In re Lasure, 26528.

• Decision Date: 11 August 2008
• Docket Number: No. 26528.,26528.
• Citation: 379 S.C. 144,666 S.E.2d 228
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Alfred William LASURE, Appellant.

666 S.E.2d 228

379 S.C. 144

In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Alfred William LASURE, Appellant.

No. 26528.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard June 26, 2008.

Decided August 11, 2008.

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. Durant and Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, both of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster; Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh; Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe and Assistant Attorney General Brandy A. Duncan, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

Justice WALLER:

This is a direct appeal from the jury's verdict which found appellant, Alfred William Lasure, to be a sexually violent predator, and from the subsequent court order of commitment to the Department of Mental Health for appellant's long term control, care, and treatment. We affirm.

FACTS

In March 2000, appellant pled guilty to one count of lewd act upon a child which had been committed in January 1997 when appellant molested a seven-year-old boy while traveling through South Carolina on a Greyhound bus. Appellant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. The sentencing sheet specifically noted that appellant was to participate in any sexual offender treatment offered by the Department of Corrections (DOC).

Prior to his anticipated release from prison, the State filed a petition pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act. See S.C.Code § 44-48-10 et seq. (Supp. 2007). At his jury trial, appellant moved to dismiss based on the argument that the SVP Act is unconstitutional because the State Constitution mandates rehabilitation of inmates. Appellant contended that the State should not have waited until the end of his criminal sentence to provide treatment. The trial court denied appellant's motion.

The State's sole witness was Dr. Pamela Crawford, an expert in forensic psychiatry. Her testimony demonstrated appellant has a long criminal history of sexually abusing pre-pubescent and adolescent boys. Appellant was convicted of various offenses in Florida in 1967, 1972, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1981 and 1982.¹ While on bond for the January 1997 South Carolina offense, appellant fled to Florida and again re-offended which resulted in another Florida conviction in 1997. Because he failed to get sex offender treatment in Florida, he was taken back to jail. In 1999, the fugitive warrant from South Carolina was discovered which ultimately led to his South Carolina conviction in 2000.

Dr. Crawford diagnosed appellant with pedophilia as well as paraphilia NOS. In her opinion, appellant met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator.

Additionally, Dr. Crawford noted that although appellant completed Phase I of the Sex Offender Treatment Program offered by the DOC — which she described as the educational phase of treatment — appellant refused to participate in the Residential Treatment Unit which provides intensive treatment. Dr. Crawford explained that appellant has never taken responsibility for any of the sexual offenses he has committed.

Beyond cross-examining Dr. Crawford, appellant presented no defense. The jury deliberated less than 15 minutes and found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is a sexually violent predator.

ISSUE

Does the SVP Act violate Article XII, Section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution?

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues the SVP Act violates Article XII, Section 2 of the State Constitution. Specifically, appellant complains he should have been placed into this particular SVP program from the beginning of his criminal sentence. We disagree.

Article XII, Section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution states that the General Assembly "shall establish institutions for the confinement of all persons convicted of such crimes as may be designated by law, and shall provide for the custody, maintenance, health, welfare, education, and rehabilitation of the inmates." S.C. Const. art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added). A statute is presumed constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 134-35, 568 S.E.2d 338, 344 (2002).

In Sullivan v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 444, 586 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2003), this Court held that even if Article XII, Section 2 is read to require some rehabilitation for inmates, "it does not mandate any specific programs that must be provided by the General Assembly or the [DOC] and, more importantly, it does not...