In re Krooks

• Decision Date: 17 November 1931
• Citation: 257 N.Y. 329,178 N.E. 548
• Parties: Application of KROOKS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

257 N.Y. 329

178 N.E. 548

Application of KROOKS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 17, 1931.

Proceedings by Fanny E. Krooks to determine an attorney's lien, opposed by William W. Conrad, attorney. From an order of the Appellate Division (230 App. Div. 836, 245 N. Y. S. 773), affirming an order of Special Term which fixed the amount of the attorney's lien, petitioner appeals.

Reversed, and matter remitted to Special Term with directions.

CRANE, J., dissenting.Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.

Maurice Janklow and Louis A. Rosenstein, both of Brooklyn, for appellant.

Samuel Rubin and William W. Conrad, both of New York City, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

Fanny E. Krooks owned real estate assessed at $25,000, title to which the city of New York acquired by condemnation. By written contract, she retained William W. Conrad as her attorney to take such proceedings as might be necessary ‘in connection with the collection of any award or the payment of any compensation resulting from the condemnation,’ and by that contract she agreed to pay him all moneys in excess of $38,000 ‘which may be paid to me or my assigns as a result of said proceedings.’ On this record a finding could properly be made that Mr. Conrad faithfully performed services as her attorney and that he acted with such energy and skill that the justice at Special Term before whom the condemnation proceeding was conducted stated in a memorandum that the sum of $46,500 was awarded by him for the Krooks property. Two days after the publication of that memorandum Mrs. Krooks canceled her retainer and on the following day instituted this proceeding to set aside the written agreement and to determine the attorney's lien. The application in so far as it sought to set aside the agreement was denied. Without taking evidence in relation to the value of the attorney's services, the lien was fixed ‘at the amount set forth in said agreement of retainer of October 22, 1929, to wit, the sum over and above $38,000, which may be paid to the said Fanny E. Krooks, or her assigns, as a result of said condemnation proceedings.’

A client may at any time for any reason which seems satisfactory to him, however arbitrary, discharge his attorney. Tenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y. 524, 529,45 Am. Rep. 263;Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398, 402,98 N. E. 914, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 536;Matter of Paschal, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 483, 496, 19 L. Ed. 992. Even in the presence of a definite agreement the client's right persists. Cancellation by him cannot constitute a breach of contract, for implied in every such agreement is the right to discharge. Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46, L. R. A. 1917F, 402;Johnson v. Rabitch, 113 App. Div. 810, 812, 99 N. Y. S. 1059. The decisions in this state rest upon the familiar principle that the peculiar relationship of trust and confidence which ought to exist between attorney and client injects into the contract special and unique features. Whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions, it is clearly settled in New York. Martin v. Camp, supra. Assuming that the rule were to be narrowed to the extent of allowing cancellation only in those instances where the attorney's services had not been substantially completed (Matter of City of New York (In re Rosedale and St. Lawrence Avenues in City of New York), 219 N. Y. 192, 194,114 N. E. 49), it would now in this case require application. Before services by the attorney under the agreement could be held to be fully performed, at least an award to the client must have become final and determinate....