In re K.G.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 472,472
• Parties: IN RE: K.G.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

IN RE: K.G.

No. 472

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

June 17, 2020

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 619056008

UNREPORTED

Nazarian, Beachley, Shaw Geter, JJ.

Opinion by Shaw Geter, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Appellant, K.G., was charged as a juvenile in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute motor vehicle theft, unauthorized use of a vehicle, breaking and entering a vehicle under the rogue and vagabond statute, and various theft related offenses. The State abandoned all but the rogue and vagabond charge at the adjudication hearing, and a magistrate found appellant involved in that count, beyond a reasonable doubt. This finding was upheld following an exceptions hearing to a judge of the circuit court, and appellant was placed on probation. Appellant timely appealed and asks the following question for our review:

Is the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of involvement in the charge of rogue and vagabond?

For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On February 21, 2019, David Dexter woke in his Fells Point home in Baltimore, and noticed that his 2015 Chevy Malibu was missing. Dexter called the police and reported the vehicle was stolen. The key fob that unlocked the doors of his Malibu was also missing.

The next day, February 22, 2019, at around 1:30 p.m., Officer Darla Wright found the stolen Malibu parked in the Northeast District of Baltimore on Raymar Avenue. Officer Wright checked the vehicle and confirmed that the vehicle's door and trunk were locked and secure. She also noticed a black jacket in the back seat, located on the driver's side of the vehicle.

After calling for a tow truck, Officer Wright waited nearby in her marked patrol vehicle. While she was waiting, two young men walked up the street, turned and walkedaway, then turned again and walked back towards the Malibu. Officer Wright testified as follows:

Q. And what happened after that?

A. I advised them not to go near the car, that the car is stolen, and then the shorter male opened the rear driver's side door, took the jacket out and proceeded to walk down the street, so I continued to call for additional units. As they saw me walking towards them, they started to run and I gave chase.

Q. And did you see how the male entered the vehicle?

A. Yes. They just unlocked the door because the car door was locked.

When the young men were apprehended a short distance away, the one who opened the car door was observed wearing that same black jacket. Officer Wright identified K.G. as the individual who opened the car door.¹ The key fob for the Malibu was never found.

A video recording taken from Officer Wright's body camera footage was admitted at trial and played for the court. On that recording, Officer Wright can be overheard telling the young men, as they approached the stolen car: "Stay away. Don't touch the car. Don't touch the car. It's stolen. It's stolen. I watch you guys. I'm watching this car here." The body camera surveillance video shows that, shortly after the two young men approach the locked car, the rear door on the driver's side and the trunk both popped open. As Officer Wright orders them away, the young men walk away from the scene, with one of them carrying the black jacket previously located in the back seat of the stolen car.

Pertinent to the arguments raised, at the hearing before the magistrate, appellant's counsel argued that appellant did not know the vehicle was stolen and that he was simply retrieving his own jacket.² During closing argument, appellant's counsel continued that the State conceded reasonable doubt by dropping some of the greater charges, and that: "[o]ne they say they don't know if it was his jacket or not and there's no testimony about it not being his jacket." Nevertheless, despite these arguments, the magistrate found that the State had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was involved with conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute breaking and entering a vehicle, under the rogue and vagabond statute.

In his written motion excepting from the magistrate's decision, appellant's counsel explained that "there is no evidence that Respondent intended to take any property belonging to anyone else," and "[t]he State never proved whose jacket was taken from the car. It is impossible to steal one's own property." Counsel maintained this argument before the circuit court judge at the exceptions hearing, namely that based on the video and the evidence in the record, including the fact that appellant was wearing the jacket when he was apprehended, "all we are left with, Your Honor, with these inferences, is that in fact it's my client's jacket." Counsel continued, "he cannot steal property that belongs to him" and "[h]e cannot have an intent to steal property that belongs to him."

In its arguments before the magistrate and the circuit court, as well as in its written memorandum in opposition to appellant's exception, the State averred that the stolenChevy Malibu belonged to David Dexter and that appellant's actions of disobeying Officer Wright's instructions not to touch anything in or around the stolen vehicle was circumstantial evidence that established his specific intent to steal the jacket from inside that vehicle. In the circuit court, the State explained:

The State will contend that in order to get the mens rea, the specific intent from the Respondent, we are able to prove that through the surrounding circumstances, and those circumstances, as stated in my Memo, is that the Respondent was told of the stolen nature of the vehicle. He was told not to touch the car twice. He continued to enter the car. He removed the property from that car while being told not to touch the car. And after the removal of the property, the Respondent then fled the scene.

The State was going to contend that based on those circumstances, that that would prove that he did have the subjective standard of the specific intent in order to show that he had the intend [sic] to steal something out of that vehicle.

The circuit court agreed with the State and upheld the magistrate's finding that appellant was involved in the charge of rogue and vagabond:

All right. What this Court saw in the video, body worn camera video, was that a police officer had taken possession of the car and determined—well, had determined that the car was stolen—and therefore the car was really a crime scene in and of itself. The officer started to process the paperwork necessary under these circumstances. She adjusted her vehicle so that she could be situated beside the stolen car. She was across the street. It appeared that she was not exactly legally parked, but she was positioned beside the vehicle. She got out of the car to walk towards—out of her car to walk towards the stolen vehicle—when she observed two African-American males walking down the street.

When the officer started to walk towards the car the car was locked and secured. At some point the trunk popped open and the Court could not see how the door was opened. At the time the officer was walking over towards the vehicle and the two suspects were very close to the vehicle, the officer began to say "Don't touch, the vehicle is stolen", words to that effect. The one person—I'm not sure what he did—but the other person retrieved a jacket from the vehicle.

The vehicle was in fact a crime scene and anything that was in the vehicle was part of that scene. Under all of the circumstances, this Court is going to affirm the Magistrate's Decision because whether or not the Respondent who took the jacket owned it or not, he had no authority to take anything from that vehicle, and therefore this Court is going to affirm the Magistrate's Decision. That is the ruling of this Court. Thank you.

We shall include additional details in the following discussion.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding that he was involved in the charge of being a rogue and vagabond because the State failed to prove that he had the specific intent to steal the vehicle or any property within. More specifically, appellant concedes he was inside the stolen vehicle, but there was no evidence that the jacket belonged to another person. The State responds by suggesting that because Officer Wright had called for a tow truck to retrieve the stolen vehicle, the vehicle and its contents were in her custody and possession when appellant unlocked the door, removed the jacket and fled the scene. In reply, appellant maintains that "no evidence demonstrated that the jacket belonged to anyone" but him, and there was insufficient evidence of specific intent.

Maryland has adopted "a separate system for juvenile offenders, civil in nature." In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 91 (1994); see also In re Areal B., 177 Md. App. 708, 714 (2007) ("Juvenile causes are civil, not criminal proceedings") (citation omitted). The Juvenile Causes Act (the "Act"), codified at Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2018 Supp.), §§ 3-8A-01 - 3-8A-34 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("Cts. & Jud. Proc."), "grant[s] jurisdiction in juvenile courts over young offenders and establish[es] the process for treating them, to advance its purpose of rehabilitating the juveniles who havetransgressed to ensure that they become useful and productive members of society." Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 155 Md. App. 580, 598 (2004) (citation omitted), aff'd, 388 Md. 214 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1102 (2006); see also In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451, 465 (2016) ("Juvenile proceedings aspire to 'the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding,' and 'retain their special and informal nature'") (internal...