In re Kravitz's Estate

• Decision Date: 30 June 1965
• Citation: 211 A.2d 443,418 Pa. 319
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Max KRAVITZ, Deceased. Appeal of Ethel KRAVITZ.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

211 A.2d 443

418 Pa. 319

In re ESTATE of Max KRAVITZ, Deceased. Appeal of Ethel KRAVITZ.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 30, 1965.

Desmond J. McTighe, Norristown, for appellant.

Morris Passon, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

BELL, Chief Justice.

May a convicted slayer re-litigate in the Orphans' Court the issue of murder and the question of his guilt?

Ethel Kravitz, the appellant, was indicted for the murder of her husband, Max Kravitz, in their home in Wynnewood, on July 4, 1958. She pleaded not guilty; she was found guilty of murder in the second degree by a jury on December 12, 1958 and on July 17, 1959, she was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence in the State Industrial Home for Women at Muncy Pennsylvania. On June 28, 1960, this Court in Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A.2d 861 affirmed the judgment and sentence.

Max Kravitz left surviving him, his widow Ethal Kravitz, a brother Harry Kravitz, and a sister Esther Passon. Kravitz left a will in which he bequeathed his residuary estate to his wife if she survived him by ninety days. Having so survived him, she presented her claim to her husband's residuary estate at the audit of his executor's account. Her claim was disallowed and dismissed in a learned Opinion by President Judge Taxis.

Ethel Kravitz did not testify in the criminal case in which she was convicted of murdering her husband. However, in the president case she offered (a) to take the witness stand in support of her claim, and (b) to testify that she was innocent of the murder of her husband, and (c) to support her claim of innocence by the testimony of additional witnesses. The auditing Judge (1) refused to permit the question of her guilt or innocence to be relitigated, and (2) held that the finding of the jury and the sentence of the Court in the above mentioned case of Commonwealth v. Kravitz was conclusive of her guilt, and (3) that under the Slayer's Act of August 5, 1941, ^[1] she was not entitled to any part of her husband's estate which had been bequeathed to her in his will.

The exact questions presented by this appeal have never been specifically decided in Pennsylvania. Before analyzing the language of the pertinent Act of August 5, 1941, we shall first discuss prior cases and the reasons for the enactment of the 1941 Act.

In Carpenter's Appeal, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637, a son had murdered his father for the purpose of securing his estate. Nevertheless, the Court allowed the son to inherit his father's estate on the ground that the crime did not destroy his right to inherit under the then existing Intestate Act. Thereafter, the Legislature passed the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, ^[2] which, in Section 23, prohibited a person 'who shall be finally adjudged guilty of murder' from inheriting (under certain circumstances) any part of the estate of the person killed. This Act was interpreted in TARLO'S ESTATE, 315 PA. 321, 172 A. 139, ^[3] to mean that where a father murdered his wife and daughter and then took his own life, his heirs could inherit through him his daughter's estate because the father had not been 'finally adjudged guilty of murder.' As the result of the decision in Tarlo's Estate, the Legislature repealed Section 23 of the Interstate Act of 1917, and enacted the Slayer's Act of August 5, 1941.

The pertinent provisions of the Act of 1941 are as follows:

Section 2. 'No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent, but such property shall pass as provided in the sections following.'

Section 14. 'The record of his conviction of having participated in the wilful and unlawful killing of the decedent shall be admissible in evidence against a claimant of property in any civil action arising under this act.'

Section 15. 'This act shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this State that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed.' ^[4]

It will be instantly noted that there is no express provision in the Act of 1941 covering the specific question whether a person convicted of murder can re-litigate the issue (a) of the crime, or (b) of his (or her) guilt or innocence thereof, in a proceeding in the Orphans' Court to determine the distribution of the decedent's estate. From the failure of the Slayer's Act to expressly cover this question, appellant and appellee reach exactly opposite conclusions.

Public Policy and Recent Analogous Cases

The trend of the law in Pennsylvania--both statutory and decisional, as well as the public Policy of our Commonwealth--is clear.

In Commonwealth v. Evans et al., 399 Pa. 387, 389, 398 160 A.2d 407, James F. Torrance was convicted ^[5] of misbehavior in office and of conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in connection with the construction of a part of the North-eastern Extension of the Pennsylvania Turnpike. After Torrance's conviction, the Turnpike Commission brought an action of assumpsit against the surety to recover $300,000. because of Torrance's participation in the conspiracy to defraud the Commission and his failure to faithfully perform his duties. Torrance had given two bonds, one in his capacity as a member of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission and the other in his capacity as Secretary-Treasurer of the Commission. In each of these bonds the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. was surety, and bound itself unto the Commission for the faithful performance by Torrance of the duties required in his performance of the aforesaid offices. In that case, namely, Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423, this Court ^[6] held that the record of the criminal proceedings against Torrance was admissible, and that the judgments of conviction entered against Torrance were conclusive as to the defendant's liability for the face amount of the bonds. The Court said (pages 225, 226, 227 and 228 of 412 Pa., pages 425, 426, 427 of 194 A.2d):

'In their answers to the complaint, Torrance and Fidelity specifically denied the existence of the conspiracy to defraud, and misbehavior in office, and that the former had breached the conditions of the bonds; also that the conviction of Torrance was conclusive of their liability. * * *

'Import of the Criminal Judgments

'The rule in most jurisdictions is that a judgment entered in a criminal case is not proof of anything in a subsequent civil action growing out of the same facts, except the fact of its rendition. See 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 754; 30A Am.Jur., Judgments, § 472, and 2 Freeman, Judgments, § 653 (5th ed. 1925). The rule is a carry over from the early days of the common law. See 18 A.L.R.2d 1287. With the lapse of time, it has been recognized that the reasons for the rule are weak and outdated. A growing minority would admit the criminal record as evidence of the facts determined in the criminal proceeding unless it is excluded by statute. See, Development in the Law Res Judicata, 65 Harvard L. Rev. 818 (1952); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711, (1932), and 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 and 1289. The federal courts have now adopted a progressive view and hold that the issues essential to a guilty verdict must be regarded as having been determined by the judgment. See, Local 167, I.B. of Teamsters, etc., v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, [54 S.Ct. 396, 78 L.Ed. 804] (1934); United States v. Gramling, 180 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Salvatore, D.C. 140 F.Supp. 470 (1956); United States v. Doman, 255 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir.1958), aff'd 359 U.S. 309, [79 S.Ct. 755, 3 L.Ed.2d 828] (1959).

'* * * in Mineo v. Eureka Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 182 Pa.Super. 75, 125 A.2d 612 (1956), it was held that the named insured in a fire insurance policy or his assignee was conclusively barred from recovery on the policy by the conviction of the insured on the charge of arson. Also, it has been held that a person convicted of murder cannot take as beneficiary under an insurance contract on the life of the victim. See, In re Greifer's Estate, 333 Pa. 278, 5 A.2d 118 (1939).

'* * *

'The question of the involvement of Torrance, the principal on the bonds, in a conspiracy to defraud and misbehavior in office, was thoroughly explored in a long and well conducted trial. The convictions which followed necessarily established that Torrance participated in a conspiracy to defraud the commission, and that he wilfully permitted payment of vast sums of money to Manu-Mine to which it was not entitled.

'* * *

'* * * we therefore conclude, that the breach of the conditions of the bonds has been established.'

In Greifer's Estate, 333 Pa., supra, the Court held that a wife who was convicted of the murder of her husband could not claim the benefit of the policies of insurance upon her husband's life which were a part of an inter vivos trust created by him for her benefit. Justice (later Chief Justice) SCHAFFER, speaking for a unanimous Court, distinguished Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637, and Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa., supra, and said (page 279, 5 A.2d page 118):

'* * * She is barred by the common law principle that a person will not be permitted to profit by his own wrong, particularly by his own crime: Robinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins Co., 69 Pa.Super. 274; Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n [1892], 1 Q.B. 147; Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800; Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, [6 S.Ct. 877, 29 L.Ed. 997]; Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E....