In re Licenses for Sale of Used Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 01 November 1920
• Docket Number: No. 33516.,33516.
• Citation: 179 N.W. 609
• Parties: IN RE LICENSES FOR SALE OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

179 N.W. 609

IN RE LICENSES FOR SALE OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES.

No. 33516.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 1, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Lester L. Thompson, Judge.

Proceedings to compel Secretary of State to issue a general license to dealer in used automobiles. Issuance of license ordered, and respondent appeals. Reversed.H. M. Havner, Atty. Gen. and J. W. Sandusky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Jesse A. Miller, of Des Moines, for appellee.

SALINGER, J.

I. The secretary of state declines to issue a general distinctive number to cover and operate as a license for all motor vehicles owned or controlled by appellee in the business of, for one thing, selling used motor vehicles. The trial court holds that section 23 of chapter 275, Acts 38th G. A., gives applicant the right to such number, and it ordered the secretary of state to issue same. This appeal raises whether the court below correctly interpreted said statute.

It is agreed that no objection has been, or can legitimately be, made to the character, standing, or reliability of the applicants, and that the secretary would have granted the application if he had believed he had the right to do so under said act of the Thirty-Eighth General Assembly, and the only reason for declining the application is that the secretary of state contends the statute does not give applicant the privilege which it claims.

[1] II. Appellee urges that the construction insisted on by the state would work such oppression as that we should not hold the Legislature intended such construction. Its argument is, in effect, that such construction would greatly burden and hamper the business of dealing in used motor vehicles, and impair greatly the value of established business in buying and selling such vehicles. But the state could insist just as forcibly that the construction of appellee would cause the state to lose a large income. We have to say that, since it is not claimed the statute offends the Constitution, oppressiveness or relative oppressiveness is merely an argument to be considered on what the Legislature did intend. Standing alone, it will not overthrow an intent which is clear. For there is power to enact harsh laws.

III. At the outset, appellee contends that the wording of section 23 leaves no room for any construction other than the one adopted by the trial court. That section is:

“Every person, firm, association or corporation manufacturing or dealing in motor vehicles, may instead of registering each motor vehicle, make an application for a general distinctive number for all the motor vehicles owned or controlled by such manufacturer or dealer.”

[2][3] Grant for the sake of argument that, if this section were the whole of the statute, any dealer in motor vehicles is entitled to a single number covering all motor vehicles owned by him; but the question remains whether we can give this provision this meaning upon a consideration of the whole statute of which section 23 is but a part. True it is that the courts may not read into a statute words which change its clear meaning, nor give to it a construction the exact opposite of that which the language imports. They may not rewrite a statute, no matter how obvious it may be that it uses “Yea” when in reason it should have said “Nay.” State v. Claiborne, 185 Iowa, 170, 170 N. W. 417, 3 A. L. R. 392. But the literal meaning of words should be disregarded if clearly opposed to the legislative intent. McKinnon v. Sanders, 161 Iowa, 555, 143 N. W. 407; 2 Sutherland Stat. Constr. § 376. And when all is said there remains the duty to declare what the true construction is, and in performing that duty the courts seek the legislative intent by considering the effect of differing interpretations, by considering all the provisions of the enactment, and by applying generally the “rule of reason”; and on so proceeding it has often been held that, though a single provision speaks without qualification, it was not intended that the unqualified words should be read literally.

[4] (a) With one exception which will have attention later, appellee insists that the words of section 23 must be read literally, no matter what other sections say. That means applicant is entitled to a single number because section 23 gives that right as to “all” vehicles, and, there being no words of qualification, “all vehicles” of necessity includes used vehicles. It will not be denied that the same argument could be as well made had the provision read, “The collective number shall cover any motor vehicle,” instead of “all motor vehicles”; and, though “any” was not qualified, it has been held that reason qualified it.

In Company v. Woodroffe, 7 Barn. & C. 838, the court considered a corporate charter providing that, if “any person” chosen to be warden shall refuse to accept the office, he shall suffer a forfeiture, and it was considered that the statute applied to such persons only as are by the terms of the charter eligible to such office. The words of the federal Constitution how “any person or persons” shall be punished for misprision of treason or felony were conceded to be, standing alone, broad enough to comprehend every human being. Yet it was ruled that they must be limited to those who owed allegiance to the United States. United States v. Palmer, 16 U. S. (3 Wheat.) 631, 4 L. Ed. 471. A statute requiring county officers to permit examination of documents by “any person” is to be limited to persons who have an interest of some sort, great or small, to be subserved by such examination. Boylan v. Warren, 39 Kan. 301, 18 Pac. 176, 7 Am. St. Rep. 551. The right of “any” person to contest the validity of a will is to be limited to one having an interest in the subject-matter of the contest. Campbell v. Fichter, 168 Ind. 645, 81 N. E. 662, 11 Ann. Cas. 1089;Crawfordsville v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 98 N. E. 180. The words in a statute providing for the taking of affidavits of “any person” for the purposes of a motion, when required by his adversary, are applicable only to those persons who may by existing laws be subjected to this species of examination; wherefore it was held that a party to an action cannot be compelled by the adverse party to make the affidavit for the purposes of a motion. Hodgkin v. Railway, 5 Abb. Prac. N. S. (N. Y.) 74. In Dowell v. Vicksburg Ry., 61 Miss. 529, it is ruled that the words “any person” in a statute declaring that a railroad shall be liable for any damages or injury which may be sustained by any person from a locomotive or cars do not embrace employés of the road. To like effect is Carle v. Canal Co., 43 Me. 271,Connor v. Railway, 59 Mo. 292, and Powers v. Railway, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 488. And a statute giving a lien to “every laborer or operator in any coal mine” upon all the property of the person, firm, or corporation owning or operating such mine and used in the construction or operation thereof does not give such lien upon the property of the owner in favor of miners employed by an operating lessee of the mine. Caster v. McClellan, 132 Iowa, 502, 109 N. W. 1020.

It follows that, even if section 23 stood alone, its “all” might on demand of reason be qualified. It follows in turn that, since this one section is but part of the act, other provisions of the act may emphasize that, in reason, section 23 should not be read literally.

[5] (b) To reach the conclusion of the trial court one must give literal effect to the words found in section 23 and give no effect to equally plenary words found in earlier provisions of the same enactment.

Why should the broad language found in section 23 be deemed more potent than words of like effect were held to be in the cases to which we have referred, or more potent than like words found in other sections of chapter 275. In section 4 individual registration is required of “every owner of a motor vehicle.” Why is not this broad requirement as effective as is “all vehicles” in section 23, used in designating what shall have the immunities or privileges of that section. If “every” in section 4 is ineffective, what makes sacrosanct and paramount the mere omission to qualify in terms the “all,” etc., of section 23. Why is omission in section 23 to mention “used and secondhand vehicles” in terms more potent than the command of section 3 that registration shall be made of “every motor vehicle kept in this state.”

IV. So much for the fact that the “all,” etc., found in section 23 is under the authorities and because of the use of like words in other sections not necessarily beyond being qualified. There remains, for one thing, the inquiry whether reading section 23 literally would not work a construction that the Legislature intended by section 23 to destroy all that it sought to accomplish by the act as a whole.

The object expressed in the title of chapter 275 is “to license and regulate.” As we shall presently see, the act as a whole brings pressure to bear in all ways to induce individual registration. Provision after provision makes plain that the regulation which is declared to be the purpose of the enactment has for its object by means of individual registry and certification to furnish such means of identification as will be helpful in tracing stolen cars; and the only theft serious enough for legislative notice and consideration is the stealing of used vehicles. No doubt with such theft in mind it was enacted that the owner must register and so give such detailed information as to number, marks, and make as will aid identification and tracing. He must re-register annually. If the car be dismantled or its use be abandoned, the county treasurer...