In re KJA

• Citation: 790 N.E.2d 155
• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 33A01-0205-JV-191.,33A01-0205-JV-191.
• Parties: In re K.J.A., a Child Alleged to be a Delinquent Child. Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Division of Disabled Aging and Rehabilitative Services, an agency of the State of Indiana, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Henry County Office of Family and Children, Appellee-Intervenor.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

790 N.E.2d 155

In re K.J.A., a Child Alleged to be a Delinquent Child.

Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Division of Disabled Aging and Rehabilitative Services, an agency of the State of Indiana, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Henry County Office of Family and Children, Appellee-Intervenor.

No. 33A01-0205-JV-191.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 19, 2003.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Janet L. Parsanko, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Mark C. Stamper, New Castle, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

MATTINGLY-MAY, Judge.

The Indiana Family and Social Services Administration ("FSSA"), Division of Disabled Aging and Rehabilitative Services ("the Division"), appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to correct error. The Division raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in denying the Division's motion to correct error because the court erroneously required the Division to pay the costs of K.J.A.'s placement. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the summer of 1999, twelve-year old K.J.A. was referred to the Division for an evaluation to determine whether she was eligible to receive services under the Division's Bureau of Developmental Disabilities Services ("the Bureau"). On July 22, 1999, K.J.A.'s mother filled out a Division referral application.

On August 29, 2000, while the Division application was pending, police arrested K.J.A., who was then thirteen-years old. The State filed a petition for a juvenile detention hearing. The trial court appointed counsel to represent K.J.A. and held a detention hearing. Thereafter, the court determined it was in K.J.A.'s best interests not to return to her parents' home at that time and ordered she be detained in the Henry County Youth Center's residential, non-secure section. The court ordered the costs of detention be paid by Henry County's Office of Family and Children ("HCOFC") pursuant to Ind. Code § "XX-XX-X-X et seq., both prior to and subsequent to the date of this Order." (Appellant's App. at 9.)

On September 5, 2000, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that K.J.A. had been delinquent by habitually disobeying her parents¹ and by leaving home without her parents' permission.² K.J.A. admitted at her initial hearing that she was habitually disobedient of her parents. At the State's request, the trial court dismissed Count II, regarding K.J.A. leaving home without permission. The court found K.J.A. to be a delinquent child and scheduled a dispositional hearing.

On November 14, 2000, the Division determined that K.J.A. was not eligible for services through the Bureau because she did not have "substantial limitations in three (3) or more life areas" and her impairments were "not due to developmental delays." (Id. at 64.) (Capitalization removed.) On November 16, 2000, the trial court held K.J.A.'s dispositional hearing and determined that she should stay at the Henry County Youth Center while the denial of services by the Division was pending on appeal.

On December 18, 2000, the probation department filed a supplemental report regarding K.J.A. that stated:

It is the recommendation of the Probation Department that [K.J.A.] be placed at the Indiana Developmental Training Center ["IDTC"], ... Lafayette, IN.... The Probation Department will continue to pursue an appeal of the denial of services by the [Division] ..., but the appeal process will be lengthy and the outcome uncertain. It is in the best interest of [K.J.A.] that she be placed at the IDTC where she can receive treatment for her many psychological, behavioral and educational issues. If an appeal is successful and services are available at a later date from [the Division], a modification of disposition could be filed.

(Id. at 27-28.) On December 21, 2000, the trial court conducted another dispositional hearing and ordered K.J.A. placed in the IDTC in Lafayette pending the appeal of her Division application. In that order, the court provided "the costs associated with placement shall be paid from the Family & Children's Fund in association with the local Division of Family & Children pursuant to I.C. XX-XX-X-X et seq., both prior to and subsequent to the date of this Order." (Id. at 30.)

On January 31, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the Division heard K.J.A.'s appeal of the denial of her application for services from the Bureau as a developmentally disabled individual. The ALJ found that K.J.A. met five of the eligibility criteria and the Bureau's earlier decision to deny services to K.J.A. was "not affirmed." (Id. at 69.) On February 23, 2001, the Division "adopt[ed]" the ALJ's "findings of fact and the decision." (Id. at 51.)

On July 19, 2001, the trial court reviewed K.J.A.'s case and ordered her to continue her placement at IDTC. On December 21, 2001, the court conducted another review of K.J.A.'s case and again ordered her to remain at IDTC. However, this time the court ordered "the costs associated with the ... placement at the [IDTC] shall be paid by the [Division] ... pursuant to the attached determination of eligibility of the [ALJ] as approved February 23, 2001, both prior to and subsequent to the date of this Order." (Id. at 32-33.)

The Division filed a motion to correct error in which it argued the juvenile court did not have the authority to order the Division to pay for K.J.A.'s placement as a juvenile delinquent. The HCOFC filed a motion in opposition to the State's motion to correct error in which HCOFC argued the Division was required by law to pay for K.J.A.'s placement because it had not appealed the ALJ's determination of K.J.A.'s eligibility for services. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Division's motion to correct error. The Division appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

A trial court has discretion to determine whether it will grant or deny a motion to correct error. Volunteers of America v. Premier Auto Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), trans. denied. We reverse the trial court's decision only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. A trial court abused its discretion if its decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court misapplied the law. Id. The Division argues that the trial court abused its discretion when denying its motion to correct error because the court did not have the authority to order the Division to pay for K.J.A.'s placement in IDTC pursuant to a delinquency proceeding. The Division claims the trial court's order violates Ind.Code § 31-40-1-1.³ We review the construction of statutes de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation. Hochstedler v. St. Joseph County Solid Waste Management Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910, 914 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002),trans. denied. Our goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature by giving effect to the language that was used. Id. "Accordingly, if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation." Id.

On two previous occasions, we have held that a juvenile court did not have statutory authority to order a state agency to pay for the services provided to a delinquent child or a child in need of services. See In re E.I., 653 N.E.2d 503, 511-12 (Ind.Ct. App.1995)

(holding juvenile court could not order the Indiana Division of Mental Health, the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Indianapolis Public Schools and Department of Education to pay for services ordered for a CHINS because Ind.Code § 31-6-4-18(a) placed that burden on the county); In re Garrett, 631 N.E.2d 11, 13 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (holding juvenile court could not order the Department of Mental Health to pay for mental health treatment of a juvenile delinquent because Ind.Code § 31-6-4-18(a) required the county to pay for services for a juvenile delinquent), trans. denied.

Those decisions were both made when the controlling statute was XX-X-X-XX(a), which provided: "The cost of any services ordered by the juvenile court for any child, or the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, and the cost of returning a child under IC 31-6-10 shall be paid by the county. The county council shall provide sufficient funds to meet the court's requirements." 1995 Ind. Acts 270, § 1. The legislature subsequently amended the statute, with the new language becoming effective January 1, 2000. See 1999 Ind. Acts 273, § 119.

Now, the controlling statute provides:

(a) The county shall pay from the county family and children's fund the cost of:

(1) any services ordered by the juvenile court for any child or the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, other than secure detention; and

(2) returning a child under IC 31-37-23.

(b) The county fiscal body shall provide sufficient money to meet the court's requirements.

Ind.Code § 31-40-1-2. The amendment changed the requirements by 1) specifying that services were to be paid from the county's family and children's fund, and 2) excluding "secure detention"⁴ from the services that the county could pay for with money from the county's family and children's fund.

K.J.A. was placed in the IDTC in Lafayette, Indiana. The record does not indicate whether that facility is secured or unsecured. If the facility is unsecured, then Ind.Code § 31-40-1-2 requires the county to pay for that service from the county's family and children's fund. See Garrett, 631 N.E.2d at 13

(holding previous version of the statute required the county to pay for the services and prohibited the juvenile court from requiring a state agency to pay for services). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not have the authority to order the Division to pay for K.J.A.'s placement. See id.

If the facility is secured, then the county still has to pay for the services. Ind.Code § 31-31-8-3, which discusses provision of facilities, staff, budget and expenses for juvenile detention and...