In re Langford

• Decision Date: 21 August 1893
• Parties: In re LANGFORD.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

57 F. 570

In re LANGFORD.

United States Circuit Court, D. South Carolina.

August 21, 1893

Cothran Cothran & Wells, for petitioner.

D. A Townsend, Atty. Gen., and Mr. Ansel, for respondent.

SIMONTON District Judge.

This case comes up upon petition for habeas corpus, the writ, and the return thereto. The petition sets forth that the petitioner, a citizen of the United States and of the state of South Carolina, is the agent of the receivers of the Richmond & Danville Railroad at Prosperity, a town in South Carolina; that on the 14th of July, 1893, as such agent, he received by a regular train over a railroad of the receivers, a keg of whisky consigned to A. A. Singley, a resident of said town, which keg, as shown by the way bill, was shipped from Pleasant Ridge, in North Carolina, to said town in South Carolina; that he delivered the keg to the consignee, and that soon thereafter he was arrested under a warrant issued by a trial justice of said state, charged with violating the provisions of an act of the legislature of South Carolina entitled 'An act to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within this state except as herein provided;' and that he is yet in custody. The petition further shows that the delivery by him of the keg of whisky, as aforesaid, was made by him under and pursuant to the laws regulating commerce between states, and that the act of the legislature of the state under which he has been arrested and is held in custody is in conflict with said interstate commerce law, and is null and void, so that his arrest is illegal. He prays his discharge from arrest. The return of the sheriff having him in custody admits that the petitioner is held for violation of the said act, by reason of the delivery of the keg of whisky as stated, and denies that the act is in conflict with the interstate commerce law, and, on the contrary, avers that it comes within the provisions of the act of congress approved August 8, 1890, commonly known as the 'Wilson Act.' It further avers that the petitioner is in custody for trial in the courts of the state for a crime against the state, and that this court, in comity to the courts of the state, ought not to interfere herein until the said state courts have first passed upon the question involved in the case.

In Cantini v. Tillman, 54 F. 970, the alleged conflict of the dispensary act with the constitution and laws of the United States was discussed, and the validity of the act was sustained. The opinion, however, expressly reserved any question as to the validity of this twenty-fifth section. The case at bar raises the issue on this section. The petitioner is in custody under the charge of violating section 25 of the act of the legislature referred to. This section is in these words:

'No person shall knowingly bring into this state, or knowingly transport from place to place within this state, by wagon, cart, or other vehicle, or by any other means or mode of carriage, any intoxicating liquors, with the intent to sell the same in this state in violation of law, or with intent that the same shall be sold by any person, or to aid any other person in such sale, under a penalty of $500, and costs for each offense, and in addition thereto shall be imprisoned in the county jail for one year. In default of payment of said fine and costs, the party shall suffer an additional imprisonment of one year. Any servant, agent, or employe of any railroad corporation, or of any express company, or of any persons, corporations, or associations doing business in this state as common carriers, who shall remove any intoxicating liquors from any railroad car, vessel, or other vehicle of transportation, at any place other than the usual and established stations, wharves, depots, or places of business of such common carriers within some incorporated city or town, where there is a dispensary, or who shall aid in or consent to such removal, shall be subject to a penalty of $50, and imprisonment for thirty days for every such offense: provided, that said penalty shall not apply to any liquor in transit, when changed from car to car to facilitate transportation. All such liquor intended for unlawful sale in this state may be seized in transit, and proceeded against as if it were unlawfully kept and deposited in any place. And any steamboat, sailing vessel, railroad, express company, or other corporation, knowingly transporting or bringing such liquor into the state, shall be punished upon conviction by a fine of five hundred dollars and costs for each offense. Knowledge on the part of any authorized agent of such company shall be deemed knowledge of the company.'

There can be no doubt that but for the passage of the Wilson act the provisions of this section would be in conflict with the interstate commerce law, and void. Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465, 8 S.Ct. 689, 1062; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681. This last case induced the passage of the Wilson act. Caldwell, J., in Re Van Vliet, 43 F. 766.

The Wilson act is as follows:

'An act to limit the effect of the regulations of commerce between the several states and with foreign countries in certain cases.

'That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids, transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein shall upon arrival in such state or territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such state or territory and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise.'

What were the interstate commerce regulations which were in existence at the passage of this act, from which intoxicating liquors were by it exempted? This question is answered in the two cases quoted above. The first of these cases had declared that under the interstate commerce regulations the right to import intoxicating liquors into any state existed, and the second case declares that this right of importation involved the right to the importer to sell so long as the liquor remained in the original package; that therefore the police power of the state could not prevent the importation except under restrictions, nor forbid the sale of the importation by the importer so long as it remained in the original package. The Wilson act put the imported package, whether in its original shape or otherwise, under the police power of the state, upon its arrival in such state, precisely as other intoxicating liquor in the state is subject to such police power.

What is the meaning of the term 'upon its arrival?' The respondent insists that by this term is meant its entrance within the borders of the state. Thus it is a prohibition of the importation of intoxicating liquors into this state. That does not seem to be within the scope of the Wilson act. It provides 'for all fermented,...