa Claus and that the requested name change would be against public policy. Id.
Courts in other states have included a review of public policy considerations when ruling on name change petitions. See Application of Sakaris (N.Y. Civil Court 1993), 610 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011; In the matter of the Application of Pirlamarla (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1985), 504 A.2d 1238, 1241; In re Harris (Pa.Super.Ct.1997), 707 A.2d 225, 227; Lee v. Ventura County Superior Court (Cal.Ct.App.1992), 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 763, 768.
Although a person may change his name at common law as long as he/she does not do so with fraudulent intent, requesting a court to approve a name change requires additional considerations. A name change application becomes subject to judicial scrutiny because the applicant is requesting court approval of the name change. "An inevitable by-product of the statutory process is the result that the judicial imprimatur is placed upon the change of name lending it the aura of propriety and official sanction." Matter of Linda Ann A. (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1984), 480 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997. Because of these considerations, we find that the "reasonable and proper" standard provided in R.C. 2717.01 includes judicial scrutiny regarding whether a requested name change is consistent with public policy.
Appellants also contend that the trial court erred by not considering factors concerning the best interest of the child. In a proceeding to change the name of a minor child, the court is required to consider the best interest of the child in determining whether reasonable and proper cause has been established. In re Willhite (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 28, paragraph one of the syllabus.
However, the facts of this case differ materially from those cases in which the best interest of the child must be considered. A review of Ohio cases requiring consideration of the child's best interest in a name change petition reveals that in each case the court was considering whether to change the name of an already-named child. See e.g., id., Erin C. v. Christopher R. (1988), 129 Ohio App.3d 290;; In re Budenz (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 359; In re Crisafi (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 577; Bowen v. Thomas (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 196. Appellants' petitions request that the court change their own names as adults. The petitions were not to change the name of an already-named child. Accordingly, as the request was to change the name of two adults, there was no best interest of a named child to be considered by the court. Appellants' first assignment of error is overruled.
In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred by finding that granting the name change petitions would be against public policy....
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