In re Knott
| Decision Date | 27 October 1917 |
| Citation | 197 S.W. 1097,138 Tenn. 349 |
| Parties | IN RE KNOTT. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.
Petition of J. G. Harrill and wife to adopt Louise Knott, infant daughter of J. C. Knott and wife, in which an adoption was decreed, and in which proceeding the petition of J. C. Knott to vacate the order of adoption and that his petition be treated as an answer to the original petition was granted and, on final hearing, dismissed, and his motion for a new trial overruled. From a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals on the appeal of J. C. Knott, reversing the action of the county judge, the original petitioners J. G. Harrill and wife bring certiorari. Decree of Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
This case originated in the county court of Knox county, and was begun by the petition of J. G. Harrill and wife to adopt Louise Knott, the infant daughter of J. C. Knott and wife. The petition set forth that the petitioners are desirous of adopting the said Louise, that they are able financially and physically, and otherwise are suitable persons, to adopt and rear the child; that Louise had been abandoned by the father J. C. Knott, and that the mother had consented to the proceeding.
The county judge heard the testimony of the petitioners and the mother of the infant, and one other witness, from all of which he decreed the adoption as prayed in the petition. The judgment of the court recites that the child is about 15 months of age, that its parents are now living apart, and that it has been abandoned by them for several months, and that petitioners have been caring for and supporting it since the 1st of June, 1916, and that a strong mutual attachment has arisen between them and the said Louise, and that petitioners are so situated that they can bestow the proper care and attention upon the child, and that it is manifestly to its best interest that it be adopted by the petitioners and that the mother expressly consented that the adoption might take place.
The father was not made a party to the proceeding, and he had no notice, actual or otherwise, thereof or the purpose upon the part of the petitioners to have the child adopted. When he learned of the purported adoption, he filed a petition in the cause denying all of the material allegations of the original petition, and especially denying that he had abandoned the infant, and that he desired its adoption by the original petitioners. His petition is somewhat lengthy and goes into detail about the matter, and prays, among other things, that his petition be treated as an answer to the original petition, that Harrill and wife be served with a copy of the petition and be required to answer it, and that the order of adoption be vacated and set aside and for nothing held, and that the petitioner be held and be made a party to the proceeding.
This was done, and the county judge heard the testimony of the father and of several of his witnesses, together with the testimony of the mother. Upon a final hearing he dismissed the petition of the father, and held that he had not shown sufficient evidence to justify the court in vacating the order of adoption previously entered. A motion for a new trial was made and entered, which was overruled, and an appeal taken to the Court of Civil Appeals. That court reversed the action of the county judge, and the case is before us upon the petition of Mr. and Mrs. Harrill for certiorari.
The right of adoption is not a natural one. It contravenes common right, and originated with the statute. It was unknown to the common law, although it was practiced by the ancients of Greece and Rome, and probably other ancient people, and is of the remotest antiquity. Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 118 Am. St. Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775; 1 R. C. L. 593; Johnson's Estate, 98 Cal. 531, 33 P. 460, 21 L. R. A. 380; Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602, 52 L. R. A. 75, 79 Am. St. Rep. 246; Markover v. Krauss, 132 Ind. 294, 31 N.E. 1047, 17 L. R. A. 806; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321.
The statutes of this state respecting adoption are very meager, and are contained in sections 5409, 5410, and 5411 of Thompson's Shannon's Code, which are as follows:
"5409. Any person wishing to adopt another as his child, shall apply by petition, signed by the applicant, and setting forth the reasons therefor, and the terms of the aforesaid adoption.
5410. The court, if satisfied with the reasons given, may sanction the adoption by decree, entered upon the minutes, embodying the petition, and directing the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Blair v. Badenhope
...this regard, the dissent in this case makes the same mischaracterization of our prior precedents as Mr. Blair. Quoting In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S.W. 1097 (1917), the dissent maintains that natural parents "cannot be deprived of [the right to the care and custody of their children] wi......
-
In re Audrey S.
...ties irretrievably and forever. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119, 117 S.Ct. 555, 565, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996); In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 355, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1917); In re D.D.K., No. M2003-01016-COA-R3-PT, 2003 WL 23093929, at *8 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec.30, 2003) (No Tenn. R.App. P. 11 a......
-
Magevney v. Karsch
...that the Legislature intended that such proceedings would be in accordance with the usual practice of such courts." In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098. We add that, although the statutes do not in terms provide for consideration of the welfare of the child involved, such consid......
-
In re S.M.
...10. The factors to be considered in a "best interests" analysis can be found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). 11. In re Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 355, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1917); O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995); In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929, 932 12. Beca......