In re M.H.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2021
• Docket Number: C-190718,C-190717,C-190693,NOS. C-190692,S. C-190692
• Citation: 169 N.E.3d 971
• Parties: IN RE: M.H., a minor child.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

169 N.E.3d 971

IN RE: M.H., a minor child.

NOS. C-190692

C-190693

C-190717

C-190718

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 31, 2021

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Springman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee State of Ohio.

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant M.H.

OPINION.

Crouse, Judge.

{¶1} In these consolidated appeals, appellant M.H. challenges her adjudications of delinquency by the Hamilton County Juvenile Court. The appeal numbered C-190692 involves an adjudication of delinquency for conduct that, if it had been engaged in by an adult, would have constituted the offense of obstruction of official business. The appeal numbered C-190693 involves an adjudication of delinquency for conduct that, if it had been engaged in by an adult, would have constituted the offense of resisting arrest. And the appeals numbered C-190717 and C-190718 involve adjudications of delinquency for conduct that, if it had been engaged in by an adult, would have constituted two offenses of assault on a peace officer. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgments of the juvenile court.

I. Facts and Procedure

{¶2} On December 11, 2018, Mount Healthy Police Officers Jordan Rubariu and Colin Higgins received a dispatch for "physical trouble with a customer who was refusing to leave [the Family Dollar]." The dispatch provided that "unruly juveniles" were in the store and that one of the juveniles had thrown candy at the store clerk. According to the dispatch, the juvenile was "a female black wearing a white coat and a red hat."

{¶3} Minutes after the dispatch, Rubariu and Higgins saw M.H. walking with two other individuals approximately 100 yards away from the Family Dollar. M.H. matched the description of the alleged assailant. The officers activated their body-worn cameras and the overhead lights of their patrol vehicle.

{¶4} Higgins testified that Rubariu exited from the patrol vehicle and twice ordered M.H. to "come here." Footage from Higgins's body cam shows M.H. standing on the sidewalk, facing Rubariu. M.H. asked Rubariu, "What's the problem?" and Rubariu immediately grabbed her wrist. M.H. then pulled her arm away from Rubariu and twisted her body in an attempt to break free. In response, Rubariu performed a takedown maneuver on M.H. While on the ground, M.H. nestled her hands underneath her body and started kicking her legs to avoid the impending arrest. Rubariu laid his body on top of M.H. to immobilize her and handcuff her. Higgins grabbed M.H.’s ankles to prevent her from kicking Rubariu.

{¶5} Officer Timothy Baird initially responded to the Family Dollar to investigate the alleged assault. While Baird was making the initial police report, Rubariu put out an assistance call. Baird immediately left the Family Dollar and responded to the scene to assist Rubariu. When Baird arrived, Rubariu was lying on top of M.H. and Higgins was holding her ankles. After Rubariu successfully handcuffed M.H., the three officers carried her to the patrol vehicle—Rubariu holding her hands, Baird holding her arm and shoulder, and Higgins holding her ankles. M.H. resisted, kicking her legs backwards and hitting Higgins in the groin. Higgins was not injured.

{¶6} M.H. continued to resist as the officers forced her into the backseat of the patrol vehicle. The officers attempted to restrain M.H. through the use of a hobble. As another responding officer, Alan Fath, was placing the hobble on M.H.’s legs, she kicked Baird in the arm. Baird's arm collided with his body-worn camera and displaced the camera, but Baird was not injured. Eventually, M.H. was secured in the back of the patrol vehicle and transported to the police department.

{¶7} On December 11, 2018, the state filed several complaints to have M.H. adjudicated delinquent for three counts of assault on a peace officer, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing official business. M.H. filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of what she alleged was an unconstitutional use of excessive force. On July 30, 2019, the magistrate conducted a suppression hearing. Based on the testimony of Officers Higgins and Baird, the magistrate denied M.H.’s motion. Immediately thereafter, the magistrate proceeded to trial on all counts. The magistrate heard testimony from Officers Higgins, Baird, and Fath. At the close of trial, the magistrate adjudicated M.H. delinquent for obstructing official business, resisting arrest, and two counts of assault on a peace officer.¹ Following objections from M.H., the juvenile court adopted the magistrate's decisions. M.H. appealed, raising the following four assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court erred when it denied M.H.’s motion to suppress.

2. The trial court erred in adjudicating M.H. delinquent when the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the adjudications.

3. The trial court committed numerous errors that violated M.H.’s right to due process and a fair trial.

4. The juvenile court erred in adjudicating M.H. delinquent for obstruction of official business, resisting arrest, and assault on a peace officer where the adjudications were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

II. Motion to Suppress

{¶8} In her first assignment of error, M.H. argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to suppress. The motion to suppress centered on the alleged use of excessive force by the arresting officer, Rubariu.

{¶9} A motion to suppress is a "[d]evice used to eliminate from the trial of a criminal case evidence which has been secured illegally[.]" Hilliard v. Elfrink , 77 Ohio St.3d 155, 158, 672 N.E.2d 166 (1996). A motion to suppress can raise only matters that are capable of determination without a trial of the general issue. Crim.R. 12(C).

{¶10} In this case, M.H. asked the juvenile court to suppress all evidence that was obtained in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. But M.H. did not specify what evidence she sought to suppress. And a review of the record shows that no evidence was obtained as a result of her arrest. M.H. simply sought to defend the charges against her and justify her conduct. Thus, M.H. essentially argued for a determination of the general issue—i.e., that she established the affirmative defense of an officer's use of excessive force.²

{¶11} The sufficiency of an affirmative defense cannot properly be established through a pretrial motion. See State v. Carnes , 2016-Ohio-8019, 75 N.E.3d 774, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.), aff'd , 154 Ohio St.3d 527, 2018-Ohio-3256, 116 N.E.3d 138 (holding that the sufficiency of the state's evidence is a "general issue" to be determined at trial); State v. Graham , 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0028-M, 2016-Ohio-8503, 2016 WL 7626180, ¶ 13 (holding that an essential element of the offense cannot be contested through a pretrial motion). Instead, "the issue must be presented in a motion for acquittal at the close of the state's case." State v. Hoskins , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090710, 2010-Ohio-2454, 2010 WL 2224942, ¶ 11.

{¶12} We accordingly conclude that the juvenile court did not err in denying M.H.’s motion to suppress. M.H.’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

{¶13} In her second and fourth assignments of error, M.H. challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting her adjudications for obstruction of official business, resisting arrest, and assault on a peace officer.

{¶14} A sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument challenges the adequacy of the evidence on each element of the offense. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).

{¶15} A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument challenges the believability of the evidence. In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we sit as a "thirteenth juror." State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We must review the entire record, weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.

A. Obstruction of Official Business

{¶16} M.H. was adjudicated delinquent for obstruction of official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), which states: "No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties."

{¶17} To support an adjudication for obstructing official business, the state must prove that M.H. "(1) performed an act; (2) without privilege; (3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public official of any authorized act within the public official's official capacity; and (4) that hampered or impeded the performance of the public official's duties." In re Payne , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio-4849, 2005 WL 2248870, ¶ 11. M.H. challenges all of the elements, arguing that she did not engage in any affirmative act intended to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officers and that did in fact hamper or impede them in the performance of their duties.

{¶18} "The proper focus in a prosecution for obstructing official business is on the defendant's conduct, verbal or physical, and its effect on the public official's ability to perform the official's lawful duties." State v. Wellman , 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 12 (1st Dist). "Where the...