Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 09 May 1911
• Citation: 116 P. 176,28 Okla. 754,1911 OK 157
• Parties: GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. et al. v. STATE ex rel. CALDWELL.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

116 P. 176

28 Okla. 754, 1911 OK 157

GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. et al. v. STATE ex rel. CALDWELL.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

May 9, 1911

Syllabus by the Court.

It is not within the power of the state courts to enjoin interstate carriers from receiving at points without the state for transportation to and delivery to consignees at points within the state shipments of spirituous, vinous, fermented, and malt liquors and imitations thereof, "to persons who they well know, immediately upon receiving possession thereof, intended to use said liquors in violation of the laws of the state," including certain persons therein alleged to have paid the "special tax required by the United States of liquor dealers," or "to any other person after said defendant handling the shipment has been reliably informed from credible source, either by circumstances or otherwise, that such person is a person who does not intend said shipment of liquor for his personal or family use, but in violation of the law of the state," said shipments being articles of interstate commerce.

Error from Superior Court, Oklahoma County; A. N. Munden, Judge.

Action by the State, on the relation of Fred S. Caldwell, against the Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed and remanded.

Cottingham & Bledsoe, R. A. Kleinschmidt, C. O. Blake, C. L. Jackson Edgar A. De Meules, C. E. Warner, and Edward R. Jones, for plaintiffs in error.

Fred S Caldwell, for defendant in error.

WILLIAMS J.

On the 14th day of September, A. D. 1910, the defendant in error as plaintiff, by Fred S. Caldwell, as counsel to the Governor against the plaintiffs in error as defendants, commenced in the superior court of Oklahoma county an action to restrain them as interstate carriers from receiving at points without the state shipments of spirituous, vinous, fermented, and malt liquors, and imitations thereof, for transportation to and delivery at points in this state, "to persons who they well know, immediately upon receiving possession thereof, intended to use said liquors in violation of the laws of the state," including certain persons therein alleged to have paid the "special tax required by the United States of liquor dealers," or "to any other person after said defendant handling the shipment has been reliably informed from credible source, either by circumstances or otherwise, that such other person is a person who does not intend said shipment of liquor for his personal or family use, but, on the contrary, intends to use and dispose of same in violation of the laws of the state of Oklahoma." That Fred S. Caldwell, as counsel to the Governor, was authorized to bring this suit in the name of the state, has been settled by the Criminal Court of Appeals and such holding has been followed by this court. Counsel for the defendant in error in his brief says: "If such liquor shipments are the subject of legitimate commerce between the states, then certainly they cannot be enjoined. It would be an insult to the intelligence of this honorable court to argue that a legitimate commerce transaction or any lawful and proper act of the interstate carrier to be done and performed in connection therewith could be enjoined by a state court or any other court." From this concession it naturally follows that, if intoxicating liquors are the "subject of legitimate commerce between the states," this cause should be reversed and the temporary injunction dissolved. In Commonwealth v. People's Express Co., 201 Mass. 564, 88 N.E. 420, 131 Am. St. Rep. 416, it is said: "The Wilson act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, insures delivery to the consignee of intoxicating liquor which is transported as interstate commerce free from and regardless of all prohibitive statutes of the several states. As pointed out above, such delivery may be at the residence or place of business of the consignee as well as at some common depot of consignment. The liquor is safe from state laws, until it passes into the actual or constructive possession of the consignee. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 [18 S.Ct. 664, 42 L.Ed. 1088]; Vance v. Vandercook Co. (No. 1) 170 U.S. 438 [18 S.Ct. 674, 42 L.Ed. 1100]; American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133 [25 S.Ct. 182, 49 L.Ed. 417]; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U.S. 17 [25 S.Ct. 552, 49 L.Ed. 925]; Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U.S. 501 [26 S.Ct. 138, 50 L.Ed. 288]; Heyman v. Southern Railway Co., 213 U.S. 207 [27 S.Ct. 104, 51 L.Ed. 178]; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 129 [27 S.Ct. 606, 51 L.Ed. 987]. If the statute was construed as applying to interstate commerce, it would constitute a restriction upon its freedom and therefore would be beyond its power." See, also, to the same effect, State v. Eighteen Casks of Beer et al., 24 Okl. 786, 104 P. 1093, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 492; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. State, 26 Okl. 300, 109 P. 230; In re Lebolt (C. C.) 77 F. 587; Ex parte Jervey (C. C.) 66 F. 957; In re Langford (C. C.) 57 F. 570. In Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218, 29 S.Ct. 633, 53 L.Ed. 972, a state statute (Ky. St. 1908, § 1307) providing for the punishment of any party knowingly furnishing intoxicating liquor to an inebriate as applied to the transportation of liquor by an express company from state to state being under consideration, the court said: "Liquor, however obnoxious and hurtful it may be in the judgment of many, is a recognized article of commerce. License Cases, 5 How. 504, 577, 12 L.Ed. 256, 289; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 110, 10 S.Ct. 681, 34 L.Ed. 128, 132, 3 Interst. Com. R. 36. In Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 444, 18 S.Ct. 674, 676, 42 L.Ed. 1100, 1103, Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'Equally well established is the proposition that the right to send liquors from one state into another, and the act of sending the same, is interstate commerce, the regulation whereof has been committed by the Constitution of the United States to Congress, and hence that a state law which denies such a right or substantially interferes with or hampers the same, is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.' That the transportation is not complete until delivery to the consignee is also settled. In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 426, 18 S.Ct. 664, 669, 42 L.Ed. 1088, 1096, it was held that the Wilson act (Act Aug. 8, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 313, c. 728 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3177]) 'was not intended to and did not cause the power of the state to attach to an interstate commerce shipment whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment, and until its arrival at the point of destination, and delivery there to the consignee.' This legislation is in the exercise of the police power--a power which, generally speaking, belongs to the state--and is an attempt, in virtue of that power, to directly regulate commerce; but, in case of conflict between the powers claimed by the state and those which belong exclusively to Congress, the former must yield, for the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof are 'the supreme law of the land.' Section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3564) provides: 'Every railroad company in the United States *** is hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road *** all passengers *** freight, and property on their way from any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor.' New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. Mfg. Co., 115 U.S. 650, 6 S.Ct. 252, 29 L.Ed. 516; Wabash, S. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S.Ct. 4, 30 L.Ed. 244, 1 Interst. Com. R. 31. In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 334, 28 S.Ct. 121, 123, 52 L.Ed. 230, 234, it was declared 'that any exercise of state authority, in whatever form manifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution.' In Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 129, 135, 27 S.Ct. 606, 607, 51 L.Ed. 987, 991, it was said: 'The testimony showed that the package containing a gallon of whisky was shipped from Cincinnati, Ohio, to George Meece, at East Bernstadt, Ky. The transaction was therefore one of interstate commerce, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. The Kentucky statute is obviously an attempt to regulate such interstate commerce. This hardly questioned by the Court of Appeals, and is beyond dispute under the decisions of this court.' Clearly, within the cases above cited, the statute before us, as applied to transportation from state to state, cannot be sustained." That intoxicating liquors, when consigned to points where their sale is prohibited by state laws, are the subject of interstate commerce, is also settled by the following authorities: State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 102 Me. 385, 67 A. 312, 120 Am. St. Rep. 504; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 18 S.Ct. 664, 42 L.Ed. 1088. In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 172 F. 117, 96 C. C. A. 322, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a state statute prohibiting carriers from

carrying intoxicating liquors into any county or district wherein the sale of such liquors is prohibited by state law as applied to shipments from other states, is void as an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, and affords no justification for the refusal of a railroad company, although a corporation of such state, to receive and carry such shipments. In United States ex rel. Friedman et al. v. United States Express Co. (D. C.) 180 F. 1006, it was also held that, where an express company doing interstate business refused shipments of intoxicating liquors offered by...