In re Johnson
| Decision Date | 23 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09–0500.,09–0500. |
| Citation | 805 N.W.2d 750 |
| Parties | In re the DETENTION OF Harold JOHNSON, Harold Johnson, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Michael H. Adams, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines and Susan Krisko, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
On further review we must determine whether Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)( e ) (2009) entitles a sexually violent predator (SVP) to be discharged from civil commitment if the district court does not commence a final hearing within sixty days of the court's determination that a final hearing is required. We find section 229A.8(5)( e ) requires the district court to conduct the final hearing within sixty days, but the court's failure to conduct a hearing within sixty days entitles an SVP to civil remedies, not discharge. We therefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district court's order denying discharge.
On July 13, 2001, Harold Johnson was determined to be an SVP and was civilly committed pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A. In 2006, Johnson underwent his annual review to determine whether facts existed to warrant a final hearing to adjudicate whether Johnson still possessed a “mental abnormality” that predisposed him to commit sexually violent offenses. The district court determined Johnson presented no competent evidence that warranted a final hearing. After the adverse determination, Johnson filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this court, which we granted. We determined Johnson presented evidence which would permit a fact finder to reasonably conclude Johnson's mental abnormality had changed and, that if discharged, he was not likely to engage in sexually violent acts. We therefore ordered the district court to conduct a final hearing for Johnson. See Johnson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 756 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Iowa 2008). Procedendo was issued on November 3, 2008.
On January 2, 2009, sixty days after procedendo was entered, the parties participated in a teleconference to schedule Johnson's final hearing. The district court scheduled Johnson's final hearing for February 24, 2009. During the teleconference, Johnson noted he would be bringing a motion for discharge or sanctions on speedy trial grounds. Johnson filed his motion for discharge or sanctions on January 8, 2009. The motion asked for Johnson to be discharged or, alternatively, for the State to be restricted from presenting expert evidence at Johnson's final hearing. On February 2, 2009, the district court held a hearing on the motion. Johnson asserted Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)( e ) required his final hearing to be commenced within sixty days of the determination he was entitled to a hearing. Additionally, because his final hearing was not held within the sixty-day time limit, Johnson argued he was entitled to be discharged from the SVP civil commitment program. The district court denied Johnson's motion for discharge or sanctions, finding there was no statutory consequence for failing to meet the final hearing scheduling deadline outlined in Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)( e ) and, therefore, any breach did not strip the district court of its jurisdiction.
At Johnson's final hearing, the jury concluded Johnson still suffered a mental abnormality that predisposed him to commit sexually violent offenses. The district court entered judgment denying Johnson's discharge. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. He appealed the district court's order denying his motion for discharge or sanctions. The appeal was transferred to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's order finding Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)( e ) was directory rather than mandatory. Additionally, the court of appeals concluded the provision does not require a trial to be conducted within sixty days, only that the trial be scheduled within sixty days. Johnson petitioned for further review, which we granted.
Johnson asks us to determine the meaning of Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)( e ). We review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law. In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 2010).
We are confronted with two related, but divergent, issues. First, we must determine whether the district court violated Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)( e ) when it failed to commence Johnson's final hearing within sixty days. If we find a violation, then we must determine whether section 229A.8(5)( e ) entitles Johnson to discharge.1
Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)( e ) states:
e. The burden is on the committed person to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is competent evidence which would lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held to determine either of the following:
(1) The mental abnormality of the committed person has so changed that the person is not likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged.
(2) The committed person is suitable for placement in a transitional release program pursuant to section 229A.8A.
If the committed person shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a final hearing should be held ... the court shall set a final hearing within sixty days of the determination that a final hearing be held.
Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)( e ) (emphasis added). The precise issue we seek to resolve is whether the phrase “shall set a final hearing within sixty days” requires the district court to commence the final hearing within sixty days or whether it merely requires the district court to schedule the final hearing within sixty days.
When interpreting a statute, we attempt to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the law. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 187. “We do not search for meaning beyond the express terms of a statute when the statute is plain and its meaning is clear.” Id. (quoting Cubit v. Mahaska Cnty., 677 N.W.2d 777, 781–82 (Iowa 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ordinary and common meaning of the statute's words is dependent on the context and setting in which they are used. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006). If the plain language is not clear, then we must review “the statute's ‘subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various interpretations.’ ” Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)).
We begin our analysis by considering the meaning of the phrase “shall set a final hearing within sixty days.” The word “set” has various meanings depending on its context. For example, when a person states they will “set a fire” the person is using the word “set” to mean “start” or “commence,” but a person that states they must “set a wedding date” may use the word “set” to mean “schedule.” Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1138–39 (11th ed.2004). The legislature instructed the district court to “set a final hearing within sixty days,” and within the context of lawyers, courts, and common scheduling practices, “set” is interchangeably used to mean both “schedule” and “conduct.” Therefore, dissecting every possible dictionary or grammatical use of the word “set” is not necessary.
However, the legislature's instruction to the district court to “set a final hearing within sixty days” carries little utility if we construe the provision to merely require the district court to schedule a hearing within sixty days. The legislature added this sixty-day requirement as part of a comprehensive amendment to chapter 229A in 2002 which increased the procedural protections given to civilly committed SVPs. See 2002 Iowa Acts ch. 1139, §§ 1–27 (codified as amended in Iowa Code ch. 229 (2003)). If “set” is construed to only require the district court to schedule a hearing within sixty days, then little protection is provided to the SVP because the provision would permit the district court to actually conduct the final hearing within any timeframe. Such a construction makes section 229A.8(5)( e ) constructively surplus language and is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the provision.
We conclude section 229A.8(5)( e ) requires the district court to commence a final hearing within sixty days of the determination a final hearing is required. Johnson was not provided a final hearing within sixty days in violation of his statutory rights.
After determining Johnson's final hearing should have commenced within sixty days, we must now determine what remedy Johnson is entitled to. Johnson's proper remedy is a matter of statutory construction. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 188–90. In ascertaining the legislature's intent, we look to the language of the statute, its nature and objects, legislative history, statutory context, and the consequences that would flow from each construction. Id. (); see also Cox, 686 N.W.2d at 213. We note chapter 229A is a civil statute, intended to protect the public through confinement and treatment of SVPs. Atwood v. Vilsack, 725 N.W.2d 641, 651–52 (Iowa 2006). Because confinement creates a risk of liberty deprivation, however, the legislature included procedural protections in the SVP civil commitment act to ensure civil commitment is guided by definite procedures and standards. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 188.
In Fowler, we confronted what remedy a respondent was entitled to if the State failed to prosecute its SVP civil commitment action within the ninety-day time limit required under Iowa Code section 229A.7(3) (2007).2 Id. at 185. We held a violation of section 229A.7(3) entitled Fowler to dismissal of his civil commitment action. Id. at 190–91. Our reasoning emphasized the legislature...
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