Linda Ann A., Matter of

• Decision Date: 12 October 1984
• Citation: 126 Misc.2d 43,480 N.Y.S.2d 996
• Parties: Matter of LINDA ANN A. for Leave to Change Her Name to Linda Ann M. * Supreme Court, Special Term, Queens County, Part 2
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 996

480 N.Y.S.2d 996

126 Misc.2d 43

Matter of LINDA ANN A. for Leave to Change Her Name to Linda

Ann M. ^*

Supreme Court, Special Term,

Queens County, Part 2.

Oct. 12, 1984.

Blodnick, Schultz & Abramowitz, P.C., Lake Success, for petitioner.

ARTHUR W. LONSCHEIN, Justice.

This is an application for a judicial change of name, pursuant to Article 6 of the Civil Rights Law. Petitioner, an unmarried woman, seeks leave to assume the name "Linda Ann M." As the reason for the change, petitioner states candidly that she wishes to assume the name of her "lover" whom she is "not free to marry."

Under common law, a person is free to assume any name she chooses, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or interference with the rights of others. (Smith v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 N.E. 947.) No judicial proceeding is necessary and a name change can be made effective through simple usage or habit. (Matter of Halligan, 46 A.D.2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458.)

The statutory change of name procedure is supplementary to the common law and is useful in that it provides greater speed and certainty and in that it results in a permanent public record of the change. (Matter of Halligan, supra. )

The statute requires the court to grant the petition if the statements in the petition are true unless there is a "reasonable objection" to the change. (Civil Rights Law, § 63.) The court's power of review is thus quite limited and the court should be chary of substituting its subjective judgment on the propriety or advisability of the name change for an objective consideration of its lawfulness. (See Matter of Halligan, supra, p. 171, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458, n. 1 and cases there cited.) An inevitable by-product of the statutory process is the result that the judicial imprimatur is placed upon the change of name lending it the aura of propriety and official sanction. If the court determines, therefore, that the change of name will foster fraud or other illegality it is not only free to withhold its imprimatur and deny the petition, it is bound to do so.

This consideration becomes paramount in a case such as petitioner's. The court is free to draw the normal and reasonable inferences from the petition and infers that petitioner's lover, whose name she seeks to assume, is presently married to another woman. Petitioner's relationship to him is therefore adulterous. The court's disapproval of the relationship is not officious moralizing. Adultery is a crime (Penal Law, § 255.17) and is recognized as serious marital wrongdoing such as will justify the offended spouse in seeking a separation or divorce. (Domestic Relations Law, §§ 170200 As was pointed out in Matter of Carol B., 81 Misc.2d 284, 366 N.Y.S.2d 98 on virtually identical facts the court is being asked, in effect, to approve of the relationship as well as the name change. (See, also, The Hurley Name Case, 38 Pa.D. & C.2d 146.)

Further, the court infers that the purpose of this name change would be to allow petitioner to hold herself out as Mr. M.'s wife. This would clearly...