In re L.M.T.

• Citation: 752 S.E.2d 453
• Decision Date: 20 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 40PA13.,40PA13.
• Parties: In the Matter of L.M.T., A.M.T.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

752 S.E.2d 453

In the Matter of L.M.T., A.M.T.

No. 40PA13.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 20, 2013.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A–31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, 2012 WL 6595388 (2012), reversing orders entered on 19 October 2010 and 5 March 2012, both by Judge Edward A. Pone in District Court, Cumberland County, and remanding for additional findings of fact. Heard in the Supreme Court on 4 September 2013.

Christopher L. Carr and Elizabeth Kennedy–Gurnee for Cumberland County Department of Social Services, and Beth A. Hall, Attorney Advocate for the Guardian ad Litem, petitioner-appellants.

J. Thomas Diepenbrock, Asheville, for respondent-appellee-mother.

Annick Lenoir–Peek, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Office of Parent Representation, amicus curiae.

NEWBY, Justice.

In this case we consider the statutory requirement that a trial court make certain findings of fact in matters involving the legal separation of a parent and child. Though a trial court is required to make written findings of fact in a permanency planning order that consider the factors in section 7B–507 of our General Statutes, these findings need not recite the statutory language verbatim. When reviewing the sufficiency of such orders, an appellate court should consider whether the trial court's findings of fact address the substance of the statutory requirements. Further, even if the permanency planning order is deficient standing alone, the appellate court should review that order in conjunction with the trial court's termination of parental rights order to determine whether the statutory requirements are met. In some instances, a deficiency in one may be cured by the other. In this case, because both the permanency planning order and the termination of parental rights order comply with the statutory mandate, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Mother appealed after the trial court entered two orders that (1) ceased reunification efforts between respondent and her children, L.M.T. and A.M.T., (“cease reunification order”) and (2) terminated respondent's parental rights (“termination order”). At the Court of Appeals respondent argued that the trial court's cease reunification order failed to satisfy section 7B–507, which requires trial courts to “make[ ] written findings of fact that” further reunification efforts would be “futile” or “inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home.” N.C.G.S. § 7B–507(b)(1) (2011). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that in the cease reunification order the trial court “made numerous and detailed findings addressing respondent's troubled case history.” In re L.M.T., –––N.C.App. ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, No. COA12–743, 2012 WL 6595388, at *2 (Dec. 18, 2012) (unpublished). Moreover, the Court of Appeals found “sufficient evidence in the record to support the required findings.” Id. at *3. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals determined that the cease reunification order contained “no finding explicitly linking those facts with any of the factors listed in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B507, including the futility of further reunification efforts or that further efforts would be inconsistent with the juveniles' health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home.” Id. at *2. Based on these perceived deficiencies in the cease reunification order, and without considering the termination of parental rights order, the Court of Appeals reversed both orders and remanded for additional findings. Id. at *3.

We allowed discretionary review to consider the requirement that a trial court make certain findings of fact under subsection 7B–507(b) of our Juvenile Code. In re L.M.T., 366 N.C. 563, 738 S.E.2d 359 (2013). The purpose of the Juvenile Code is, in part, to “provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents” and to ensure “that the best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court.” N.C.G.S. § 7B–100(4), (5) (2011). The General Assembly further stated that “when it is not in the juvenile's best interest to be returned home, the juvenile will be placed in a safe, permanenthome within a reasonable amount of time.” Id. § 7B–100(5). The Juvenile Code strikes a balance between the constitutional rights of a parent and the best interests of a child, id. § 7B–100(3) (2011) (stating that a purpose of the Juvenile Code is “[t]o provide for services for the protection of juveniles by means that respect both the right to family autonomy and the juveniles' needs for safety, continuity, and permanence”), and provides a protective framework when a juvenile is “alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent,” id. § 7B–300 (2011). See In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 553, 614 S.E.2d 489, 498 (2005) ( “Parents' fundamental right to control their children at some point gives way to the state's interest in the welfare of the child. In Subchapter I of our Juvenile Code, the General Assembly has established procedures to safeguard parental rights while simultaneously providing for the removal of children and even the termination of parental rights.”).

To advance the Juvenile Code's dual purpose of protecting parental rights and promoting the best interests of the child, subsection 7B–507(b) requires that trial courts make written findings of fact in orders that place “a juvenile in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services.” N.C.G.S. § 7B–507(b) (2011). Relevant to the case at hand, that statute mandates:

[T]he court may direct that reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile shall not be required or shall cease if the court makes written findings of fact that:

(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.]

Id. Strict adherence to this statute ensures that the trial court fulfills the aspirations of the Juvenile Code by allowing our appellate courts to conduct a thorough review of the order. While trial courts are advised that use of the actual statutory language would be the best practice, the statute does not demand a verbatim recitation of its language as was required by the Court of Appeals in this case. Put differently, the order must make clear that the trial court considered the evidence in light of whether reunification “would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.” The trial court's written findings must address the statute's concerns, but need not quote its exact language. On the other hand, use of the precise statutory language will not remedy a lack of supporting evidence for the trial court's order.

Our review of the cease reunification order in this case “is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings [of fact] and whether the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re P.O., 207 N.C.App. 35, 41, 698 S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010) (citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C.App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235, disc. rev. denied,356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192 (2002)). The trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. Id. (citing In re Weiler, 158 N.C.App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003)).

At the permanency planning review hearing, the trial court considered extensive evidence from multiple witnesses, including respondent, about respondent's continued drug abuse, which she admitted occurred in the presence of her children; her lack of employment, attempted suicide, and confessed deception of the court; her involvement in domestic violence with her husband; and other repeated instances of behavior inconsistent with the best interests of the juveniles. That evidence supported the following findings of fact contained in the cease reunification order:

The Respondent Mother has now disclosed that she has a substance abuse problem, primarily related to prescription drugs.

[Respondent Mother's drug use became] increasingly worse ... while she was in the process of seeking reunification with the juveniles.

There have been instances of domestic violence between the Respondent Mother and her now husband.... At least one of those incidents involved [respondent's] use of a knife....

The environment of the Respondent Mother's home is not conducive to raising children. In fact, the environment that the Respondent Mother and her husband have created is injurious.

That while the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem and everyone else involved was working toward the reunification process, the Respondent Mother was sinking deeper and deeper into an abyss of domestic violence and drug abuse all the while covering it up and refusing to acknowledge the fact of its existence in order that the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem and others surrounding her could assist her and help the juveniles. The deception of the Court during this process is bad enough, but the Respondent Mother has completely let her children down.

The Respondent Mother and her husband are facing eviction and have received a notice to vacate their housing....

[The juveniles] are in need of permanence and deserve a fresh start.

The Court determines that in the best interest of the juveniles, the permanent plan should now be changed to that of placement with other Court approved caretakers with a concurrent plan of adoption.

Return of the juveniles to the custody of the Respondents would be contrary to the welfare and best interest of the juveniles.

While these findings of fact do not quote the precise language of subsection 7B–507(b), the...