In re Jessie T.
| Decision Date | 08 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-JV 16-0253,1 CA-JV 16-0253 |
| Citation | 399 P.3d 103 |
| Parties | IN RE JESSIE T. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Maricopa County Public Advocate's Office, Mesa, By Jason Kinsman, Counsel for Appellant
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, By Lisa Marie Martin, Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
¶ 1 Jessie T. appeals the juvenile court's delinquency adjudication finding that he committed animal cruelty in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13–2910(A)(9) (), a class six felony. Because we conclude that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the court's adjudication, we modify the adjudication to reflect that Jessie committed the lesser-included offense of inflicting unnecessary physical injury to any animal, a class one misdemeanor, in violation of A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(3).
¶ 2 Police detectives discovered a Facebook photo of Jessie holding a pellet gun in one hand and a black cat by its tail in the other. The detectives also observed photos of a subsequent mutilation of what appeared to be the same cat. Jessie later admitted to a police officer that he shot the cat and did so "because it was a stray, and it was black." Jessie also admitted that after the shooting, he took pictures of a female friend disemboweling the cat.
¶ 3 The State filed a delinquency petition alleging Jessie intentionally or knowingly subjected an animal to cruel mistreatment in violation of A.R.S. § 13–2910.
A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(9), (H)(2).
¶ 4 At the adjudication hearing, after the close of the State's evidence, Jessie moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 29(D)(2). The State responded that it had made a "showing beyond a reasonable doubt" because "[Jessie] did cause reasonable risk of death or serious injury to the cat, because he shot the cat and killed it." The court denied the motion.
¶ 5 In its closing argument, the State asked the juvenile court to focus on "inflicting unnecessary physical injury to an animal" and argued that Jessie "did create a reasonable risk of death or serious impairment, because he actually killed the cat." The State highlighted the Facebook photo of Jessie holding the cat by the tail as evidence that he "actually did kill the cat." Alternatively, the State argued that if it had failed to meet its burden of proving Jessie subjected the cat to cruel mistreatment under A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(9), the court should adjudicate him delinquent for violating A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(3), as a lesser-included offense that prohibits unnecessarily inflicting "physical injury" to any animal. Defense counsel countered that "killing an animal and causing serious physical injury [are] not the same." Counsel also pointed to the distinct elements of "killing" and "serious physical injury" within the statute to support his argument. The State responded that it was only attempting to prove that Jessie inflicted serious physical injury upon the cat—an injury that created a reasonable risk of death as evidenced by the cat's actual death.
¶ 6 The juvenile court found Jessie delinquent for subjecting the cat to cruel mistreatment by shooting it with a pellet gun. The court explained that it "d[id] not know which injury ultimately caused the death of the cat, but [found] that [Jessie's] act of shooting the cat constituted ‘serious physical injury’ as contemplated by A.R.S. § 13–2910(H)(2) and A.R.S. § 13–105(39)." The court placed Jessie on probation and, over his objection, designated the offense a felony. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 7 Jessie admits he shot the cat with a pellet gun, but contends that the juvenile court erred when it found him delinquent for cruel mistreatment because there was no evidence the cat suffered before it died. He argues that "the purpose of [ A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(9) ] is clearly to prevent the suffering of animals as each method of inflicting cruel mistreatment ... requires suffering." The State does not address Jessie's statutory construction argument but summarily contends that by shooting the cat, Jessie inflicted serious physical injury because the cat died. Although the State was not required to prove "suffering" to support a delinquency finding under A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(9), the State was required to prove that the pellet gun shot resulted in serious physical injury to the cat, and not merely that the cat died.
¶ 8 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence but review the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the adjudication. In re Kyle M. , 200 Ariz. 447, 448, ¶ 6, 27 P.3d 804 (App. 2001). We will reverse for insufficient evidence only when there is a "complete absence of probative facts to support a judgment or when a judgment is clearly contrary to any substantial evidence." Id . at 448–49, ¶ 6, 27 P.3d 804.
¶ 9 We review de novo the interpretation of statutes. Id. at 448, ¶ 6, 27 P.3d 804. Our primary goal is to fulfill the purpose of the statutory provisions at issue. State v. Cabrera , 202 Ariz. 296, 299, ¶ 14, 44 P.3d 174 (App. 2002). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give it effect and do not employ other rules of statutory construction to discern the legislature's intent. State v. Christian , 205 Ariz. 64, 66, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241 (2003). We also consider the statutory scheme as a whole and presume that the legislature does not include statutory provisions that are "redundant, void, inert, trivial, superfluous, or contradictory." State v. Moerman , 182 Ariz. 255, 260, 895 P.2d 1018 (App. 1994).
¶ 10 To support a delinquency finding for cruel mistreatment of an animal, the State was required to prove that (1) Jessie tortured or otherwise inflicted unnecessary serious physical injury on the cat, or (2) he killed the cat in a manner that caused protracted suffering. A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(9), (H)(2). Because the State did not attempt to show that Jessie tortured the cat or killed it in a manner causing protracted suffering, we focus only on whether the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that Jessie inflicted unnecessary serious physical injury.
¶ 11 "Serious physical injury includes physical injury that creates a reasonable risk of death , or that causes serious and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of health or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb." A.R.S. § 13–105(39) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). "Serious physical injury" is an element of the offense that must be separately established beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. George, 206 Ariz. 436, 441–42, ¶¶ 10–14, 79 P.3d 1050 (App. 2003).
¶ 12 According to the State, Jessie's admission that he intentionally shot the cat was sufficient to show he inflicted an injury on the cat and thereby created a reasonable risk of death. The State does not contend that Jessie caused the cat to suffer disfigurement, serious impairment of health, loss of limb or bodily organ, or protracted impairment of the function of any limb or bodily organ. For this reason, our focus is further limited to whether the State proved the cat suffered a significant injury that was sufficient to create a reasonable risk of death.
¶ 13 The plain language of the cruel mistreatment subsections at issue, A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(9), (H)(2), indicates that killing an animal without proof of protracted suffering does not equate to causing serious physical injury. State v. Williams , 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131 (1993) (). Killing an animal does not constitute cruel mistreatment unless the killing causes protracted suffering. See State v. Pitts , 178 Ariz. 405, 407, 874 P.2d 962 (1994) (). Accepting the State's argument that evidence of death alone is sufficient to constitute "reasonable risk of death" would stretch the scope of the animal cruelty statute beyond its plain meaning. If the legislature intended that killing an animal without causing protracted suffering be categorized as cruel mistreatment, it presumably could have done so, but did not. Instead, the legislature's drafting choice shows that the crime of cruel mistreatment to animals requires proof of torture, serious physical injury, or killing with protracted suffering.
¶ 14 Moreover, the use of "serious physical injury" ( A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(9),(H)(2) ) and "physical injury" ( A.R.S. § 13–2910(A)(3) ) to distinguish offenses within the animal cruelty statute is consistent with the statutory construction of the assault statutes, A.R.S. §§ 13–1203, –1204. Thus, this court's analysis in George , in which we considered the legal difference between "serious physical injury" and "physical injury" in the context of an aggravated assault conviction and a gunshot wound
, is instructive. 206 Ariz. 436, 79 P.3d 1050.
¶ 15 The defendant in George shot a woman, causing a bullet to pass from the right side of her neck through her right underarm. Id. at 439, ¶ 2, 79 P.3d 1050. Evidence presented at trial showed the victim lost a significant amount of blood, some sensation, strength and muscle control to her right arm, and "had not regained full function of her arm during her two-day hospital stay." Id . at 440, ¶ 4, 79 P.3d 1050. Her physician, however, ...
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State ex rel. Montgomery v. Brain
...for each. The animal cruelty statutes were structured to have tiered offenses. In re Jessie T. , 242 Ariz. 556, 559, ¶ 16, 399 P.3d 103, 106 (App. 2017). The legislature has classified cruel mistreatment as a felony offense, whereas the lesser-included offense of intentionally, knowingly, o......