In re A.K.

• Decision Date: 04 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0608.,12–0608.
• Citation: 825 N.W.2d 46
• Parties: In the Interest of A.K., Minor Child A.K., Minor Child, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

825 N.W.2d 46

In the Interest of A.K., Minor Child A.K., Minor Child, Appellant.

No. 12–0608.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 4, 2013.

Michael J. Jacobsma and Missy J. Clabaugh of Jacobsma & Clabaugh PLC, Sioux Center, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce L. Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, and Carl J. Petersen, County Attorney, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

A juvenile accused of sexually abusing and assaulting three children appeals from his delinquency adjudication. He contends the juvenile court should have excluded evidence of a prior bad act and that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he committed the delinquent acts. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the juvenile adjudication as to six of the seven counts of delinquency and reverse as to one count.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In August and September 2011, two petitions were filed alleging fifteen-year-old A.K. was a delinquent child pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 232 for committing a total of three counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and four counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse involving three different victims.¹ A.K. denied the charges, and an adjudicatory hearing was held in January 2012.

At the adjudicatory hearing, D.E.² testified regarding events that happened on the night of July 1, 2011: That night, he walked to the figure eight races at the county fairgrounds with his sisters and some friends. ³ A.K. pulled up in a white car and offered to give them a ride, and the group accepted. After arriving at the races, the group split up, but later A.K. approached D.E. and asked him if he wanted to play truth or dare. A.K. and D.E. got into A.K.'s parked car, and A.K. touched him “inappropriately.” After the races ended, A.K. offered to drive D.E. to a farm to look at the animals and obtained permission from D.E.'s older sister. A.K. drove D.E. to a remote location, and they got into the back seat. A.K. pulled down his pants and removed D.E.'s pants. A.K. lifted D.E. onto his lap and touched his penis to D.E.'s anus. He also rubbed D.E.'s penis with his hand, and put D.E.'s penis in his mouth. A.K. then took D.E. back to town to meet his sister. D.E. did not tell anyone about the incident until several days later.

D.E.'s twin sister, J.E., also testified. She corroborated D.E.'s testimony about riding to the races with A.K. and about D.E. leaving with A.K. both during and after the races. She also testified that later in the summer, A.K. asked her if she wanted to ride her bike out to Blue Scout Island with him. She agreed. They entered an old burned-out house, and A.K. dared her to pull her pants down. She did. He looked at her and then she pulled her pants up and she left. He neither touched her nor moved toward her. She waited to tell anyone about the incident until several days later.

D.E. and J.E.'s older sister testified about the night of the races and corroborated that D.E. and A.K. disappeared during the races and were found together in A.K.'s car. She also corroborated that A.K. left with D.E. in his car after the races to go to the farm. All three children described the interior of A.K.'s car in specific detail, including the fact that the steering wheel was covered in tape because A.K. told them the air bag had been set off.

K.D.⁴ testified that A.K. was friends with his brother and sometimes came to his house along with other friends to watch TV after school. On three occasions during the summer of 2011, A.K. tickled him, and the horseplay escalated as A.K. rubbed K.D.'s penis through his pants for about twenty minutes. K.D. testified that he did not tell anyone about the incidents because he was embarrassed. He acknowledged that his brother and another friend were in the room when the incidents took place but that they did not seem to notice anything.

A.K. did not testify but introduced testimony from his mother, father, and sister that the car described by the children was inoperable and parked in South Dakota at his father's apartment on July 1, 2011. A neighbor and an acquaintance testified that they recalled seeing A.K. on a bicycle on the evening of July 1. Some other children who had been at K.D.'s house on the days in question testified that roughhousing was common and that they did not see A.K. rubbing K.D.'s penis. A.K. also introduced evidence tending to show that D.E. and J.E. had changed elements of their stories when they had talked to friends, members of law enforcement, and a counselor.

The juvenile court adjudicated A.K. a delinquent on all seven counts. A.K. appealed. He contends the district court erred in allowing evidence of a prior bad act admitted by A.K. to an investigating officer. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the adjudication.

II. Scope of Review.

Delinquency proceedings are special proceedings that serve as an alternative to the criminal prosecution of a child. In re J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Iowa 2005). The objective of the proceedings is the best interests of the child. Id. We review delinquency proceedings de novo. Id. Although we give weight to the factual findings of the juvenile court, especially regarding the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1996). We presume the child is innocent of the charges, and the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the delinquent acts. Iowa Code § 232.47(10) (2011). Our review of the juvenile court's admission of other-acts evidence is for an abuse of discretion. J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d at 751.

The State argues that our de novo standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence for juvenile adjudications is inappropriate and unwarranted by Iowa Code chapter 232. The State contends that although our caselaw has long held that our review is de novo and that we consider the facts anew to determine whether the State has met its burden to prove the child engaged in acts of delinquency, the statute has not supported such review since 1965 and urges us to adopt a standard of review identical to the review we conduct in criminal cases. Such a standard would require us to determine whether, viewing the light in the evidence most favorable to the State, any reasonable fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the delinquent acts. See State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003).

As the State describes, before 1965, proceedings under chapter 232 were “in equity.” Iowa Code § 232.13 (1962). Thus our review on appeal was de novo, as it is in all equity cases. SeeIowa R.App. P. 6.907. However, chapter 232 was substantially revised in 1965, and the provision expressly requiring delinquency proceedings to be tried in equity was removed. CompareIowa Code § 232.13 (1962), withIowa Code § 232.58 (1966). In its place was the directive that “an interested party ... may appeal to the supreme court for review of questions of law and fact.” Id. § 232.58 (1966). Identical language is still in effect in section 232.133(1) (2011). However, in cases following the revision of chapter 232, we continued to assert that our review was de novo without acknowledging that particular change in the statutory language. See, e.g., In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 1972). Instead, we cited to the old rule of appellate procedure which indicated that our review of equity cases was de novo. Id.

The State points out that other states and federal jurisdictions apply the same standard of review to sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims in juvenile cases as in criminal cases. These other jurisdictions have reasoned that because the State has the same “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden in both juvenile and adult criminal proceedings, the standards and scope of appellate review should also be the same in juvenile and criminal proceedings. See United States v. DeLeon, 768 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.1985) (concluding standard of review of federal juvenile adjudication is whether, viewing evidence in light most favorable to the government, a reasonable fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the juvenile committed the alleged act); In re Jose D.R., 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 186 Cal.Rptr. 898, 901 (1982) (holding standard of review in juvenile adjudications is same as in criminal convictions because standard of proof below is identical in the two proceedings); In re W.C., 167 Ill.2d 307, 212 Ill.Dec. 563, 657 N.E.2d 908, 923 (1995) (holding the standard of review in juvenile adjudication is whether, after viewing evidence in light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt); J.D.P. v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1000, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (holding that in reviewing sufficiency of evidence in juvenile adjudication the appellate court considers the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and affirms if those inferences constitute substantial evidence); In re A.D., 771 A.2d 45, 48 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001) (holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction).

While the State accurately describes the changes to chapter 232 in 1965, we do not think the revision requires a change in our standard of review. The revised language provides that an interested party may appeal “for review of questions of law and fact.” Iowa Code § 232.133(1). This language is compatible with our framework of de novo review which in other contexts requires this court to review the “ facts as well as the law [to] determine from the credible evidence [the parties'] rights anew.” State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550, 567 (Iowa 1973) (emphasis added); see also In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1977). Further, we have continued...