In re KC

• Decision Date: 01 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 86365., No. 86364
• Citation: 714 N.E.2d 491,186 Ill.2d 542,239 Ill.Dec. 572
• Parties: In re K.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. K.C., Appellee). In re S.D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. S.D., Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

714 N.E.2d 491

186 Ill.2d 542

239 Ill.Dec. 572

In re K.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. K.C., Appellee).

In re S.D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. S.D., Appellee).

Nos. 86364, 86365.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

July 1, 1999.

Mary L. Boland, Asst. State's Atty., Jim Ryan, Atty. Gen., Crim. Appeals Div., Chicago, for the People.

Renee C. Norris, Asst. Public Defender, Chicago, for Cameron Kennard.

Cook County Public Defender, Chicago, for Delerme Schaeffner.

Justice RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

In separate petitions for adjudication of wardship, the State charged respondents, K.C. and S.D., with criminal trespass to a vehicle (720 ILCS 5/21-2 (West 1996)). The State later amended the petitions to include charges under sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4-102(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)). Respondents moved to strike the amendments, arguing that sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) potentially punish wholly innocent conduct without requiring a culpable mental state and therefore violate the due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV). The circuit court of Cook County agreed with respondents and dismissed the amended counts. The State appealed directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill.2d. R. 603).

SECTION 4-102 OF THE ILLINOIS VEHICLE CODE

Section 4-102 reads, in relevant part:

"Offenses relating to motor vehicles and other vehicles-Misdemeanors.

(a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:

(1) A person, without authority to do so, to damage a vehicle or to damage or remove any part of a vehicle;

(2) A person, without authority to do so, to tamper with a vehicle or go in it, on it, or work or attempt to work any of its parts, or set or attempt to set it in motion; * * *

(b) Sentence. A person convicted of a violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. A person convicted of a violation of this Section a second or subsequent time, shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 625 ILCS 5/4-102 (West 1996).

A person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor faces a maximum fine of $2,500 (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(a)(2) (West Supp.1999)) and a maximum prison term of 364 days (730 ILCS 5/5-8-3(a)(1) (West 1996)). A person convicted of a Class 4 felony faces a maximum fine of $25,000 (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999)) and a maximum prison term of three years (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (West 1996)).

ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

The threshold question in this case is whether the trial court correctly concluded that sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) impose absolute liability. In deciding whether the legislature intended to establish an absolute liability offense, this court considers the guidelines that the legislature set forth in section 4-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 1996)), which states:

"A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $500, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described." 720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 1996).

This section applies to all criminal penalty provisions, including those outside the Criminal Code of 1961. People v. Gean, 143 Ill.2d 281, 285, 158 Ill.Dec. 5, 573 N.E.2d 818 (1991).

As we noted in Gean, the committee comments to section 4-9 reveal that the legislature intended to limit the scope of absolute liability. Gean, 143 Ill.2d at 285-86, 158 Ill.Dec. 5, 573 N.E.2d 818. Those comments read, in relevant part:

"This section is intended to establish, as an expression of general legislative intent, rather strict limitations upon the interpretation that mental state is not an element of an offense, although the express language of the provision defining the offense fails to describe such an element. * * *

* * *

In addition to permitting a construction requiring absolute liability in offenses punishable by incarceration or by a fine of not more than $500, the second part of section 4-9 expresses the policy that in other offenses not including a mental state in the definition only a clearly indicated legislative intent to create absolute liability should be recognized, and in all other instances, a mental-state requirement should be implied as an application of the general rule that an offense consists of an act accompanied by a culpable mental state * * *." 720 ILCS Ann. 5/4-9, Committee Comments-1961, at 169-72 (Smith-Hurd 1993).

Consistent with the committee comments, "[a]bsent either a clear indication that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability or an important public policy favoring it, this court has been unwilling to interpret a statute as creating an absolute liability offense." People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill.2d 113, 120, 138 Ill.Dec. 148, 547 N.E.2d 117 (1989). Instead, if at all possible, the court will infer the existence of a culpable mental state, even where the statute itself appears to impose absolute liability. See, e.g., People v. Tolliver, 147 Ill.2d 397, 403, 168 Ill.Dec. 127, 589 N.E.2d 527 (1992); Gean, 143 Ill.2d at 288, 158 Ill.Dec. 5, 573 N.E.2d 818; Sevilla, 132 Ill.2d at 123, 138 Ill.Dec. 148, 547 N.E.2d 117; People v. Nunn, 77 Ill.2d 243, 252, 32 Ill.Dec. 914, 396 N.E.2d 27 (1979).

With these principles in mind, we now turn to sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2). The parties agree that, as written, sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) do not require a culpable mental state. The parties also agree that, as written, sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) carry a fine greater than $500 and the possibility of imprisonment. The critical question therefore becomes whether sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) "clearly indicate[] a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability" (720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 1996)). We hold that they do.

The legislature's clear intent to impose absolute liability for violations of sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) can be gleaned from two sources. First, sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) have not always lacked a culpable mental state. On the contrary, until 1967, section 4-102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provided that:

"It shall be a violation of the provisions of this chapter for:

* * *

(c) a person to, with intent and without right to do so, damage a motor vehicle or damage or remove any of its parts or components;

(d) a person to, without right to do so and with intent to commit a crime, tamper with a motor vehicle, or go in or on it, or work or attempt to work any of its parts or components, or set or attempt to set it in motion." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat. 1965, ch. 95½, pars. 4-102(c), (d).

Thus, prior to 1967, what is now section 4-102(a)(1) required proof of intent, and what is now section 4-102(a)(2) required proof of both intent and a criminal purpose. In 1967, however, the legislature specifically deleted these mental states, leaving the rest of the provisions substantially intact. See Ill.Rev. Stat.1967, ch. 95½, pars. 4-102(a), (b). Where the legislature makes a material change to an unambiguous statute, the presumption is that "`the amendment was intended to change the law.'" Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of Human Rights, 159 Ill.2d 206, 213, 201 Ill.Dec. 96, 636 N.E.2d 528 (1994), quoting State of Illinois v. Mikusch, 138 Ill.2d 242, 252, 149 Ill.Dec. 704, 562 N.E.2d 168 (1990). Given section 4-102's unquestionable clarity prior to the 1967 amendment, the only possible conclusion that we can draw is that the 1967 amendment was designed to remove the intent and criminal purpose elements from that statute-i.e., to impose absolute liability.

The State contends, however, that we should not presume that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability simply because it specifically deleted the culpable mental state from sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2). In support, the State notes that, in Nunn, this court stated that "the omission or addition of words in a new statute [does not] necessarily indicate a legislative intent to change the effect of the earlier statute." Nunn, 77 Ill.2d at 249,32 Ill.Dec. 914,396 N.E.2d 27. Although helpful to the State on its surface, the quoted passage, when properly considered in context, confirms that the amendments to sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2) were intended to change the effect of the earlier statute.

In Nunn, the question was whether the legislature intended to make leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury an absolute liability offense. In arguing that the legislature so intended, the State pointed to the fact that, although the relevant statute originally required that the person charged know that a death or injury had occurred, the statute under which the defendant was charged was amended in 1935 and no longer required such knowledge. Nunn, 77 Ill.2d at 247-48, 32 Ill.Dec. 914, 396 N.E.2d 27. In rejecting the State's argument, this court drew a distinction between the adoption of an entirely new act and the amendment of an existing statute. Where the legislature amends an existing statute, the presumption is that the legislature intended a material change in the law. Where the legislature repeals an existing act and replaces it with an entirely new act, however, that presumption is rebutted. Nunn, 77 Ill.2d at 248, 32 Ill.Dec. 914, 396 N.E.2d 27. In Nunn, the change in the relevant law came about because the legislature repealed the original statute in toto and replaced it and others with the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (now the Illinois Vehicle Code). Nunn, 77 Ill.2d at 247, 32 Ill.Dec. 914, 396 N.E.2d 27. Thus, this court concluded, "the presumption is not invocable...